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Abstract 
Within the last few years, disabled people have become the target of 
government austerity measures through drastic cuts to welfare justified 
through the portrayal of benefit claimants as inactive, problem citizens who 
are wilfully unemployed. For all that is wrong with these cuts, they are one 
of many aspects of exclusion that disabled people face. Attitudes towards 
disability are deteriorating (Scope, 2011) and disabled people are devalued 
and negatively positioned in a myriad of ways, meaning that an understanding 
of the perceptions and positioning of disability and the power of disabling 
practices is critical. This thesis will examine how Bourdieu’s theoretical 
repertoire may be applied to the area of Disability Studies in order to discern 
how society produces oppressive and exclusionary systems of classification 
which structures the social position and perceptions of disability.  The 
composite nature of disability and multiple forms of exclusion and inequality 
associated with it benefits from a multipronged approach which 
acknowledges personal, embodied and psychological aspects of disability 
alongside socio-political and cultural conceptualisations. Bourdieu’s approach 
is one in which the micro and macro aspects of social life are brought 
together through their meso interplay and provides a thorough analysis of the 
many aspects of disability. 
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Introduction 
This thesis will examine how Bourdieu’s theoretical repertoire may be applied 
to the area of Disability Studies in order to discern how society produces 
oppressive and exclusionary systems of classification which structure the 
social position and perceptions of disability. This thesis takes British neo-
liberal society as the context for this work as a result of the ongoing assault 
against disability benefits as part of wider reform of the welfare state which 
was the focus of my Masters research. During this degree I came across 
Disability Studies as a result of my employment as a student support worker 
and the emails that were sent out from the disability service centre warning 
of the looming cuts to welfare. This quickly became the focus of my research 
project in which I explored how welfare reform was impacting upon disabled 
peoples’ sense of self, identity and citizenship. The research examined the 
problematic status of the non-working identity and how this status was 
resisted through narrative constructions which drew upon employment 
experiences as a positive identity-forming principle. However, although 
participants had been partly able to construct positive citizen identities, 
considerations of the cuts to welfare, media representation of disability 
benefit claimants and political rhetoric were seen to destabilise these. 
Many of my participants reported feeling that their legitimacy as a disabled 
person was questioned and that they were often met with speculation about 
the authenticity of their impairment. As a result, many participants 
expressed their concern about the precariousness of welfare entitlement and 
the perceptions of their access to such benefits as well as questioning others’ 
and their own deservingness. Although the welfare rhetoric was undoubtedly 
causing distress to all participants, everyone reported on negative 
experiences they encountered as the result of widespread poor understanding 
and negative attitudes towards disability. In my interviews, I found that 
participants were engaged in a lot of work against negative value associated 
with disability as non-workers, as dependent, as benefit claimants and 
against the problems of invisible illness/disability and blue badge fraud. 
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My own interest in Bourdieu seems to fall in line with many others that use 
him (Abrahams and Ingram, 2013; Morrin, 2015), namely that his work helped 
to explain a lot of my own past experiences, specifically, my uneasy move 
from a “bad” high school in a poor area to a “posh” Catholic grammar school 
in an affluent area of Aberdeen. However, I always felt that his logic of 
practice assumed too much fit and was deeply reflective of the ease of 
practices of people with the right kind of capitals. Although I understood his 
work to explain social reproduction, I always wondered why he didn’t pay 
more attention to the embodied experiences of mismatch and unease for 
those of us with the wrong sorts of capitals and the consequences that these 
capitals have for our habitus. What about different bodies and bodies that 
don’t fit and what do those experiences of misfit do to our psyche? At the 
time of my Masters research I had wanted to use Bourdieu to unpack my data 
because of his focus on the body as a bearer of value and embodied power. 
However I felt there were too many aspects of his theory that I was not 
familiar enough with and which needed careful revision and development 
before being applied to disability and this was outside the scope of my 
dissertation. Much of what I had read of Bourdieu portrayed the body in 
highly mechanistic and reproductive ways, overstating the correspondence 
between bodies and social position and assuming too much bodily order. This 
thesis has allowed me to work through many of my quibbles with Bourdieu. 
Many of Bourdieu’s defenders argue that his work remains widely 
misunderstood, (Wacquant in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Steinmetz, 2011; 
Swartz, 2013). There is a tendency for his work to be read in bits and pieces, 
but that is because his work is so vast that it is hard to find an account in 
which he brings all of it together. It might be argued that this is owed to “his 
recursive and spiralling mode of thinking [which] unfolds over time and across 
analytic spaces” (Wacquant in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 6). As well as 
this, Wacquant (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) has argued that there has 
been a tendency for people to artificially synchronise sections of Bourdieu’s 
work that represent very different stages of theoretical elaboration, and so 
people find contradictions which neglects that Bourdieu’s work was very 
much a work in progress. As a result, his admirers argue that he remains 
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partially absorbed and people misunderstand the “overall economy and 
internal logic” of his work (Wacquant in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 4). 
Indeed, the Anglophone world appears to have treated Bourdieu largely as a 
theorist of class, culture and education (Swartz, 2013) which may be one of 
the reasons that his potential application to disability studies is less than 
apparent. I confess to being a Bourdieu admirer and would argue that the 
strength of Bourdieu’s work surely lies in his theorising of symbolic power and 
its embodied logic (Swartz, 2013; Wacquant, 1993). Diane Reay (2004) has 
noted the tendency for people to overuse Bourdieu without thoroughly 
understanding his work and that it is fashionable to lay his concepts on top of 
research without properly dissecting their applicability. She therefore argues, 
citing Hey (2003), that his concept of the habitus has come to be used as an 
“intellectual hairspray” in order to bestow “gravitas without doing any 
theoretical work” (Reay, 2004: 432). Similarly, James (2015: 109) has 
suggested that Bourdieu is often superficially employed, especially within 
education research, and that there is “no such thing as a convincing ‘light’ 
adoption of Bourdieusian tools”. This thesis is therefore a prolegomenous 
attempt to properly theorise and analyse the utility of some of Bourdieu’s 
main ideas and their application to the field of disability. 
This thesis will contend with some of the major criticisms of Bourdieu as too 
reproductive and determinist and suggest that these are narrow 
interpretations of his work. Bourdieu (1984: xii) himself advocated that his 
readers should work to mend his errors and that given the specificity of his 
research context we should look for the equivalents that occur in different 
social spaces. My approach when using his tools may therefore appear to be 
more flexible than Bourdieu was credited with and I attempt to elaborate 
some of his concepts where they appear under-developed. This thesis will 
also consider some of the perceived weaknesses within disability studies 
through bringing disability into discussion with Bourdieu’s work. I suggest that 
where the social model may be too materialist and critical disability studies 
(CDS) may be too discursive, or that the models of disability variously lack 
embodied, political, psycho-social and cultural perspectives, Bourdieu’s 
conceptual framework allows an analysis which incorporates these elements 
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as entwined with one another and helps to explain the multifaceted exclusion 
that disabled people face. 
Chapter One will examine the current construction of the disabled figure 
within British neo-liberal society and the continued exclusion of disabled 
people from mainstream conceptualisations of citizenship. Within this 
chapter I will examine the development of liberalism and the welfare state, 
demonstrating that the social contract between disabled people and the state 
has always been profoundly uneasy but which has arguably been intensified in 
a neo-liberal age of austerity. 
Chapter Two will foreground some of the main approaches to disability within 
disability studies, highlighting that the social model has focussed too heavily 
on materialist accounts of oppression at the expense of embodiment, and 
that although Critical disability studies has sought to address the deficiencies 
of the social model through a critique of the ideological construction of 
disability and subjectivities, their work on unsettling and performatively 
ruffling ideas about disability neglects the nature of embodied symbolic 
power. The chapter will then proceed to an account of Bourdieu’s main 
theoretical tools, namely, the habitus and its corollary bodily hexis to open 
up a discussion of embodied dispositions as a means of 
inclusionary/exclusionary practices. Here I will cover some of Bourdieu’s 
main criticisms as overly deterministic and reproductive before 
demonstrating how some of his thinking on the body is under-theorised or 
overstated. I will also show that some of Bourdieu’s thinking on practice 
draws from a perspective of the body as unaffected by illness and impairment 
and therefore exaggerates the ease and fit between bodies and social space. 
Chapter Three will develop Bourdieu’s thinking on inclusion and exclusion by 
examining his work on symbolic power through an analysis of the symbolic 
system, doxa and symbolic capital. Here I will show how doxa maintains a 
social order reflective of non-disabled practices and which serves to imbue 
disability with negative symbolic capital. Significantly, I will demonstrate 
that Bourdieu’s under-theorised concept of negative symbolic capital 
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demonstrates the power invested in bodies and the psycho-social experience 
of embodying negative symbolic capital. 
Building upon these psycho-social and affective issues, Chapter Four will 
focus on a reworking of the habitus to incorporate some of the more psycho-
social and affective dimensions of practice. This chapter will argue that when 
we incorporate an understanding of the habitus with feelings (Reay, 2015), 
practice becomes less mechanistic. Here I will also suggest how agents’ 
habitus’ can become disempowered and depoliticised and the impact of 
social suffering on dispositions. The chapter will conclude by looking at some 
of the ways that disgust has been used to account for the negative positioning 
of disabled people before cautioning that we may attribute too much to 
disgust and that this risks overlooking many more processes involved in the 
conferral of negative status. 
The final chapter will look at one of Bourdieu’s less known concepts, 
hysteresis in an attempt to remediate some of the accusations of 
determinism and reproductionism, demonstrating that the mismatches 
between habitus and social space provide opportunities for agents to engage 
in more critical and reflexive thought. Building upon my earlier analyses of 
doxa, I will suggest that those who regularly “come up against” doxic 
structures, organisation and attitudes or who have to reconcile the multiple 
meanings of disability may be afforded dispositions which question and 
critique the self-evidence of order and resist the status quo. However, these 
dispositions for critical thought may entail negative psychic costs. 
The conclusion will then highlight the key argument of this thesis, that is, 
that to properly understand the societal position of disability in neo-liberal 
Britain we need the work of Bourdieu whilst a focus on disability also allows 
us to develop Bourdieu’s work, filling in some of the gaps in his approach and 
pushing his work forward when it seems under-developed. 
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Chapter 1 
Disability in ‘Neo-liberal’ Britain. A ‘Classification Struggle’? 
1.1 Introduction 
What does it mean to be disabled in contemporary neo-liberal Britain? 
According to Roulstone (2011:3), we are witnessing a “concerted onslaught” 
against sick and disabled people through the aggressive attacks being made 
to welfare provision. At the time of writing, disability benefits in the UK are 
undergoing drastic restructuring as part of large-scale welfare reform and the 
disability category is being significantly narrowed and redrawn (Roulstone, 
2015; Grover and Soldatic, 2013). The reclassification of disabled people 
under these reforms ostensibly seeks to discern the authentic disabled from 
the fraudulent, dividing individuals into the Poor Law binary of ‘deserving’ 
and ‘undeserving’, representing the latest remoralisation of the poor (Morris, 
1994: 33) and tightening “disability citizenship regimes with diminishing 
citizenship entitlements” (Grover and Soldatic, 2013: 217). 
The UN has recently announced it is to visit the UK to investigate whether the 
welfare reforms implemented by Iain Duncan Smith have caused “‘grave or 
systematic violations’ of disabled people’s human rights” (Fenton, 2015). This 
followed on from news published a few days prior which disclosed that 
between December 2011 and February 2014, 2,380 disabled people had died 
when they were deemed fit for work and their claim for Employment Support 
Allowance (ESA) was stopped following a Work Capability Assessment (WCA) 
used by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) (Butler, 2015a; Stone, 
2015a). Elsewhere, it has been reported that 590 disabled people have 
committed suicide whilst awaiting the outcome of their WCA and that 
279,000 cases of mental ill health and 725,000 prescriptions for anti-
depressants between 2010 and 2013 have been associated with the toughened 
WCA (Cooper, 2015; Ryan, 2015; Armstrong 2015). To add insult to injury, 
only a week before this news, the DWP had been forced to admit that they 
had created fictitious benefit claimants’ stories for leaflets which were to be 
distributed in order to show how benefit sanctions could have positive 
impacts (Rawlinson and Perraudin, 2015). 
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As if this was not enough, a few days later Iain Duncan Smith announced the 
case for further reform of the ESA through the use of Universal Credit (UC), a 
vision in which he foresees the ‘Fit for Work service’ “as the first line of 
defence when someone falls sick” (Smith, 2015).  This coincided with the 
recent news that a group of law students at Bristol and Avon Law Centre have 
managed to overturn 95% of DWP decisions regarding claimants’ fitness for 
work and have won £1m in compensation (Stone, 2015b). 
According to research carried out by Scope (2011), attitudes towards disabled 
people are deteriorating with 56% of disabled people revealing that they had 
experienced hostility, aggression or violence from a stranger based on their 
condition and over half reporting that they experienced discrimination on 
either a daily or weekly basis. Emerson and Roulstone (2014: 3095) have 
shown that disabled people are 2.3 times more likely to have been the victim 
of a violent crime and 2.6 times more likely to have been the victim of hate 
crime than their non-disabled peers. For Quarmby (2012; 2015), the 
pernicious stereotypes of disabled people as benefits scroungers which 
pervade the British media may account for the rise in disability hate crime. 
As Briant, Watson and Philo (2013) found in their analysis of newspaper 
articles reporting on disability, there has been a significant change in the way 
that disability is talked about. They note that there has been a decline in 
sympathetic coverage and an increase in use of pejorative words to describe 
disabled people and that the increased framing of disabled people in negative 
terms such as fraud, scrounger and undeserving points to the emergence of 
disabled people as a new ‘folk devil’ (Briant, Watson and Philo 2013: 887).  In 
addition to all of this, welfare minister Lord Freud was recorded as saying 
that some disabled people are “not worth the full minimum wage”, 
suggesting that they could be paid as little as £2 an hour when questioned 
about how some employers might discriminate against employing a disabled 
person (Watt and Wintour, 2014). It is no wonder then that Hughes (2015: 
992) states that disabled people “have been tipped into the abyss of 
counterfeit citizenship”. 
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This chapter will develop an understanding of how disability is dysfunctionally 
entwined in the social contract between citizen and state through an analysis 
of some of the recent reforms to disability benefits which have been taking 
place within the wider context of neo-liberalism. Through an analysis of the 
historical emergence of neo-liberalism this chapter will trace the associated 
policy, rhetoric and consequences for disabled people in order to develop a 
more complete picture of the meaning of disability within the broader, 
liberal UK setting. For Jensen and Tyler (2015), one of the major 
characteristics of welfare reform since the 1970s has been consensus that the 
welfare state has been in a permanent state of crisis in which toxic forms of 
welfare dependency has infected its citizens. By extension then, it has been 
argued that any major reform made to the modern welfare state has an 
automatic impact on conceptualisations of citizenship (Larkin, 2011). As Ong 
(2006: 499-500) has put forward, the “rights and entitlements once 
associated with all citizens are becoming linked to neoliberal criteria”. 
This chapter will therefore examine the place of disability within modern 
British society through chronicling a development of liberalism and the 
emergence of neo-liberalism, the role of the citizen, and the importance of 
the ‘free possessive individual’ in these projects (Hall, 2011). In charting the 
development of liberalism in this way, this chapter will avoid treating neo-
liberalism as a monolithic and over-generalised structure and instead, it is 
hoped, show how the current figure of disability has arrived through the 
many complex re-articulations of who the good citizen is within a neo-liberal 
state. This is achieved by focussing on the evolving ideas around citizenship, 
specifically, how disabled people have been precluded from full citizenship as 
a result of their “non-contributory” status. As such, I focus heavily on work-
related disability policy and benefits due to the emphasis on employment as 
good citizen practice and the divisive issue of claiming state support whilst 
being perceived as non-contributory. This is not to dismiss the changes being 
made to other areas of disability policy as part of a broader neo-liberal 
agenda but to emphasise how ‘worker’ has become synonymous with 
legitimate citizen status. 
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The first section of this chapter will provide an analysis of the changing 
nature of citizenship with the introduction of the welfare state and how this 
has meant to provide for disabled people. Here, we will look at how 
Keynesian systems as well as neo-liberal systems conceive of the citizen as 
the able-bodied worker. 
The chapter will then progress to a consideration of neo-liberalism, offering a 
conceptualisation of what is actually meant when we use the term neo-
liberalism as well as its consequences at the level of the individual. The 
chapter will then discuss some of the more recent and arguably neo-liberal 
policies of recent governments, including New Labour’s New Deals, reform to 
Incapacity Benefit and Employment Support Allowance and the corresponding 
welfare rhetoric in order to consolidate an idea about the positioning of 
disabled people within contemporary neo-liberal Britain. This chapter will 
draw upon the work of numerous disability scholars as well as those writing 
more broadly around austerity measures and neo-liberal governance and 
policies to demonstrate the uneasy positioning of the disabled citizen. The 
chapter will then conclude by foregrounding how Bourdieu and his theoretical 
framework might be used to understand the inequalities faced by disabled 
people today. 
1.2 Section One 
1.2.1 Liberalism, Citizenship and Disability 
This section of the chapter will demonstrate the problematic conciliation of 
disability and modern citizenship, highlighting the historical exclusion of 
disabled people from full citizen status and how the neo-liberal configuration 
of the citizen has intensified this incompatibility. Whilst it is acknowledged 
that forms of welfare provision and citizenship existed before the welfare 
state (and that these did not serve disabled people particularly well either), 
the focus of this chapter will be social citizenship in relation to the welfare 
state in consideration of its current precarity. According to Plant (2003), an 
understanding of citizenship and welfare provides an understanding of the 
terms on which individuals can become an integrated and participative 
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member of a modern society. For Hindess (1993: 19), citizenship is one of the 
central organising features of Western political discourse, and the ideas 
attached to it are so significant because of “the part they play in political 
rhetoric and political calculations of governments, non-governmental 
agencies and political and social movements”. The first part of this section 
will deal with a historical reflection on classical liberalism and the citizen 
before proceeding to an account of the welfare state. The chapter will then 
examine what we mean by neo-liberalism and the consequences of neo-
liberal policies on conceptualisations of citizenship. 
1.2.2 Classical Liberalism and Laissez-Faire 
In seeking to explain what some scholars have called the neo-liberal turn, it 
is helpful to identify that neo-liberalism is the augmentation of a long liberal 
and Western history. With the failure of state socialism and the advancement 
of liberal capitalism on an international scale, it has been argued that 
liberalism, in its various forms, is now the global hegemony and its freedom-
laden values, the only conceivable way forward in terms of social progress 
(Harrison and Boyd, 2003). However, due to the prevalence of liberalism as a 
Western ideology over the last 300 years, it has become a tricky paradigm to 
negotiate in terms of its once defining features making its historical 
development an important consideration in reaching a more nuanced 
conceptualisation of neo-liberalism. 
In response to the sovereign control of the economy, liberalism sought to 
emancipate individuals from the manacles of mercantilism (Steger and Roy, 
2010; Heywood, 2007). Advocating freedom and the natural  rights of citizens 
alongside the principles of individual rationality, liberalism sought to 
establish a social order in which free markets managed by free men ensured a 
more democratic, progressive and prosperous society for all (Steger and Roy, 
2010). In the classical liberal tradition, the citizen as an autonomous, 
independent and rationalised thinker was an integral part of the social 
contract in which the state played a minimal role, allowing for the 
maximisation of wealth through a pursuit of self-interest within the free 
market (Jones, 2012). According to Olssen (1996: 340), the citizen under 
Chapter 1 Page 19 
Disability in ‘Neo-liberal’ Britain. A ‘Classification Struggle’? 
classical liberalism was thought of as liberated from the state and free to 
determine his own means on the basis of a “universal egoism” and the 
premise that what an individual identifies as beneficial for himself is also 
beneficial for society, reflecting the invisible hand theory of a self-regulating 
system. Minimal intervention from the state therefore enabled the laissez-
faire economy and, on the supposition that state protection would foster 
idleness and perpetuate poverty, encouraged social Darwinist notions of 
struggle, competition and meritocracy (Amable, 2011). This Darwinian 
thinking of the time contributed to the feeling that the poor were a 
degenerate breed of humanity and potential burden to society whilst at the 
same time naturalised inequalities and added fuel to the fire of the eugenics 
movement (Morris, 1994). For Barnes (2012), the combination of laissez-faire 
liberalism, industrial change and increased medicalisation alongside social 
Darwinist and eugenicist beliefs contributed to and consolidated historical 
fears and prejudices against disabled people. 
In this case we can identify how the classical liberal belief in a rationale of 
possessive individualism as an embedded part of our human nature provided 
the basis for political, social and economic policy (Crook, 1996; Kuper, 1996). 
This has been said to contribute to an understanding of liberalism, and its 
variants, through an observation of the relationship between individual and 
society but more specifically, man and the public sphere (O’Connor and 
Robinson, 2008). This arguably illustrates how the social order was reflective 
of economic order. Crucially, these assumptions worked upon a highly 
optimistic view of human nature and the belief in the enterprising citizen, 
promoting the notion that unfortunate social circumstance and poverty was 
attributable to the character of indolence rather than structural inequality, 
enabling the Spencerian principle of “survival of the fittest” to gain 
substantial political purchase (Heywood, 2007). These suppositions enabled 
classical liberalism to exclude the Other (women, non-whites and the 
poor) through the misrecognition of barriers in the private sphere as inherent 
deficiencies and legitimised the exercise of imperial rule (O’Connor and 
Robinson, 2008).  These beliefs maintained their political foothold for much 
of the 19th century through the classical liberalist expositions that social 
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malaise as a by-product of poor economic times reflected the meddling and 
disruptive nature of the state (Steger and Roy, 2010). Crook (1996) has 
identified that, somewhat ironically, these Darwinist ideologies facilitated 
their own demise through inciting leftist opposition in the form of social 
reform. This liberal doctrine unravelled in light of the world wars, the 1930s 
depression and the apparent failure of self-regulation within the market 
(Amable, 2011),  fostering a paradigm shift (within Britain) from that of 
individualist liberalism to collectivist (Vincent, 2003). 
Prior to this shift, classical liberalism had nurtured a system in which the 
poor were left forsaken to the harsh and punitive domain of “less eligibility” 
Poor Laws and workhouses, doing little to provide care or support to 
vulnerable groups (Morris, 1994; Thane 2009). Indeed, the somewhat 
ambiguous contingency upon which support was administered relied on 
precarious constructions of deservingness (Stone, 1984). This was often said 
to subject recipients of care to feelings of stigma due to the nature of 
categorisation as one of defining (il)legitimate beggary and the conflation of 
idle vagrancy with disability and impairment (Stone, 1984). In some cases this 
mode of welfare inhibited the acceptance of social care and often 
perpetuated poverty, exclusion and poor health amongst these vulnerable 
groups (Thane, 2009). Social reform was thus envisaged to decriminalise and 
destigmatise “the badge of pauperism” (Fraser, 1984: 12). 
Harvey (2005: 10) provides an account of the post-war consensus, that “the 
only way ahead was to construct the right blend of state, market, and 
democratic institutions to guarantee peace, inclusion, well-being, and 
stability”. To these ends, the role of the state was identifiably to 
concentrate upon full employment, promote growth and to ensure the 
welfare of its citizens through Keynesian principles so as to avoid the 
deplorable conditions of the 1930s depression and to reduce inter-state 
contentions which had contributed to the advent of war (Harvey, 2005). In 
principle, Turner (2010) argues that citizenship, as envisaged by T.H. Marshall 
was meant to mitigate the negative impact of capitalism. Marshall (1950) 
outlined three main components of citizenship. The civil component entailed 
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the rights for individual freedoms (such as the freedom of speech and the 
right to own property) whilst the political component signified the right to 
participate in the exercise of politics (such as voting). Marshall (1950) defined 
the social component of citizenship as “the right to a modicum of economic 
welfare and security, to the right to share in the full social heritage and to 
live the civilised life according to the standards prevailing in society” 
(Marshall, 1950: 10). For Marshall, the social element of citizenship was 
supposed to create a “common floor on which everybody stands”, 
entitlement to which was not reflective of an individual’s market value 
(Lister, 1990: 47).  At the same time however, Marshall also emphasised the 
responsibility to work through his call for the public to put their “hearts into 
one’s job” (1949: 46 cited in Patrick, 2012: 7). 
Writers on citizenship have noted then that the welfare state is the 
institutionalisation of the social rights of citizenship and that citizenship 
theory provides the moral justification for social security based on an idea 
about what it is to be a full member within society (Lister, 1990). Within the 
context of welfare provision these citizenship rights have, historically, been 
purported as collective aid which through Keynesian economics of 
redistribution, sought to protect individuals from unemployment and 
incapacity so as to promote equality and encourage the mobilisation of 
workforces hindered by unequal capitalist society (Isin and Turner, 2007). 
The state then played an active role within industrial policy and developed 
the social wage through systems of welfare in order to provide for its 
citizens. The new post-war liberalism that was emerging at this time 
preserved the classically liberal impetus of the individual and the 
market through collectivist strategies of social protection which created the 
conditions for their continued mutualism (O’Connor and Robinson, 2008). 
The advance of the welfare state was said to have marked a change in 
attitude towards poverty and the social contingencies upon which poverty 
could be attributed and thus protected against by way of New Liberal social 
policy (Briggs, 1961). These social contingencies are perhaps most often 
conceived of through Beveridge’s 5 Giants of Idleness, Ignorance, Squalor, 
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Disease and Want which were to be tackled through a comprehensive system 
of social security which, unlike the Bismarck scheme of insurance payments, 
was largely tax-funded (Bosanquet, 2012). The substantial spending needed 
to implement this social security was met with fiscal criticism but was 
rebutted by William Beveridge himself who stated “it must be realised that 
nothing materially below the scales of benefit and pension suggested can be 
justified on scientific grounds as adequate for human subsistence” (cited in 
Bosanquet, 2012: 667). As such, the classical welfare state or what has been 
called the Golden Age of welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1990) was allegedly 
founded upon post-war humanitarian reflection, principled upon the notion 
of social rights, universality and solidarity to be achieved through 
institutionalised reforms (Cox, 1998; Turner, 2001). According to Cox (1998), 
the welfare state and increased social spending therefore had the potential 
to bring out the best in its citizens and improve social solidarity and a strong 
sense of national identity (Harvey, 2005). Brinkley (1998: 59) documents that 
the Keynesian economics behind this social spending was framed as a means 
of increasing investment and production through fusing “the welfare state to 
the larger vision of sustained economic growth by defining social security 
mechanisms as ways to distribute income and enhance purchasing power” and 
ultimately achieve full employment. 
This mode of political-economic governance is now conceived of as embedded 
liberalism in which the market and business activities were administratively 
controlled by the state through a socio-political framework (Harvey, 
2005). For Cox (1998) then, the welfare state in its former glory was an 
expression of social citizenship which firmly situated social rights alongside 
its civil and political counterparts within the new liberal political vision of 
the state. Replacing historical visions of laissez-faire social support and 
adapting the classic liberal ideal of rationalised and individualised self-
interest, the classical welfare system was intended to endow individuals with 
citizenship through the provision of social rights. Citizenship, as entrenched 
within social policy, was therefore argued to offer individuals an idea of 
equality in treatment and in opportunity as well as a minimum standard of 
civilised living and subsequently provided members of society with autonomy 
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through the enabling and supposedly meritocratic qualities of social rights 
(Rosaldo, 1994; Lister, 1998; Ellison, 2000). For O’Connor and Robinson 
(2008), the advent of welfare marked a shift in access to goods and services 
as no longer determined by class advantage but citizen status. 
According to Ellison (1997: 699), Marshall’s conceptualisation of citizenship 
was one in which the state represented the “guarantor of social rights” under 
a “paternalistic, inclusive social order” and which acted as a socially cohesive 
force which ensured social security. However, whilst the post-war welfare 
state was celebrated and congratulated on its universal terms, Hampton 
(2013: 69) has highlighted that the classical welfare system paid little 
attention to the needs of the “general classes” of disabled people. Similarly, 
Mercer and Barnes (2004) document that the implementation of the welfare 
system, comprised of the NHS, more extensive education, social insurance 
schemes, family and child support as well as housing benefits sought to 
provide full employment to citizens. At first glance these provisions may 
seem to indicate the neutral and basic level of equality which welfare 
universalism was premised to bestow upon citizens. For Marshall, it was 
important that social protection was accompanied by “an emphasis on 
equality and public education, allowing even the working class to discover 
and enjoy the good life” (Cox, 1998: 4) However, whilst the welfare state was 
premised to provide education, health services and social security to all, it 
was most effectively utilised by the middle classes and was therefore 
conducive in perpetuating the already deeply embedded social inequalities 
(Borsay, 2005). Marshall conceded that this was a possibility and argued that 
“status differences can receive the stamp of legitimacy in terms of 
democratic citizenship provided they do not cut too deep” (1950: 75 cited in 
Morris, 1994: 46). For Ellison (2000), Marshallian citizenship therefore 
“obscured the fault-lines of difference in the name of an anodyne 
universalism”. It has therefore been suggested that the popularised 
Marshallian vision of citizenship was decidedly neglectful of the inherent 
political conflict and power struggles within society and as such, failed to 
identify that in authorising the state to promote citizenship as an inclusive 
and equalising force, essentially equipped the governing elite with a political 
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tool which disguised social divisions (Ellison, 1997). Essentially, the political-
economic settlement measures were put in place to provide support to 
citizens so that they might become worker-citizens, but this support was 
designed around a specific and therefore exclusive citizen, i.e. the white, 
able-bodied male (Borsay 2005; Mercer and Barnes, 2004). 
The political-economic welfare settlement had therefore consolidated an 
upshot social settlement in which social life was anticipated through a lens 
which depicted, as the norm, a household overseen and provided for by the 
breadwinning male (Mercer and Barnes, 2004). As such, married women, 
children, the elderly and those with impairments became classified 
as dependant which, in the case of those considered “handicapped”, 
emphasised and reinforced the idea that they required care and tending to; 
these “special needs” were often evoked as a justification for the external 
management over individuals’ lives (Mercer and Barnes, 2004). As many 
benefits were distributed on the basis of previous earning capacity, those 
individuals classified as economically inactive were accorded second class 
statuses and entitled to third-rate benefits (Powell, 2002). Coupled with 
the organisational welfare settlement in which the bureaucratisation and 
professionalization of services fostered the idea of neutral and rational 
systems of support, the vulnerable dependency of disabled people was 
reiterated whilst concurrently enforcing the idea that there were experts (in 
particular, within the NHS, but also within the field of education) who were 
rightly authorised with control over these lives (Mercer and Barnes, 2004). 
1.2.3 Disability in the Gilded ‘Golden Age of Welfare’ 
Mercer and Barnes (2004) highlight the implementation of the Disabled 
Persons Employment Act (1944) as one of the plaintive responses to the 
increased numbers of disabled people returning home from war and the 
relative shortage in labour at the time (Oliver, 1989). Previous attempts had 
been made to re-engage injured soldiers with work during the inter-war years 
through the King’s National Roll Scheme, an “honourable obligation” to 
ensure that 5% of employees in companies with over 10 workers comprised 
disabled servicemen and which would be rewarded with the King’s Seal 
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(Kowalsky, 2007; Gladstone, 1985). However, Members of Parliament (MPs) 
while positive about the idea were reluctant to legislate, believing that no 
incentive was required to hire ex-servicemen or, in keeping with the thoughts 
of Minister of Labour John Hodge, opined that the scheme was indicative of 
an overbearing state (Kowalsky, 2007). Furthermore, Kowalsky (2007: 570) 
has documented how medical and technical advances enabled the prosthetic 
limbs industry to proclaim that injured workmen would soon be able to 
resume normal lives and jobs which concurrently led MPs to assert that “total 
disablement ceased to exist”. As a result, the scheme remained a voluntary 
enterprise with a steadily dwindling patronage until the 1940s, at which time 
the Tomlinson Committee Report sought to rectify this through the 
implementation of the mandatory quota strategy through the 1944 Act 
(Gladstone, 1985)1. 
According to Borsay (2005), the thrust of political debate surrounding the 
welfare state was the emerging synonymy of worker and citizen. Bolderson 
(1980: 170) states that the Disabled Persons Employment Act was designed to 
provide employment to the “substantially handicapped” as a matter of civic 
entitlement and was enforced through use of a voluntary register in 
conjunction with sheltered employment schemes, skills-rehabilitation 
programmes (Employment Rehabilitation Centres, RAC) and the quota which 
obliged businesses with more than 20 employees to apportion at least 3% of 
the workforce from those accredited disabled (Hyde, 1996; Barnes, 1992). 
The Act also sought to apply positive discrimination within work through the 
designation of some occupations as exclusively reserved for the disabled, 
                                         
1 Attempts to integrate disabled people have also been documented through an account of 
Thermega, the “industrial experiment” which, as a sheltered workplace located within 
hospital grounds, purported to provide employment for disabled people regardless of the 
severity of impairment through rehabilitative and curative measures (Danieli and Wheeler, 
2006: 488). Thermega advertised themselves as a method of bolstering self-confidence whilst 
paving the way for disabled people into open employment. However, Danieli and Wheeler 
(2006) have noted that in practice, Thermega selected only the least severely impaired 
workers for training whilst relegating those deemed too inefficient to institutional care 
within the hospital, a consideration that certainly taints the assertion that Thermega was 
establishing a foothold within industry for disabled people. They do however credit 
Thermega on its location within hospital grounds stating that it went some way in removing 
social barriers through the proximity of living and working adjacent to appropriate medical 
care, a situation which they liken to the reasonable adjustments of the Disability 
Discrimination Act. Conversely, it might be argued that this more closely resembles Total 
Institutionalisation (Goffman, 1961). 
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namely elevator and car park attendant positions (Thornton and Lunt, 
1995).  The Act garnered epochal recognition as a humanitarian companion to 
the emerging welfare system, and during its discussion within the House of 
Commons was heralded as “the dawn of a new day”, leading one MP to assert 
that disabled people would “be able, with dignity and without their feelings 
being impaired by the taint of charity, to turn to the law for the full 
satisfaction of their rights” (Gladstone, 1985: 103). 
The application of quota schemes in employment have commonsensically 
been perceived as encouraging means of positive discrimination through 
which under-represented members of society become an appointed part of 
the workforce, ostensibly reflecting that a “fair share” of disabled individuals 
are “economically active” (Thornton and Lunt, 1995). However, this system 
has relied upon precarious definitions of “disabled person” and “economically 
active” (Thornton and Lunt, 1995). It is important to acknowledge that during 
the time of these post-war adjustments and changes, disability was 
definitively situated as a medically sanctioned and individual limitation 
(Oliver, 1989). Moreover, Barnes (1992) has indicated that these employment 
adaptations were principally concerned with assisting individuals who had 
“recently acquired physical impairment” such as those wounded in war and 
therefore disregarded the needs of individuals with congenital impairments, 
the learning disabled or those with mental health issues. 
Bolderson (1980) has documented that in response to the development of 
disability-related policy and the quota scheme, employers challenged the 
government, arguing that there were three categories of disabled people to 
be considered; those injured in war or through industrial accidents; those 
normally capable of work but who had not been injured as a result of it; and 
“others” – that is to say, those with congenital impairments and who had no 
basis in employment. This last group, known as the general class of disabled, 
was reasoned as outside the scope of responsibility of employers based on a 
belief that it would cause the workplace to become ‘overrun’ with disabled 
and inefficient workers, a claim which the government quashed through 
elucidating that those not considered efficient enough would be provided for 
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in sheltered work (Bolderson, 1980; Hampton, 2013). Borsay (2005) has 
highlighted that on these terms, disabled people were expected to gain and 
maintain their employment based on their own merit whilst competing in the 
able-bodied workspace, effectively polarising workers as 
efficient/inefficient. The general class of disabled people lacked the political 
visibility and representation accorded to ex-servicemen and the industrially 
injured and as such, “the provision of services was more a case of continuity 
than change” when compared to those under the Poor Law (Hampton, 2013: 
76). 
Barnes (1992) identified that the categorisation of disabled individuals as 
unfit to compete in open employment was historically decided by 
Disablement Resettlement Officers, a role for which there was no training, 
leading to decisions being made purely on the basis of their own experience 
and opinion of disability and with no consideration for the fluctuating nature 
of impairment. Acknowledging then that industry rejected responsibility for a 
particular group of disabled people alongside its expectation of those in work 
to self-manage clearly reinforces the belief that impairment was a private 
and individual matter. Moreover, this sub-classification of disabled people as 
either efficient or inefficient seems to interpolate a deeper level difference; 
that there are those who became disabled through what might be seen as 
honourable activity (war or labour) and who are therefore worthy of social 
and economic investment as a matter of rejoining normal life; and there are 
those who have always been disabled or inherently deficient and therefore 
relegated as a matter of perceived abnormality. As Kitchin (1998) has noted, 
through attributing disability to the individual through medicalisation or 
through narratives of fate, society is able to justify its ableist actions. 
According to Borsay (2005), the quota persisted undisputed with the Piercy 
Committee (1956) observing that the main objective of the quota had been a 
sort of campaign for public awareness between industry and its workers, 
effectively replacing compliance as a matter of compulsion with persuasion, 
resulting in large evasion with little prosecution. It might be suggested then 
that Marshall’s (1950) vision that social citizenship would grant full social 
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inclusion for all falls somewhat by the wayside when it comes to disabled 
citizens (Morris, 1994). 
1.2.4 What then, of the ‘general classes’? 
Those prevented from entering open employment were moved into 
segregated and sheltered workspaces. Conventionally, the introduction of 
segregated and sheltered workspaces was endorsed as a benevolent and 
philanthropic enterprise which catered for the extra needs of disabled people 
as a result of their functional limitations and was promoted as a potential 
“bridging experience” into mainstream employment (Barnes, 1991: 71; Hyde, 
1996).  However, it has been argued that sheltered and segregated 
workspaces incurred as many problems as they solved and worked upon 
largely negative assumptions about the productive potential of disabled 
people (Barnes and Mercer, 2005; Hyde, 1996). In the first instance, these 
workshops intensified the divide between disabled and non-disabled workers 
and therefore could be argued as contributing to the social exclusion 
experienced by disabled people (Goss et al, 2000; Barnes, 1991). Individuals 
placed within sheltered workspaces were not only physically separated from 
the rest of the working population in what have been described as 
“containment measures”, but were also employed in lower-skilled and 
manual labour whilst being paid less than their able-bodied counterparts, 
demonstrating the assumption that disabled people are less skilled, less 
productive and worth less (Thornton and Lunt, 1994: 233; Goss et al, 2000). 
This is further compounded when considering that sheltered workshops were 
regarded “a charitable concern rather than a commercial enterprise”, 
seemingly reinforcing that disabled people are economically unviable and as 
such, the skills and experience gained within sheltered employment were not 
substantial enough to be considered transferrable into mainstream 
employment (Barnes, 1991). As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, the 
sentiment that disabled employees are less productive and should therefore 
be paid less than their non-disabled peers was echoed by Lord Freud some 
seventy years later. Even when efforts were made to integrate disabled 
people into mainstream employment through Employment Rehabilitation 
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Centres, retraining was directed only at people who had acquired impairment 
and who were thus expected to achieve “full recovery to physical fitness” 
through curative means, thereby locating the problem as medical once again 
(Barnes, 1991). What is more, individuals were only retrained in low-skilled 
occupations, further reinforcing an idea about what kind of work disabled 
people were suited to (Barnes, 1991; Borsay, 2005). This raises some 
questions with regard to how people may be classified as economically 
active without any real consideration being given to the quality of 
employment they are engaged in. Barnes (1992) has noted that employment 
is considered emblematic of adulthood; not only does it provide financial 
independence and status, it is considered an identity-forming principle which 
grants self-esteem, develops our social capital, skills and creativity, whilst 
giving people a distinct sense of purpose, responsibility and control (Lindsay, 
2011; Andersen, 2002). To relegate disabled people to the lowest skilled and 
most menial work then is to barely recognise their status as an equal adult 
citizen. Bacchi and Beasley (2002: 328) have argued that to be perceived as 
in control of your body is to be considered a full, autonomous citizen whilst 
those who are controlled by their bodies are regarded as lesser citizens who 
must be regulated. This demarcation serves to promote a further division 
between citizenship as a public activity and the body as “quintessentially 
private”, a tension which is encapsulated in the discussion around active and 
passive citizenship; “the active citizen acts in public, and these actions are 
deliberative (i.e. rational), separate from the (dangerous) pulls of emotion 
and bodily ties” (Bacchi and Beasley, 2002). 
As such, although the Act sought to change the way that disabled people 
were seen and the emphasis that was placed upon rehabilitation signified the 
importance of turning disabled people into taxpayers (Anderson, 2003), it did 
little in terms of integrating them into meaningful paid employment and civic 
life. Whilst the implementation of the quota may have represented positive 
discrimination, it was not statutorily enforced and was challenged on the 
grounds that some disabled people had no basis in employment (Bolderson, 
1980). Sheltered employment as a response to meeting the perceived extra 
and special needs of disabled people can be identified as contributing to the 
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consolidation of the perceived deficiencies by producing exclusionary spaces 
(Kitchin, 1999). As such, we might identify that citizenship was therefore 
expected to be achieved through employment status and not through other 
means of inclusion such as a right to family life or relationships, 
demonstrating how work was assumed to lead to inclusion. According to 
Kitchin (1999), the creation of such spaces serves to remind disabled people 
that they are in or out of place by enforcing the idea that they are the 
deviant Other and different from everyone else. Kitchin (1999: 346) 
elaborates that the socio-spatial organisation of work encourages disabled 
people to “believe the logic of the oppression” and teaches individuals “self-
blame, self-shame and self-doubt”. In light of these considerations, the belief 
that the Disabled Persons Employment Act neutralised the taint of stigma or 
charity and enabled individuals to seize their right to employment as was 
envisaged in the House of Commons was unduly optimistic, if not naive, with 
no consideration given to the importance of meaningful employment. As we 
shall go on to see, whilst employment department names may have changed 
and new organisations are charged with heading the employment services, 
the policy set in the 1940s survived largely unchanged (Borsay, 2005). 
Although employment was desired as the principal means of welfare for 
disabled people because it curbed the social expense associated with non-
workers and fulfilled civic criterions of self-sufficiency and independence 
(Hampton, 2013), Borsay (2005) has documented that for those marginalised 
from the workforce, financial want was targeted through the National 
Insurance Act (1946) and later, the National Assistance Act (1948). However, 
as many disabled people had no basis in employment, provision through 
contribution based insurance payments was inapplicable, causing individuals 
to rely upon an “economy of makeshifts” (Borsay, 2005: 140). With no 
disability-based welfare payments and little in the way of support for the 
severely disabled, many were left living in isolated poverty or else kept in 
residential homes (Barnes, 2012). According to Barnes and Mercer (2010), the 
1948 National Assistance Act dissolved the antecedent Poor Law system and 
entrusted local authorities with the responsibility for provision of residential 
accommodation for disabled people considered vulnerable and in need whilst 
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simultaneously allowing such provision to be delegated to the voluntary 
sector, increasing the prominence of charities within disabled peoples’ lives. 
This is not so distant to the vision of David Cameron nearly sixty years later in 
which disability is evoked through the discourse of charity “as the Big Society 
advocates a shift back from rights guaranteed by the state, to a model of 
philanthropy” (Slater, 2015: 8; Runswick-Cole and Goodley, 2011). 
The Act also purported to enhance the lives of disabled people through 
welfare services that would, allegedly, provide more opportunities for 
inclusion, improve self-esteem, broaden social capital and enable individuals 
to realise their potential (Barnes and Mercer, 2010). These claims enabled 
the institutions involved to state that whereas residential care may have once 
resembled prison-like hospitals, they were now more appropriately conceived 
of as hotels, and the residents, as guests (Barnes and Mercer, 2010). 
However, for those individuals residing in these care institutions, their 
experience has been likened to “batch living” whereby groups of individuals 
were enswathed as a homogenous, passive mass subject to the authority of 
care-home managers’ routines and regimes (Barnes and Mercer, 2010; 
Goffman, 1961: 11). These conditions in which residents underwent a process 
of “mortification”, the expropriation of previous social identity and role 
supplanted with that of inmate, lead to the entirety of people’s lives, their 
experience of “work, recreation and sleep” taking place under the one roof 
of the total institution (Goffman, 1961: 23). Segregated from family and 
community, residents were created as dependent due to the incorrect belief 
that they could not be charged with making decisions for themselves, a 
pervasive notion which challenged the extent to which they could meet the 
responsibilities of citizenship (Barnes, 1991; Oliver, 1989). Whilst Borsay 
(2005) notes that Beveridge recognised disability as a “primary cause of 
need”, the way in which welfare was distributed precluded meaningful 
integration within employment or adequate assistance through benefits, 
unsurprisingly given that Beveridge saw “the danger of providing benefits 
which are both adequate in amount and indefinite in duration, is that men as 
creatures who adapt themselves to circumstances, may settle down to them” 
(Beveridge, cited in Leaper, 1991). Having reflected on the early 
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development of the welfare state and its failure to include disabled people as 
full citizens, the chapter will now turn to the emergence of neo-liberalism 
and its shaping of social security and notions of citizenship. 
1.2.5 Defining Neo-liberalism 
Neo-liberalism has become a sort of academic catchphrase (Boas and Gans-
Morse, 2009). The term neo-liberalism as it is often employed throughout 
social studies has proven to be a somewhat problematic and elusive concept, 
often obscured by struggling political, social and economic expressions in 
modern society (Mudge, 2008). Neo-liberalism is variously referred to as an 
intellectual and political movement, an economic and political policy 
paradigm, a doctrine, a thought collective, a form of governance and an 
ideology to name but a few formulations, making it a tricky concept to define 
(Davies, 2014). 
Neo-liberalism has often been evoked to account for a range of social 
practices and processes, from the advocacy of free-market trade to 
techniques of public management, resulting in an incoherent 
conceptualisation which dilutes its potency as an abstraction for critique 
(Dean, 2012). Brown (2003) has indicated that the term neo-liberal takes on a 
pejorative and therefore ethereal quality within contemporary society owed 
to its perceived role in deepening poverty and inequality, precluding 
politicians and economists alike from self-identifying with this discourse and 
causing for some social theorists to argue that neo-liberalism remains a 
misnomer used by leftist radicals in foregrounding undesirable situations 
contained within their opposition (Birch and Tickell, 2010). Furthermore, the 
term neo-liberalism is used asymmetrically across ideological divides, 
employed frequently by those who are critical of free markets, but rarely 
assumed by those who view marketization more positively, partly because it 
is seen to signify “a radical form of market fundamentalism with which no 
one wants to be associated” (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009: 138). This has 
particularly been the case with authors such as Bourdieu and Chomsky who 
describe neo-liberalism pejoratively as the “lamentable spread of global 
capitalism and consumerism, as well as the deplorable demolition of the 
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proactive welfare state” (Thorsen and Lie, 2006). Moreover, the critical 
literature on neo-liberalism accords it an overwhelming significance whilst 
often leaving it undefined so that is has been easy for some to suggest that 
neo-liberalism is a concept used as a “generic term of deprecation describing 
almost any economic and political development deemed to be undesirable” 
(Thorsen and Lie, 2006: 9). 
What perhaps makes this pejorative use of the term even more striking is that 
in its inception within the Freiberg school neo-liberalism was used to “to 
denote a philosophy that was explicitly moderate in comparison to classical 
liberalism, both in its rejection of laissez-faire policies and its emphasis on 
humanistic values” (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009)2. Although some may identify 
this as ‘ordo-liberalism’ Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) go on to say that within 
the Freiburg school the terms were used interchangeably although the use of 
‘neo’ in neo-liberalism was seen as a positive qualifier when compared with 
the “paleo-liberals” who clung to traditional forms of liberalism.  They 
expand that it was only once neo-liberalism had migrated to Latin America 
and was used in radical economic reform under Pinochet that it acquired its 
negative connotations. 
Whilst acknowledging the deprecatory use of the term is an important 
consideration, to renounce neo-liberalism as a concept because of the 
unintended or inadvertent negative consequences it entails is to dismiss the 
political rationality that extends beyond the anticipation of the market 
(Brown, 2003). As Hall (2011: 706) has argued, although ‘neo-liberalism’ is an 
unsatisfactory term because it is reductive and neglects “internal 
complexities and geo-historical specificity”, there are enough common 
features to merit a “provisional conceptual identity” so that in naming neo-
liberalism we are able to politically resist it. 
According to Dean (2012: 2) neo-liberalism is, empirically speaking, “a 
militant movement that draws its strength and gains its frontal character 
from that which it opposes...Keynesian macroeconomic management and the 
                                         
2 Moreover, writers such as Hayek and Friedman had initially adopted the term neo-liberal to 
signify a break with classical liberalism, but subsequently dropped it (Stedman-Jones, 2014). 
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welfare state”. In response to the perceived failings of embedded/new 
liberalism, political debate became polarised with the left advocating the 
need for more stringent control and regulation whilst the right sought to 
restore the freedom of the market and business (Gamble, 2001; Harvey, 
2005). Whereas embedded liberalism had sought to regulate the market 
through the social and political control exercised by the state, neo-liberalism 
sought to disembed capital from this administrative cage (Harvey, 2005). 
Neo-liberalism has been recognised as a historical transformation inspired by 
Friedman’s monetarism, burgeoning forth from the late 1970s under, 
primarily, the Thatcher and Reagan governments and which rapidly, if 
unevenly, became the global hegemony (Harvey, 2005). In contrast to the 
Keynesian provision of a safety net, neo-liberalism abandoned the duty for 
democratic protection and instead promoted “mechanisms of debt” and 
cheap credit to sustain society (Harvie and Keir, 2010). What became 
apparent in light of the right’s success was that this revival of free-market 
economics signalled the return of power to a small number of elites (Harvey, 
2005). Whilst Hayek’s (1960) The Constitution of Liberty had emerged in the 
1960s as a critique of Keynesianism and as a call for the revival of 
economic/classical liberalism, it was originally, indeed primitively, dismissed 
as an ideo(il)logical throwback by politicians and economists who identified 
state intervention as necessity within capitalist modernity (Gamble, 2001). 
According to Gamble (2001), no one could have anticipated the rise of neo-
liberalism or the manner in which it hurtled forward.  The speed with which 
neo-liberalism came to dominate political and economic arenas was 
undeniable, met with disbelief at the seemingly short-sighted economic 
policies being employed, but with no apparent alternative (Gamble, 2001; 
Steger and Roy, 2010). Hendrikse and Sidaway (2010) have documented this 
first wave of neo-liberalism as characterised by the promotion of austerity, 
monetarism and privatisation as central features of the rolled back state. 
Birch and Mykhnenko (2009) have explained that these economic adjustments 
were legitimated through the naturalisation of globalised relations as an 
economic order. Soon, neo-liberalism became “the dominant common sense, 
the paradigm shaping all policies” (Gamble, 2001: 129). 
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In this respect, Dean (2012) suggests that neo-liberalism might be considered 
a thought collective in which an organised group of individuals exchange 
ideas within a common intellectual framework, the commonality being the 
“desire to renovate free-market liberalism”. More recently, Dawson (2013) 
has typified the empirical nature of neo-liberal economies as those which 
increase marketization through privatisation, the proliferation and expansion 
of flexible markets and deregulation of business. Similarly, Boas and Gans-
Morse (2009) have noted various uses of the concept neo-liberalism as a 
response to Keynesianism. Firstly they identify its association with three 
kinds of economic reform policies that have come to typify neo-liberal 
political theory: those that liberate the market; those that reduce state 
control of the economy, namely through privatisation, and those that enforce 
austerity through budget cuts and reduced public expenditure. In the UK, Hall 
(2011) argues, the primary target of neo-liberalism has been the welfare 
state. 
Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) then go on to advance neo-liberalism as an 
ideology which instructs us to think of ourselves as individuals and the 
concomitant roles that we must fill. Important in this consideration of neo-
liberalism as an ideology is to acknowledge the role played by the economic 
and political configurations of neo-liberalism; that neo-liberalism may be 
manifested through reform policies and development strategies but that 
these are not phenomena distinct from each others’ formation, rather they 
are mutually constitutive and contribute to the neo-liberal 
ideology.  Although neo-liberalism is not a single system and has many 
variants across different countries (Hall, 2011) it has become the hegemonic 
discourse, pervading so much of our thinking that it has “become 
incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in and 
understand the world” (Harvey, 2005). As Bourdieu (1998a: 29) stated: 
“Everywhere we hear it said, all day long – and this is what gives the 
dominant discourse its strength – that there is nothing to put forward in 
opposition to the neo-liberal view, that it has succeeded in presenting 
itself as self-evident, that there is no alternative”. 
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1.2.6 Neo-liberalism at the level of the individual 
Having demonstrated some of the macro theorisations of neo-liberalism it is 
important to examine its effects at the level of individuals as Dawson (2013: 
6) suggests “the strength of neoliberalism is its effect at the individual level: 
‘Instability is meant to be normal, Schumpeter’s entrepreneur served up as 
an ideal Everyman’ (Sennett 1998:31)”. According to Harvey (2005), the 
success of neo-liberal theory was made possible through disseminating the 
message that our freedom had been jeopardised by collectivism through the 
restriction of private ownership and competitive markets. Thatcherism 
signalled the end of social solidarity through which dependency and idleness 
allegedly subsisted, replaced with the resuscitation of individualism, private 
ownership and responsibilisation of subjects; “Economics is the method; the 
object is to change the heart and soul” (Thatcher, 1981) 3. According to 
Ignatieff (1989: 65) this perceived failing of the welfare state lay in the 
nurturing of a passive citizenship of equal entitlement which, as a measure of 
collectivism represented a “conspiracy against liberty” and individualism. 
As we have already seen, the Beveridge Report clearly conveyed a 
commitment to citizenship as an achievement which is earned through 
contribution to the insurance-based benefits system, evidenced through the 
1946 National Insurance Act, (Plant, 2003). Under this approach, the 
obligation was to work, which enabled the payment of insurance. Conversely, 
the National Assistance Act (1948) was to provide for those who could not 
contribute through employment and insurance and, for this reason, was 
means and character-tested (Plant, 2003). Moreover, Beveridge indicated 
that assistance afforded to individuals ought to be of a level which 
encouraged individuals to pursue employment and that schemes of assistance 
which distanced individuals from the pressures of “economic rewards and 
punishments while treating them as free citizens is inconsistent with the 
principles of a free community” (Beveridge, 1942: 11 cited in Plant, 2003). In 
light of this, we can identify how employment and insurance contributions 
                                         
3 While Reaganism in the US and Thatcherism in the UK are often identified as the first and 
most blatant manifestations of neo-liberalism it should be noted that similar market-
orientated policies were implemented in a number of social democracies (Sweden, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand) (Bell and Green, 2016). 
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became “the passport to citizen rights” whilst assistance schemes called into 
question the character of individuals observed as betraying social duty (Plant, 
2003: 158). For Beveridge, the National Assistance Act was intended as 
a transitional safety net which would gradually become unnecessary 
(Atkinson et al, 1981). This neglected a specific problem with the security 
package, mainly, that through increased spending on public pensions, 
insurance benefit payments were significantly reduced and not sufficient 
enough to alleviate poverty, forcing individuals to turn to national assistance 
to supplement their benefits (Borsay, 2005). As a result, the numbers of 
people dependent upon national assistance steadily increased over the next 
twenty years, intensifying the prominence of benefits associated with 
citizenship as status and thereby blurring the important distinction between 
contributory and non-contributory benefits (Plant, 2003). Plant (2003) also 
notes that at this time, the Labour party stressed the beneficial opportunities 
for the whole of society which could be gained through investment in public 
services through general taxation.  However, a strong emphasis upon work 
ethic and the stigma associated with means-testing needed to claim national 
assistance influenced many disabled people to forego their benefits, a 
problem that was not recognised until the “rediscovery of poverty” in 
Townsend’s The Last Refuge in which the welfare state was detailed to have 
failed the disabled and elderly (Hampton, 2013: 92; Borsay, 2005). Plant 
(2003) notes that in response to this associated stigma and the increased 
need for universality across benefits, the distinction between insurance and 
assistance was further blurred, with the replacement of assistance with the 
Supplementary Benefit and “pressure to reduce the reliance on means 
testing” (Borsay, 2005: 163). It could therefore be suggested that the 
emerging ambiguousness surrounding benefits and increased public spending 
at this time contributed to the belief in a citizenship conferred as status and 
leading to what Thatcher called “entitlement society” (Plant, 2003: 155). As 
Hall (2011: 707) suggests, neo-liberalism believed that the Keynesian welfare 
state’s “do-gooding, utopian sentimentality enervated the nation’s moral 
fibre, eroded personal responsibility and undermined the over-riding duty of 
the poor to work”. For Hall (2011) then, neo-liberalism is grounded in the 
idea of the “free, possessive individual”. 
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Clarke (2004: 31) notes that the collective identity nurtured by welfarism had 
been subverted in exchange for citizens with “individualised and economised 
identities as taxpayers and consumers”. In light of this, we can identify how 
classically liberalist traditions of freedom, citizen rights and the rational 
individual or Adam Smith’s homo economicus are now, arguably, so deeply 
embedded in our cultural history that their existence is largely self-evident 
and very much a part of social convention (Harrison and Boyd, 2003). 
Although the neo-liberal ethic for personhood may not be the only 
propagation of individualism within current discourse it does maintain 
hegemonic control, enforcing an idea of society as comprising independent 
and equal agents engaged with market forces, creating a belief that 
individualism is synonymous to self-sufficiency (Kingfisher, 2002). Key to 
understanding neo-liberalism as a new ideology is the recognition that whilst 
it initially seems to revive the classically liberal notions there are in fact 
some distinct divergences (Olssen, 1996). Firstly, while classical liberalism 
saw the role of the state as minimal in order to guarantee the free-market, 
neo-liberalism seeks to use the state to engineer conditions conducive to 
market success (Olssen, 1996). Secondly, although the classical tradition 
placed optimistic emphasis upon the liberated and rational human nature of 
agents engaged with the economy, neo-liberalism seeks to nurture the 
enterprising and competitive character (Olssen, 1996). The latter 
development signifies how the belief in a self-regulating, “universal egoism” 
which flourishes under laissez-faire conditions has been supplanted with an 
individualism moulded by the state and which becomes “perpetually 
responsive”; homo economicus is now more appropriately conceived of as 
“manipulatable man” (Olssen, 1996: 340). Olssen (1996: 340) elaborates that 
it is not a case of the self-interested citizen being dissolved by new neo-
liberal codes but that supposed laziness encouraged by welfarism creates the 
belief that new methods of surveillance, control and “performance appraisal” 
is needed. For some, neo-liberal governance has meant that formulations of 
contemporary citizenship reflect and reproduce neo-liberalism through an 
existential politics in which the state becomes involved in the definition, 
categorisation and institution of legitimate characteristics of human nature 
(Raco, 2009). To this end, the state seeks to co-produce entrepreneurial 
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citizens through narratives and discourses on citizenship which purport to 
reflect the real desires and aspirations of its citizens (Raco, 2009). By 
redrawing citizenship boundaries through reform to rights, entitlements and 
responsibilities, the state thereby substantiates the relationship between it 
and its citizens. 
Identifying that the neo-liberal agenda seeks to justify and rationalise its 
aggressive market tactics and to reduce public expenditure, politicians are 
tasked with communicating a message which portrays welfare and those that 
use it as morally reprehensible and indolent. This has created culture of audit 
in which individuals are scrutinised and made accountable (Henrikse and 
Sidaway, 2010). According to Gilbert (2002: 163), the welfare reforms that 
are unfolding are being promoted as the necessary trimming the fat in 
government spending in order to obscure the changing philosophy towards 
welfare, which, as part of a far broader ideological transition in social 
security, is also assisting in the redefinition of the welfare state as the 
provision of “public support for private responsibility”. The increasingly 
restrictive eligibility for disability welfare support is being supported by the 
rationale of workfare, supplanting the Keynesian principles of redistribution 
with an ethics of competition and thus transforming the quality of citizenship 
(Etherington and Ingold, 2012). 
For Turner (2001: 189), this has taken place through the erosion of 
Marshallian citizenship because the “social and economic conditions that 
supported post-war British welfare consensus have been transformed by 
economic and technological change”. Ellison (2000) notes that whilst 
citizenship continues to be understood as a socio-legal status which entails 
corresponding rights and responsibilities, within late modernity citizenship is 
increasingly emphasised as a process predominately embedded within the 
complex social politics of participation and belonging. What becomes 
apparent when addressing the issue of disability within this framework of 
citizenship is that disabled people are still not served by this vision of 
citizenship or the protective rights it entails which other members of society 
benefit from.  These rights are emphasised as “contributory rights, and they 
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correspond, more or less, to a set of duties typically expressed through work, 
war and parenthood”, fields which disabled people are often excluded from 
(Turner, 2010: 96). On this basis, disability is more favourably provided for 
under the discourse of human rights in which entitlement is not so connected 
to contribution (Turner, 2010). Of course, the social rights of citizenship do 
intersect with human rights, specifically when we think that “poverty 
mitigation is the human rights core of “social” citizenship” (Davy, 2014). As 
part one of Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: 
“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to 
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, 
old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control” 
(United Nations, 2015). 
Roulstone and Emerson (2014: 3087) have similarly shown that disability is 
increasingly seen as a human rights issue as a result of the shift from medical 
model understanding to social model thinking in which disabled people’s 
social exclusion is now understood as “powerfully shaped by social structures 
and sociocultural practices” rather than the inevitable consequence of ill-
health. Harris et al (2013) have stated that the inclusion of disability within 
the rhetoric of human rights shows an increased recognition of disabled 
people as citizens within liberal welfare regimes and, in theory, as entitled to 
the protective rights which defend marginalised groups from social exclusion 
(Harris et al, 2013). Unfortunately however, as we have so far seen in this 
chapter, incongruent notions of social citizenship contravene the practical 
implementation of rights-based policy for disabled people (Harris et al, 
2013). In addition to this there are those that suggest that rights are 
inherently individualistic and separate individuals from groups and obscure 
the political struggle for equality (Schneider, 1986). As Pearson and Watson 
(2007: 119) have argued “There is the need to challenge the processes that 
create the inequality experienced by disabled people, and merely according 
them recognition as rights-bearing subjects fails to do this”.  However, there 
are those that warn that as we witness a shift from viewing social rights as 
entitlements to seeing social rights framed in terms of need we see that the 
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state now wields significant power in defining legitimate social need, 
dissolving notions of universality and solidarity in favour of personal 
responsibility (Cox, 1998). 
For Barton (1993) then, in order to understand the place of disabled people in 
society, it is essential to understand the neo-liberal ideology which informs 
state interventions within services and welfare provision and shapes the 
common perceptions of who counts as a full or legitimate citizen. 
Understanding how citizenship is theorised within the neo-liberal UK regime 
is therefore central to understanding how disabled people are affected and 
discounted by the practical implementation of policy designed around non-
disabled citizens (Harris et al, 2013). This understanding is pertinent as Moore 
(2015: 671) argues, the “changing socio-political and cultural relations are 
redefining disability”. 
According to Hahn (1985) disability is “founded on a realization that all 
aspects of the environment - including architecture, communications, and 
other settings that provide a context for human interactions - are 
fundamentally moulded by public policy” and as Stone (1984) and 
subsequently Roulstone (2015: 673) have both argued, “disability is exactly 
what a state deems it to be”. For many disability scholars then, 
contemporary understandings of disability and disability policy is punctuated 
by neo-liberal state discourse and rhetoric (Mladenov, 2015; Grover and 
Piggott, 2010, 2005; Grover and Soldatic, 2013). This is problematic given 
that policymakers within these states are so often influenced by a notion of 
citizenship which precludes the full inclusion of disabled people (Harris et al, 
2013). 
According to MacLeavy (2011), the welfare reforms currently unfolding 
reflect the broader financial climate in which austerity and financial 
diligence are purported as necessity whilst simultaneously nurturing the 
belief that a socio-political enterprise of self-sufficiency entwined with 
labour market activation is key to restoring the economy. Crucially, this 
emphasis upon employment as a means of active citizenry and social 
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obligation has enabled the further moralisation of the long-term unemployed, 
effectively situating individuals as work-shy and welfare-dependant and 
ultimately responsible for the social malaise contributing to Broken Britain 
(Garthwaite, 2011; Dean, 2012). 
For Barton (1993: 239) “The emphasis has been placed on the distributive 
justice of the market, the freedom of individuals and the centrality of choice 
within an enterprise culture in which there is a diversified system of 
provision”. Barton (1993) expands that underpinning the neo-liberal approach 
is a fundamental belief in merits of competition and that this competitive 
approach to the market will inevitably improve the quality of services. This 
emphasis on individualism and economic rationality is thought to produce a 
“leaner and fitter” economy which would compete better in the international 
market and has relied upon the popularised understanding of the good citizen 
as responsive worker (Barton, 1993). As Ellison (2000) has described, the idea 
of the good citizen has been manipulated by the competitive forces of the 
market so that social inclusion is no longer so state-regulated or protected 
and instead depends upon contribution in the economic and competitive work 
environment as a means of civic inclusion. As a result, renewed emphasis 
upon civic responsibilities as entwined with social rights become explicit, 
specifically through the exposition of paid employment and tax contributions 
as two main duties to be upheld and upon which social entitlement becomes 
contingent (Touraine, 1992; Isin and Turner, 2007). Those that rely upon 
welfare benefits become subjects of scrutiny positioned within a hierarchy of 
entitlement, subsequently creating an ideal in the good citizen against which 
individuals may be benchmarked (Morris, 2011; Rummery, 2006). Reliance 
upon the state is no longer viewed as the guarantee of inclusion but the 
badge of exclusion (Morris, 1994). This competitiveness has individualised 
social actors as self-determining entrepreneurs and, as a result of policy 
rhetoric, advocates the citizen as a synthesis of self-governing, responsible 
agency with communitarian ethics (Ellison, 2000; Morris, 2005) Individuals are 
thus expected to comprise specific social practices and behaviours and 
concurrent identities, serving to socially and politically determine the 
relationship between the individual, society and the state (Lister, 2007; 
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Yuval-Davis, 1997). This neo-liberal approach to citizenship therefore 
advocates a communitarian approach to civic duties through promoting 
individual responsibilities that contribute to the welfare of society as a means 
of becoming an active citizen and at the same time, delineating a citizen 
ideal to which individuals are expected to align to and which subsequently 
proffers membership to society (Morris, 2005). 
Newman (2010: 713) has documented that the welfare state has become 
moralised through “pedagogies of the self” as a strategy of governmentality 
through which individualism is promoted. This has facilitated the construction 
of the citizen-subject as a self-regulating and self-governing agent 
responsible for the management of their own lifestyle and contributions to 
their local community, emphasising a turn away from the sentiment of 
entitlement to that of duty (Newman, 2010). The social and political rights 
attached to notions of citizenship thus become contingent upon an individual 
fulfilling a kind of ideological personhood (Marks, 2001) defined as active 
citizenship and which refers to the individual as: 
“the able-bodied British citizen who is free from learning difficulties 
should behave in a proper and ‘socially responsible’ fashion. 
Simultaneously, such a citizen should, as far as possible, be 
economically self-supporting and not make demands on state largesse 
and, if temporarily incapacitated, he or she should return to work as 
soon as they are able” (Larkin, 2011). 
Having defined what is meant when using the term neo-liberal and 
demonstrated how neo-liberal governance acts at the level of the individual 
through shaping ideas about who constitutes the good and legitimate citizen 
and the disabled citizen’s exclusion from this status, the chapter will now 
look at how the disability category is constructed within recent policy and 
political rhetoric. 
1.3 Section Two 
1.3.1 Re-drawing the Disabled Citizen in Neo-Liberal Britain 
We might begin then by configuring the disability category as it has been 
politically constructed within the welfare state on either side of the 2008 
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financial crisis. The number of people claiming sickness and disability related 
benefits has been a concern of both Conservative and Labour governments 
over the last thirty years (Piggott and Grover, 2009). However, welfare 
retrenchment in this area has been notoriously difficult to secure. Scarbrough 
(2000: 250) noted that achieving welfare retrenchment is “not only extremely 
difficult but also an extremely slow process, relying heavily on the educative 
capacity of the political elites. The evidence suggests they have a very steep 
hill to climb”. Fifteen years later, it appears that this has been achieved. 
The present crusade against welfare-dependency is argued as embedded 
within modern neo-liberal policies which have gradually instilled an idea of 
social decay as resulting from individuals being trapped by poverty, fiscal 
dependency and personal failure as well as the idea that these individuals 
constitute an immobilised workforce devoid of any work ethic or inclination 
(Garthwaite, 2011). This has been argued to have facilitated a moralising 
campaign against the long-term unemployed, and specifically, those claiming 
disability benefits, legitimated through propaganda that inculpates welfare-
dependency as one of the main forms of social malaise contributing to Broken 
Britain (Dean, 2012). As such, it has been reasoned that the welfare cuts that 
have taken place under recent governments relies heavily upon the notion of 
a moral citizen as one engaged in paid work and who fulfils civic duties 
(Dean, 2012). 
In this section, we will look briefly first to New Labour’s New Deals before 
assessing the reforms to Incapacity Benefit brought in by New Labour in 2008. 
The chapter will then look at some of the most recent cuts made to disability 
benefits and the accompanying political rhetoric implemented under both the 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition and the subsequent Conservative 
government of 2015. Through examining these most recent policy initiatives 
and the attendant political rhetoric, we are able to conceive of how many 
disabled peoples’ lives are being discounted as the state constructs ever-
trickier and unrealistic expectations of the disabled citizen and the role they 
ought to play within an age of austerity. 
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1.3.2 New Labour, New Deal. Neo-liberalism with a human face 
New Labour’s New Deals were introduced through the discursive framework 
of inclusion, responsibility and equality of opportunity so that fiscal 
redistribution, which was now suggested to be a passive rather than active 
form of welfare, was no longer the primary means of tackling inequality and 
poverty (Lister, 1998; Levitas, 1998). Similarly, Andersen (2002) has remarked 
that whilst welfare policies of the past were primarily concerned with the 
conferral of social entitlements, they now reflected a preoccupation with 
employment as an integrative institution and instrumental in obtaining 
citizenship. According to Giddens (1998: 103), equality was now politically 
defined as inclusion, and that inclusion referred to “in its broadest sense to 
citizenship, to the civil and political rights and obligations that all members 
of society should have ... [and] to opportunities and to involvement in public 
space”.  Instead of traditionally redistributive initiatives, the emerging social 
integrationist approach heralded by New Labour advocated paid employment 
as the core value and first priority of the economically inactive and the 
principal means of improving quality of life and social inclusion (Levitas, 
1998).  As Powell (2000) has noted, Gordon Brown argued that the New Deals 
would tackle the cause of poverty rather than alleviate it with welfare 
benefits through redesigning the welfare state around work ethic. As such, 
New Labour championed that they would convert the workless culture 
amongst those receiving benefits and reconstruct the welfare system around 
employment, committing to Making work pay (Powell, 2000). This was 
accompanied by the Third Way’s frequent use of moral and contractual 
discourse (‘something for something’) through the evocation of the 
community and civic society in which people were encouraged to see 
themselves as citizens with duties, obligations and responsibilities to that 
community (Fairclough, 2000). Through this moral and contractual discourse, 
we begin to see how New Labour positions citizens within these New Deals, as 
individuals encouraged to generate their own inclusion and alleviate their 
own poverty by entering into civic contracts with individualised 
responsibilities and duties (Fairclough, 2000). As Dean (2010: 188) has 
suggested, the neo-liberal rationality contained within these policies is to 
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“assist” individuals in exercising their freedom in state-defined ways, that is, 
as active job seekers. Disabling institutional structures and organisation, the 
increased cost of living with impairment as well as social discrimination and 
negative attitudes towards disability are seemingly not an issue to inclusion 
so long as you are employed. 
Powell (2000: 47) expands that New Labour was therefore considered to have 
re-written social history in order to make way for the Third Way initiative, 
discounting the political right’s emphasis upon civic duties and the old left’s 
emphasis upon redistribution and instead forging a “new” political motto of 
“no rights without responsibilities” (Giddens, 1998 cited in Powell). 
Citizenship under New Labour’s Third Way therefore seemed to move from 
“dutiless rights” to “conditional welfare” through which it was premised 
employment opportunities would be created and individuals made 
accountable for their engagement with such responsibilities (Powell, 2000: 
47). However, if we look at the historical development of citizenship as 
entrenched within the welfare state, we see that rights and responsibilities 
have always been premised to go hand in hand, that employment has always 
been the expectation of the ‘good citizen’ and that social security has been 
intended to facilitate this. Given the barriers to employment for disabled 
people however and therefore their accession to good citizen status, 
negotiating these rights and responsibilities has been inconceivably 
problematic. 
The New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP, 1997) was introduced as an 
initiative which would confront the dynamics of social exclusion, enhance 
peoples’ awareness of disabled people’s capabilities and create more job 
opportunities, and which boasted social model thinking on disability 
(Roulstone, 2000). Contained within the New Deal were five strategies which 
sought to directly improve the employment rates of disabled people; 
“education, training and work placements; vocational advice and support 
services; in-work benefits; incentives for employers; and improving physical 
accessibility” (Bambra et al, 2009: 4). According to Newman (2010) these 
initiatives might be thought of as governmental strategies of a new post-
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welfare state and through which we are witnessing a fundamental shift in our 
approach to social policy and citizenship. As we have already seen and as 
Newman (2010: 712) argues, this shift is what numerous commentators have 
alluded to as a “distinct policy turn” which seeks to activate its citizens 
through greater accountability and responsibilisation of subjects, indicating a 
state preoccupation with morally regulating individuals so as to engender the 
norms of a good citizen. 
However, whilst the New Deal premised the increased education of employers 
and employment opportunities, Roulstone (2000: 432) adds that these 
objectives were “overturned at the point of delivery” and left the question of 
positive change at the feet of disabled individuals. The New Deal was 
voluntary and provided advice and information through a Personal Adviser as 
well as offering information on the barriers to employment so that disabled 
people were made more aware of how best to pursue job opportunities 
(Millar, 2000).  As such, when compared with the other compulsory New Deal 
programmes which entailed a “menu of options” in individualised support to 
improve employability, the New Deal for Disabled People was less about 
enhancing the individual’s ‘human capital’ and therefore a more ‘work-first’ 
approach without addressing the multiple disadvantages faced by those who 
are furthest from the labour market in the first place (Millar, 2000). As 
Roulstone (2000) has noted, the contractual rhetoric of the New Deals, in 
which new job opportunities are premised as the route out of poverty and 
dependency, creates the idea that disabled people are being provided for 
through the progressive and humane reform of capitalism. This focus on the 
rhetoric of dependency thus eschews the multiple barriers to employment 
faced by disabled people and obscures that the main aim of the New Deal is 
to change the dependent individual (Roulstone, 2000). What is more, those 
that did make use of the NDDP programme tended to be disabled people who 
were already better placed for employment for a number of reasons: 
“they were younger, better qualified, more likely to have a working 
partner, to have access to transport, to have had their health problems 
for shorter periods, to have been out of work for shorter periods, and to 
have had previous work experience” (Millar, 2000: 30). 
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Arguably then the NDDP programme did little to help those disabled people 
most marginalised from the labour market and seems to reinforce the idea 
that there is a class of disabled people unsuited to work4. Problematically, 
Roulstone (2000) has suggested that in grouping disabled people under the 
New Deal alongside more notably and historically stigmatised groups such as 
single mothers and the young unemployed, the distinction of disabled people 
as ‘deserving poor’ became less clear. As Beresford (2012) has highlighted, 
these groups of welfare recipients face extended moralisation as those who 
have historically been used as neo-liberalism’s scapegoats; the underclass, 
single parents, asylum seekers, the long-term unemployed and youths. For 
Roulstone (2000), the New Deal for Disabled People had initially made clear 
announcements about the social factors which had hindered disabled people 
in entering the labour market and thus communicated the message that 
disabled people represented the deserving poor. However, as time went on, 
this distinction began to fade within New Deal rhetoric. This conflation of 
disability with the ‘underclass’ is further evidenced when Roulstone (2000) 
notes that shortly after they were elected in 1997, New Labour soon set 
about looking into “non-legitimate” Disability Living Allowance claims, of 
which 442,000 people were to be surveyed, evidencing their attempt to 
separate the real disabled from the spuriously disabled. This was further 
bolstered by New Labour’s further clampdown on those claiming Incapacity 
Benefit through a large-scale review of entitlement (Roulstone, 2000). This 
moral underclass rhetoric used to justify the shift from redistributive 
discourse to that of social inclusion was also further evidenced in Harriet 
Harman’s, then Minister of Social Security, speech on social inclusion in which 
she refers to benefit claimants as living in a ‘parallel world’ in which they 
lack the sense of order that paid employment brings (Fairclough, 2000). In 
developing his analysis of how New Labour discursively framed employment 
when compared with earlier Old Labour speeches, Fairclough (2000) notes 
that the right to work is barely raised, except in reference to disabled people 
who are portrayed as having been denied this right. Accordingly then, for 
                                         
4 This is not to dismiss the achievements of New Labour’s “Improving the Life Chances for 
Disabled People” report which adapted social model thinking and endorsed the development 
of policies to support disabled people in achieving independent living (Oliver and Barnes, 
2010). 
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Bambra et al (2009: 3), the welfare-to-work strategies of the 1997 New Deal 
for Disabled People alluded to a “rights-based approach” to employment 
which would challenge the rising costs associated with Incapacity Benefits 
whilst also tackling social exclusion and poverty, once again demonstrating 
how neo-liberal rationality frames work as a freedom which an individual 
should be encouraged to seize. Here, we see that the expectation of the 
disabled individual, now rhetorically imbued with ‘the right to work’, is to 
remediate their own poverty, dependency and exclusion through these highly 
individualised strategies which ignore the broader structures of exclusion in 
disabled peoples’ lives. Coupled with the growing expectation of disabled 
people to take personal responsibility for their own health through self-
management we can observe how this rhetoric of empowerment and 
autonomy is yet another neo-liberal tool through which to locate blame at 
the foot of the individual (Scambler and Scambler, 2010). In this respect it 
could be suggested that disabled individuals are responsibilized to activate 
their citizenship through gaining control over their bodies (Bacchi and 
Beasley, 2002). As well as this, we have witnessed the increased 
personalisation of adult social care through direct payments, which, on the 
face of it, appeared to be empowering individuals to take control of their 
own care and design their own support (Beresford, 2008; Roulstone and 
Morgan, 2009). However, Ferguson (2012: 67) has argued that personalisation 
is dissolving state social care, shifting responsibility from the state to the 
individual and has therefore been co-opted by the neo-liberal agenda through 
the “market-driven neo-liberal notion of individualism that denies our need 
for social connection and reduces the service user to a simple ‘homo 
economicus’”. Moreover, having a personal budget for care does not 
necessarily translate into having choice or control and is dependent on local 
services and support as well as being vulnerable to the increasing cuts to 
local authority budgets which has already seen reductions to personal 
budgets (Ferguson, 2012). 
It is important here to consider the framing of such initiatives within the 
wider context of the achievements of the British disability movement, namely 
the social model of disability, and the implementation of the Disability 
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Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA) (Cameron, 2013). According to Barnes (2000), 
there could be little doubt that during the latter half of the 20th century, our 
understandings of disability and disablement had been transformed. 
Acknowledging the emergence and development of the international disabled 
people’s movement since the 1960s, Barnes argues that orthodox, 
individualised and medicalised views of disability have been reconfigured, or 
decolonised (Hughes, 2009) and given way to the socio-political account of 
disability widely referred to as the social model of disability.5 It is pertinent 
to note that the social model illuminates how it is society that disables 
people with impairments and therefore the solution is societal rather than 
individual-directed change (Barnes and Mercer, 2005).  The social model has 
been the major catalyst in increased politicisation of disabled people within 
the UK and highlighted the institutional discrimination faced by disabled 
people as a result of perceived impairments (Barnes, 2000). In response to 
the disability movement and the social model, anti-discrimination legislation 
was “reluctantly” established (Pearson and Watson, 2007: 97) in the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (and subsequently, 2005, Equality 2010) 
and legal definitions of disablement changed to include social model thinking 
(Barnes, 2000). 
The Disability Discrimination Act (1995) legislated against the discrimination 
of disabled people within employment and required that employers must 
make reasonable adjustments when their organisation or premises may be 
perceived as disadvantaging disabled people when compared with non-
disabled people (Bell and Heitmüller, 2005). For many, this act represented 
extensive progress in protecting disabled people through the power of the 
law (Roulstone, 2003) and for some may have been a step towards more fully 
integrating people with impairments into the economic sphere which 
materialist and Marxist social model thinkers thought would end the social 
oppression of disablism (Thomas, 2007). However, Abberley (2002) has argued 
that the nature of some impairment means that there will always be a group 
of people for whom work is not an option, no matter what social 
                                         
5 The social model of disability argues that disability is produced by the organisation of 
society rather than by an individual’s impairment. A more in depth description of the social 
model is covered in the next chapter. 
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arrangements are made. Moreover, it might be argued that whilst the UK had 
made “significant progress in integrating an anti-discrimination agenda into 
key areas of social life, attitudinal and structural change [was] considerably 
slower” (Pearson and Watson, 2007: 98). 
Roulstone (2003) has documented that in order for legal action to be taken in 
the event of disability-based discrimination, the disability must first be 
established as substantial or long-term which significantly problematises 
invisible and fluctuating conditions and simultaneously reinforces the medical 
model of disability in which the extent of difference must be measured, 
locating (in)ability within the body. Roulstone (2003) elaborates that in 
arguing their case in which “day-to-day problems are contested,” a disabled 
person is encouraged to recount the list of things they cannot do, a process 
which may be distressing and psychologically harmful. Crucially, the “onus” is 
upon the individual to challenge the broader structures of employment 
whereas the previous quota system, at least in theory, represented a more 
incorporated means of tackling exclusion (Warren, 2005: 310). As Pope and 
Bambra (2005) found, the implementation of the Disability Discrimination Act 
coincided with the political motivation to ameliorate low unemployment 
amongst those in receipt of disability benefits. In practice however, they 
found that employment rates actually decreased and were at their lowest 
following the implementation of the (1995) act. This may be attributed to the 
perceived risk of costly lawsuits and the additional cost of altering work 
environments which further deterred employers from selecting disabled 
applicants for jobs (Bell and Heitmüller, 2005). Crucially, enforcing anti-
discrimination law in this reactive way was ad hoc and inefficient. 
In addition to this anti-discrimination legislation, the UK government was 
documented as having increased the opportunities of disabled people through 
the Pathways to Work scheme which supplemented the New Deal program 
and was alleged to provide extra support and further incentivise individuals 
into taking on paid work (Riach and Loretto, 2009). Whilst Powell (2000) 
indicates that the Third Way worked upon a work-first basis, New Labour did 
promote some investment in education and training as a means of building 
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human capital through initiatives such as Pathways to Work. It has also been 
documented that Pathways to Work programs incorporated, at least to some 
degree, a recognition of the social model of disability in that it conceded that 
there were (and aimed to work upon) social barriers beyond the 
medicalisation of disability which contributed to underemployment (Grover 
and Piggott, 2005). However, it is quickly countered that disabled people 
continue to be conceived of in terms of a deficit model; that they are 
unemployed because they are economically unproductive (Grover and 
Piggott, 2005). Grover and Piggott (2005) elaborate upon the work of Barnes 
et al (1998), stating that in order to make disabled individuals more 
appealing to employers, they are fashioned in such a way as to advertise 
them as distinct and different. As such, it is argued that similar to the 
Disability Discrimination Act, the divide between disabled and non-disabled 
people is intensified through this individualising of disability (Grover and 
Piggott, 2005). What is more, whilst advisory services under Pathways was 
sometimes welcomed as a positive experience in building motivation and self-
esteem for some confident users, it remained largely ineffectual in 
overcoming barriers such as “non-improving health and labour market 
conditions” and neglected the heterogeneous identities of different users 
(Weston, 2012). Weston (2012) also notes that in other cases, Pathways 
programs channelled individuals into low-skilled, low-paid and ultimately 
disappointing work, reiterating the negative employment opportunities which 
have so long been connected to disabled people (Barnes, 1992). 
Riach and Loretto (2009) therefore state that these policy initiatives, in 
tandem with anti-discrimination legislation, perpetuated the belief that 
employment exists for all those who wish to avail themselves of the 
opportunity. Given that the Pathways program focuses upon the 
employability of the individual rather than the broader structures of the 
labour market and its diminishing size, these assumptions are therefore 
potentially damaging and stigmatising to unemployed disabled people. In 
light of the identified failings associated with the Pathways program, it is not 
surprising that Incapacity Benefit figures did not decrease, but rather than 
redressing the conditionality of benefits, New Labour resolved to increase 
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conditionality through the replacement of IB with Employment Support 
Allowance, ESA (Weston, 2012).Therefore, whilst the incorporation of the 
social model into government strategy suggested a breakaway from the 
reductionism of the individual and medical model, the efficacy of such 
incorporation suggests otherwise (Russell, 2002). Russell (2002) argues that 
legislative acts may allude to the production of equal opportunities but that 
when it comes to progressing disability rights, the notion of equal 
opportunities remains infeasible within a society so replete with inequality. 
In this respect many disabled people continued to be excluded from the 
labour market and were unable to fulfil the role of tax-paying moral citizen 
although this has been framed in terms of personal deficit rather than the 
result of deeply embedded inequalities. 
Therefore, whilst Cameron (2013) remarks that the establishment of anti-
discrimination legislation is one of the disability movement’s biggest 
achievements, he counters that “the best way to kill a movement is to give it 
a little of what it demands”. Identifying that the rhetoric surrounding 
disabled people was that they were now endowed with the “right to work” 
and encouraged to seize it through neo-liberal policies which avowed 
support, coupled with anti-discrimination legislation and the supposed 
changed perceptions of disability due to the social model, it is no wonder 
that failure to comply presents itself as the inactivity of passive citizens. The 
chapter will now discuss how disabled people have been increasingly 
negatively positioned through scathing media portrayals, moralising discourse 
and political rhetoric which has gathered momentum over the last decade 
(Grover, 2015). 
1.3.3 Scroungerphobia, Folk Devils and National Abjects 
Houston and Lindsay (2010) note that this process of ‘activating’ citizens 
through welfare-to-work strategies has emerged as a dominant area of reform 
within the European Union, although they highlight that in Britain, as we have 
already seen, these activation strategies have switched focus from those 
claiming unemployment benefits to those receiving disability benefits. 
According to Piggott and Grover (2009: 161), this need for welfare 
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retrenchment had to be constructed through “public communication 
strategies” which encouraged a fight against fraud through publicising a 
“scroungerphobia” discourse. As a result, disabled people would be made to 
compete for work on the grounds that whilst the number of Incapacity 
Benefit claimants increased there had “been no worsening of the health of 
the UK population”, essentially translating as those that are on IB are simply 
unemployed or represent hidden unemployment (Secretary of State for Work 
and Pensions, 2002, p. 7 cited in Grover and Piggott, 2005). Briant, Watson 
and Philo (2013: 879) identify that at this point, whilst there had been some 
attribution of blame to disabled people for this situation, most of the news 
coverage focussed on the “perceived failings of government and 
professionals”. 
Accordingly then, in 2006 New Labour outlined their plans to increase 
conditionality and reduce the 2.7million Incapacity Benefit (IB) figure by one 
million through a new benefit, the Employment Support Allowance (ESA), 
which was implemented in 2008 (Garthwaite, 2011, Weston, 2012). At the 
time of introduction of ESA, IB was portrayed as a benefit that had been too 
easy to access and that once claimants were on it, they remained on it for 
too long (Grover and Piggott, 2010). While focus was paid to the increasing 
numbers of people using IB and their relatively larger payments compared 
with Jobseeker’s Allowance, this ignored that  “in reality these benefits offer 
a very low standard of living as a long- term income” (Barnes and Sissons, 
2013: 90). Moreover, it was contended that the Incapacity Benefit was not 
actually targeted at the genuinely sick, but instead was a benefit that had 
assuaged high figures of long-term unemployment, masking a “missing 
workforce”(Theodore, 2007: 934). This has disseminated the message that 
disabled people are simply unemployed rather than living with real conditions 
(Grover, 2015). However, as Warren (2005: 309) has argued, over the course 
of the 1980s, disability became synonymous to unemployability due to the re-
categorisation of the long-term unemployed as the “long-term sick” as a 
means of ameliorating the discouraging unemployment figures of the time for 
political gain. Importantly however, this has been argued to have contributed 
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to the emerging political identity for disabled people through which they 
were able to pressurise the government (Warren, 2005). 
In an approach not dissimilar to that of the New Deals then, the introduction 
of Employment Support Allowance was therefore discursively framed as a 
supportive benefit that would help the sick and those with impairments into 
paid work and subsequently address other issues of poverty and disadvantage 
(Grover and Piggott, 2010). However, the emphasis upon employment as a 
right which disabled people missed out on was less prominent and instead, 
focus was directed at sorting the too-sick-to-work from the inactive but able. 
As Patrick (2011: 275) has argued, the rhetoric surrounding the 
implementation of the ESA implied that those claiming IB were passive and 
inactive and required “compulsion to lift them out of entrenched welfare 
dependency”. This entailed the reassessment of individuals in terms of their 
potential productivity through a Work Capability Assessment (WCA) (Grover 
and Piggott, 2010). This heavily medicalised categorising entailed within the 
WCA seemed to create a hierarchy of impairments, nurturing the idea that 
there was a scale of (un)deservingness in which a claimant would be located 
and encouraged to reassess their need (Grover and Piggott, 2010). The 
equivalence being made between being seen as capable of work and medical 
wellbeing therefore forces individuals to focus on work-related solutions to 
their situations and urges them to face up to their responsibilities as active 
citizens before asserting their social rights, rights which are premised mainly 
on the basis of economic contribution (Grover and Piggott, 2010). 
Through this highly individualised approach to disability, the implementation 
of the ESA failed to acknowledge the multifaceted disadvantages faced by 
the disabled and instead focussed on the medical sorting of individuals 
(Grover and Piggott, 2010). Grover and Piggott (2010) expanded that this 
process was not one which viewed full employment for the disabled as an end 
goal, but instead aimed to collect and analyse data as part of a system of 
surveillance. In addition to this, Grover and Piggott (2012) indicate that the 
revised WCA used by the UK is, according to the Department for Work and 
Pensions (2006), one of the toughest assessments in the world and serves to 
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intensify the conditionality of welfare. Furthermore, despite the advice from 
welfare advisers that the WCA was inhumane and flawed, DWP ministers 
pressed ahead with the fit-for-work tests (Butler, 2013). As Beatty and 
Fothergill (2011) have argued, the WCA is the gateway to disability benefits 
but importantly, a gateway which has been significantly narrowed and with 
no indication that those who previously qualified for disability benefits are 
anything other than genuine claimants. Similarly Briant, Watson and Philo 
(2013) have more recently shown that the government is simply altering the 
“disability benefit benchmarks” in order to redefine formerly disabled people 
as no longer disabled so that the cuts to disability benefits can be 
implemented without fear of retribution. 
In early 2012, more than 2.5million people of working age were unemployed 
and in receipt of disability benefits in the UK (Houston and Lindsay, 2013). 
Moreover, the numbers of disability benefit claimants has trebled since 1979, 
prompting the successive governing parties to argue that too many people 
spend too long on sick benefits and that this represents a social and economic 
crisis (Houston and Lindsay, 2013). Reform to benefits for the long-term sick 
and disabled within the UK have rapidly developed over the past decade, 
entailing increasingly restrictive eligibility criteria, greater demands of work-
related activity and negative sanctions for those who do not comply as well 
as the reduction in value of such benefits, seemingly justified on the basis of 
greater provision of employment-related support (Heap, 2014). 
The Conservative/Liberal-Democrat Coalition government proceeded with the 
ESA benefit despite the global recession and increasing job cuts and 
unemployment, and began reassessing 1.5 million IB recipients with a view to 
shifting one quarter of claimants, (those assessed as immediately fit to work) 
onto Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) and over 750,000 (those assessed as limited 
in capability) into the Work-Related Activity Group (WRAG) within ESA 
(Garthwaite et al, 2013; Weston, 2012). Furthermore, those receiving support 
through being placed within the WRAG would find their entitlement subject 
to their compliance with work-related activity and time-limited to one year 
(Weston, 2012; Patrick, 2012). Subsequently, the Conservatives announced 
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that the ESA WRAG weekly payment would be cut from £102 to £73 as of 2017 
and suggested it provided claimants with more incentive to find work (Butler, 
2015b). As well as this, they laid out the need to reform Disability Living 
Allowance through the introduction of Personal Independence Payment from 
2013. According to the Disability Rights Partnership (2011), the replacement 
of DLA with PIP aimed to reduce expenditure by 20%, equating to a fiscal cut 
of £2.1 billion to disabled people with 750,000 DLA claimants set to lose their 
support whilst the justification for such drastic reform remained vague but 
framed within the wider principle of tackling fraud, neglecting that the level 
of fraud under this benefit was just 0.05%. What was most troubling in this 
case was that the government purported that this benefit contributed to 
long-term unemployment, neglecting the fact that this benefit existed in 
order to mitigate the extra costs incurred as a result of living with 
impairment and that a great number of people receiving DLA were in paid 
work (Spartacus, 2012; Roulstone 2015). 
For Garthwaite (2011: 369) this has simply highlighted “the unacceptable cost 
of those receiving sickness-related benefits”. According to Garthwaite et al 
(2013), the Coalition’s decision to push ahead with ESA and stricter eligibility 
marked a paradigm shift in the categorisation of disabled people, a group 
who they say has historically been considered as unquestioningly deserving of 
welfare assistance. It would be fair to quibble with this assertion that 
historically disabled people have always been viewed as deserving and even 
the extent to which this deserving status has been helpful. However, speaking 
of the tendency to view the sick and disabled as deserving within more recent 
social history, Briant, Watson and Philo (2013: 875) also note this shift in 
position, stating that whilst previous Conservative and Labour governments 
had broached the topic of sickness benefit reforms in the 90s, “cuts to 
disability benefit were seen as too politically dangerous and counter to public 
opinion”. According to Piggott and Grover (2009), this was due to the lack of 
discourse which vilified sick and disabled claimants at the time, a situation 
which has drastically changed since then. However, what is unique about the 
present situation is that the cuts are actually being implemented on the back 
of the financial crises as though disability benefits are somehow to blame for 
Chapter 1 Page 58 
Disability in ‘Neo-liberal’ Britain. A ‘Classification Struggle’? 
the collapse of the economy or that they are preventing economic recovery 
(Briant, Watson and Philo, 2013). 
Weston (2012) raises the debate about the moral legitimacy of conditionality 
for disabled people stating that on the one hand there are those who 
conceive of this group as genuinely excluded from employment as a result of 
the interplay between impairment and societal attitudes (Patrick 2011, 
referenced in Weston, 2012). On the other side of this it is argued that this 
group is largely “unemployed rather than truly incapacitated”, situating the 
responsibility of gaining employment on the individual (Mead, cited in Weston 
2012).  For Mead (2011: 281 cited in Weston, 2012), disabled individuals must 
accept this responsibility and reciprocate social contributions if they are to 
be held in mutual respect and “preserve a common citizenship”. Troublingly, 
whilst there may be some validity to Mead’s argument that there are some 
disabled people who are “just” unemployed and could be in work, the 
concern lies in the overemphasis of gaining employment, to the detriment of 
other considerations such as health, meaningful employment or job cuts. This 
has been demonstrated in the research of Garthwaite et al (2013) in which 
interviews with job brokers and case workers elucidated that their only 
target was to get disabled people into work regardless of other factors or 
outcomes. Specifically, Garthwaite et al (2013) raise that Mead (2011) 
expects this group to remove themselves from “ghettoes of poverty” and 
move further afield for work, evoking Norman Tebbit’s “get on your bike” 
approach favoured by Ian Duncan Smith. This neglects how problematic this 
may be for someone who has no car/relies upon public transport and further 
negotiations around care, children and health as well as the psychological 
barriers to taking the next step (Garthwaite et al, 2013). 
Additionally this approach is woefully ignorant of how the replacement of DLA 
with PIP is likely to impact disabled individuals. As we have already noted the 
introduction of PIP aimed to shrink the disability category further, even 
though the DLA was not an out of work benefit (Roulstone, 2015). By October 
2015, the government premised that 170,000 people would have their 
payment stopped whilst another 160,000 would have their award reduced 
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(Roulstone, 2015). This is despite the fact that the level of fraud within the 
DLA was, according to the DWP’s own figures, less than 0.05% (Spartacus 
Report, 2012). Given that these payments were intended to address the 
additional costs of disability the removal of this payment and even the 
significant delays in assessment and backlogs of payment caused by the 
introduction of PIP are likely to further exclude and impoverish disabled 
people, fundamentally ignoring the “long established link between disability 
and poverty and barriers to paid work” (Roulstone, 2015: 681). The increased 
conditionality of disability benefits has prompted much debate with many 
scholars and activists calling for greater recognition of the heterogeneity of 
applicants and the diversity of their needs (Weston, 2012). Crucially, the 
electorate has been severely misled about the level of benefit fraud and the 
supposedly easy access to disability benefits (McEnhill and Byrne, 2014). 
The emphasis of these reforms has been upon the penalisation and activation 
of individuals who have been historically perceived as innately unproductive, 
constructing unemployment as the result of individual failings rather than 
portraying the lack of demand for disabled employees and the numerous 
barriers to employment that disabled people face (Garthwaite, 2011). 
Moreover, the way in which disability benefit claimants have been portrayed 
by the media is yet another barrier to overcome. This is evident in the 
research from Garthwaite et al (2013: 9) which found that many stakeholders 
working with those who had been on long-term sickness benefits reiterated 
the negative stereotypes portrayed in the media, referring to how they 
though many of their claimants had adopted a “disabled lifestyle”. Similarly, 
Beatty et al (2009 cited in Garthwaite et al 2013) found that stakeholders 
certainly believed that a dependency culture existed amongst their clients. 
These negative perceptions of disability benefit claimants become even more 
troubling when we see that recent research from Inclusion Scotland (2015) 
has documented that some Job Centre staff have behaved in “openly hostile” 
ways and referred to claimants in derogatory terms. The incident highlighted 
within the report was that a claimant was shown a can of air freshener 
because the advisers thought “the people who come in here stink” (Inclusion 
Scotland, 2015: 23). The report therefore raises the extent to which the UK 
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Government can be believed when it states that its intention is to protect the 
most vulnerable. 
Beresford (2012) documents that the Coalition government, whilst purporting 
the thinly-veiled guise of compassion and protection for the truly vulnerable, 
became explicit in their targeting of the deserving poor through these benefit 
reforms and cuts to local services, a campaign which has been supported 
through defamatory portrayals of disabled people within the media. Social 
“branding” of individuals as deserving or undeserving has increasingly been 
adopted by the mass media leading to disability benefit recipients being 
variously described as scum, feckless, work-shy, scroungers etc (Garthwaite, 
2013; Garthwaite, Bambra and Warren, 2013). As a result, dependency upon 
the state has become subject to a demonising process and public concern in 
distinguishing between the unwilling and the unwell, the strivers vs. Skivers 
is central (Garthwaite, 2013; Valentine and Harris 2014). 
Iain Duncan Smith (2009: 4) has invoked the “emerging underclass” diagnosed 
by “intergenerational worklessness” as the justification for harsh reform 
arguing that these individuals must be recovered through the “recognition 
that the nature of the life you lead and the choices you make have a 
significant bearing on whether you live in poverty”. Elsewhere, he has stated 
that as much as 70% of Disability Living Allowance (DLA) claimants have been 
“allowed to fester” as a result of the current disability benefits system, 
costing the tax payer close to £13 billion each year (Smith, 2012). Addressing 
the Conservative Party Conference in 2011, Iain Duncan Smith advocated that 
the overhaul of the benefits systems was a means of restoring the failing 
economy and henceforth, welfare reform equated to the social reform of 
Broken Britain (The Conservative Party, 2011).The UK coalition government 
therefore endorsed that the welfare reform would help people get into work 
by way of promoting individual responsibility whilst ensuring that the most 
vulnerable are protected by a fairer benefits system (DWP, 2012a). The 
overhaul of the benefits system advocated by the UK Coalition and the 
successive Conservative government was therefore promoted as a means of 
restoring the failing economy through the eradication of mass welfare-
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dependency by increasing labour market activity amongst the long-term 
unemployed (The Conservative Party, 2011; DWP, 2012). 
The ongoing cuts being made to state welfare are said to be reflective of the 
“logic of neoliberalism”, through which increasingly restrictive eligibility is 
promoted and the penalisation of poverty and the principle of workfare is 
endorsed (Grover and Soldatic, 2013: 216; Etherington and Ingold, 2012).  
These cuts are legitimated through the political packaging of welfare-
dependency as a main source of social decay within a broken society, 
inculpating individuals as morally lax and devoid of work ethic and inclination 
(Dean, 2012; Garthwaite, 2011). The rhetoric of welfare reform within the 
current socio-political and economic climate has enabled a moralising 
discourse to distinguish between two distinct categories of welfare 
recipients; the deserving and undeserving (Garthwaite, 2014; Garthwaite, 
Bambra and Warren, 2013; Runswick-Cole and Goodley, 2011). As we have 
already observed, this is said to have facilitated the campaign against an 
alleged work-shy and welfare-dependent nation for which the cure is labour 
market activation (Weston, 2012). 
For Clarke (2005: 451), these “processes of ‘responsibilisation’ have 
increasingly shaped the ideal citizen of today” and as such, it has been 
reasoned that the welfare reform as proposed by the coalition government 
relies heavily upon the notion of there being an ethical deficit which needs to 
be filled by a moral citizen, that is, a citizen engaged in paid work and who 
fulfils civic duties (Dean, 2012). More recently, Friedli and Stearn (2015) have 
documented how recent workfare sanctions and conditionality of benefits 
functions to psychologically coerce welfare recipients through a number of 
interventions which seek to modify an individual’s attitudes, beliefs and 
personality. By locating unemployment in personal psychological deficit, 
unproductive and failing citizens are compelled to become “the right kind of 
subject” through mandatory training programmes which claim to harness 
psychologised traits of employability such as “confidence, optimism, self-
efficacy and aspiration” (Friedli and Stearn, 2015: 42). In their interviews 
with welfare recipients who were involved in such workfare programmes, 
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Friedli and Stearn (2015) found that failure to comply with the programme 
was met with harsh benefit sanctions and further psychological (d)evaluation. 
This psychological devaluation and exclusionary rhetoric is also extended to 
those who are not expected to work through the constant valorisation of paid 
employment and work-focussed behaviours at the expense of other socially 
contributory practices such as caring, parenting and volunteering (Patrick, 
2012). Participation in paid employment is therefore argued to be the 
hegemonic expectation of citizens and is reflected in rhetoric which 
emphasise “no rights without responsibilities” (Soldatic and Meekosha, 2012: 
140). 
Some have described the manufacturing of consent for harsh austerity 
measures in terms of a neo-liberal politics of disgust in which ‘wasted 
humans’ are turned into national abjects through a theory of power 
described as social abjectification (Tyler, 2013). In dealing with the 
defamatory portrayal of these subjects, the employment of affect as a means 
of engendering consensus is clearly readable (Leahy, 2009). Primarily, 
feelings of disgust are said to be mobilised in order to govern so that 
moralised and moralising dispositions and practices are entwined with 
affective bodily responses (Leahy, 2009). The portrayal of deserving and 
undeserving characters and the disabled benefit fraud contrasted against the 
moral taxpayer contributes to a “distinct ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy” in 
which the disabled figure is made Other (Garthwaite, 2014: 12). Significantly 
however, Garthwaite (2014) reports that the individualising government 
rhetoric and media portrayal of disabled benefit claimants has turned the 
sick and disabled against themselves. Within Garthwaite’s interviews many 
disabled people who expressed that they themselves faced stigma as a 
benefit claimant were quick to identify the Other and undeserving disabled in 
other people. Turning the poor on the poor through anti-welfare discourse is 
characterised in what Hoggett et al (2013) describes as the structure of 
feeling of resentment or what we might describe as displaced abjection 
(Stallybrass and White, 1986). Stallybrass and White (1986: 19) suggest that 
displaced abjection represents a process whereby symbolically low social 
groups turn against not those in authority, but those contained within even 
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lower social classifications. These feelings of resentment form a particular 
brand of feeling termed ressentiment which is described as the socially toxic 
form our grievances take when we are unable to discharge them and they 
build up as intense affective feelings (Hoggett et al, 2013). This element of 
disgust and its role in the social positioning of disabled people will be further 
developed within Chapter Four with reference to the psychosocial habitus. 
1.3.4 Conclusion - An Afterthought 
Within this chapter we have explored how the disabled figure has been and 
continues to be dys-entwined in the social contract between citizen and 
state. This is to say that disabled people have often seemed to be the 
awkward afterthought to implicitly non-disabled conceptualisations of 
citizenship practices. By tracing what it means to be a citizen through 
emerging forms of liberalism and alongside the welfare state we are able to 
see how an idea of the citizen as a responsible and independent worker has 
distilled, consolidating a vision of legitimate citizen subject and the 
associated lifestyle that is largely taken-for-granted. 
Documenting how disabled people have been traditionally excluded from 
employment demonstrates how disability troubles the notion of who counts as 
a citizen. This is largely the result of being perceived as non-productive and 
non-contributory members of society but who often still rely upon 
contribution-based social protection as a result of their exclusion from the 
labour market and the extra costs of living associated with disability. As far 
as political discourse is concerned, this “something for nothing” arrangement 
is incompatible with legitimate citizenship. 
No one could defensibly suggest (or at least no one would publicly voice) that 
disabled people who cannot work, contribute or provide for themselves 
should be abandoned by society, but neo-liberalism is couched in survival of 
the fittest rhetoric and “social neo-Darwinism” (Bourdieu: 1998a: 42).  The 
prevailing socio-political rhetoric of the responsible, entrepreneurial and 
active citizen continues to re-articulate the citizen as one who is 
independent, self-managing, in paid employment and responsive to the 
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demands of market. As Bourdieu has argued (2003: 30), neo-liberal ideology6 
has instituted social insecurity and precarity within the minds of the public so 
that a belief in the entrepreneurial citizen has become a societal norm 
“imposed on the dominated by the needs of the economy”. The return of 
individualism associated with neo-liberal doxa destroys the welfare state and 
our concepts of collective responsibility whilst facilitating an approach in 
which we blame the victim for their poor position and advocate the need for 
their reform (Bourdieu, 1998a: 7). Neo-liberal doxa however, is a 
conservative doxa which portrays itself as progressive and promotes the 
dismantling of the welfare state through a progressive rhetoric, seemingly 
advocating equality, mobility, fairness and empowerment (‘help them to help 
themselves’) (Bourdieu, 2003). 
Increasingly, as we saw in the final section on recent neo-liberal policies, 
disabled people are being portrayed as wilfully unemployed ‘problem 
citizens’ who lack the motivations and aspirations to lead legitimate lives, 
constructing the inequalities and poverty they face in terms of pathologised 
personalities rather than as the economic and social fallout of neo-liberalism 
(Raco, 2012). Long precluded from participating in the field of meaningful, 
paid employment but now expected to find work in exclusionary 
environments whilst facing moralising surveillance of welfare use, disabled 
people are at pains to define and occupy a legitimate citizen status. 
Crucially, as much as these welfare cuts may be viewed as inflicting untold 
damage and stress upon disabled people, this is but one aspect of the 
systemic exclusion that disabled people face. 
The remainder of this thesis suggests how we might begin to use Bourdieu to 
gain a comprehensive understanding of the micro, macro and meso aspects of 
disability. Bourdieu has rarely been read as a political sociologist or 
philosopher but the epicentral position of symbolic power and the 
concomitant significance of representation, legitimacy and bodies within his 
work constitute untapped concepts with which to think about politics 
                                         
6 Bourdieu would avoid the term ideology in favour of doxa and symbolic domination which 
will be examined in Chapter Three 
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(Wacquant, 2004). For Bourdieu the fundamental question of political 
philosophy is the problem of legitimacy (Swartz, 2013). Moreover, the 
centrality of the body to his social theory, specifically his focus on how power 
is exercised through bodies, provides a deeply embodied account of social 
position. In addition to this, Bourdieu provides concepts such as symbolic 
capital, which I will push in a new direction by developing an idea of negative 
symbolic capital, with which we can think about the politics of group-making. 
It will be suggested that whilst Bourdieu’s work is guilty of assuming a body 
unaffected by impairment or disablement, his theory can offer a 
comprehensive understanding of micro/macro aspects of disability which 
enables an analysis of individual, societal and institutional positioning of 
disability. Bourdieu’s habitus enables us to think about the position of 
disabled people within social space through a comprehensive understanding 
of capital and their relative values within this social space. In so doing, 
Bourdieu also provides us with a mode of understanding the point of view of 
those in these social spaces. The next chapter will review some of the 
existing work within disability studies before introducing Bourdieu’s concepts 
of habitus and hexis and their application to disability as well as a discussion 
of some of his criticisms. 
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Disability, Bourdieu and Bodies 
2.1 Introduction 
The first chapter has shown how disability occupies an increasingly precarious 
position within the context of neo-liberal Britain, evidencing the problematic 
conciliation of disabled people with ‘legitimate citizen’ status. For all that is 
wrong with the welfare cuts, they are one of many aspects of exclusion that 
disabled people face (Birrell, 2015). This chapter will begin by reflecting on 
the contemporary models of understanding disability before suggesting that 
the work of Bourdieu may provide useful in explaining the multifaceted 
exclusion that some disabled people face.  It will be suggested that where 
other models of disability variously lack embodied, cultural or political 
perspectives, Bourdieu’s framework enables an account of these three 
elements as simultaneously entwined. 
Drawing upon many of his writings, this chapter will look at Bourdieu’s work 
on class, embodiment, value and practice which enables a discussion of the 
relationship between bodies and social inequalities. Arguably Bourdieu’s most 
famous work, Distinction (1984) develops a theory of aesthetic judgement 
and stratification which demonstrates how tastes (and distastes) are related 
to and reflective of an individual’s classed position. At the heart of 
understanding how we become aesthetically differentiated is the 
conceptualisation of the body as “bearer of symbolic value” (Shilling 2003: 
111). This chapter will address the centrality of the body to Bourdieu’s social 
theory and critically assess how he conceived of social action in terms of 
unconscious and embodied dispositions which enable unthinking ways of being 
in the world before addressing the impact of class on the body and habitus. 
For Bourdieu (1984), class, class tastes and the habitus are heavily mediated 
by the body and its incorporated dispositions as well as reliant upon the 
stability of the habitus for the social reproduction of bodies. However, in his 
focus on class and how class is embodied, he has sidelined other distinctions 
which qualify us with value, such as disability. 
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This chapter will therefore examine the significance of embodied 
differentiation and the importance of aesthetics and value through an 
analysis of Bourdieu’s work on (dis)taste, arguing that his work on class taste 
is not sufficient in explaining how bodies become valued or devalued and 
must acknowledge the wider doxic knowledge and corporeal ideologies 
against which bodies are measured. I will also demonstrate that although 
Bourdieu perceived his work as deeply embodied and thus portrays agents as 
both a physiological and social entity, his writing on the corporeal actually 
privileges cultural determinacy and bears no consideration to the instances in 
which impaired bodies do not comply with the ideals of cultural control. 
I will then go on to show that much of what Bourdieu has to say about the 
deeply embodied nature of the habitus reflects and relies upon a presupposed 
non-disabled corporeality. In attempting to synthesise the social with the 
physiological, Bourdieu has overlooked the potential stickiness in this 
approach and at times, even overstated the biological underpinning and 
capacity of the habitus. I will therefore be advancing Bourdieu by bringing 
him into discussion with disability. This chapter ultimately intimates that the 
work of Bourdieu and disability studies have much to gain from one another. 
As Boys and Shakespeare (2009: 5) have suggested, using disability to 
understand the occupation of social space uncovers so much of what is 
“normally hidden” and in so doing, “can help minimize the symbolic violence 
within social relations and, in particular, within the relations of 
communication” (Bourdieu, 1998b: 17). 
2.2 Understanding Disability 
According to Thomas (2004: 569), within Britain there were two main 
domains in the sociology of disability, the first of which might be considered 
“‘disability studies’ proper”, an approach associated with the social model 
which locates disability as structured by exclusion, inequality and social 
oppression. The other domain is that of the medical sociology sub-genre of 
‘the sociology of health and chronic illness’ in which disability is viewed in 
terms of illness and impairment, social suffering and disadvantage (Thomas, 
2004). More recently, a critical disability studies has emerged, closely related 
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to the North American approach which has often gone by the name of 
cultural disability studies and which seeks to deconstruct and unsettle ideas 
about disability which permeate society (Goodley, 2012, Shakespeare, 2014, 
Vehmas and Watson, 2014). 
Whilst the social model has its roots in 1960s and 1970s activism (associated 
with the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation, UPIAS), up 
until the 1990s, disability was largely thought of in medical, curative and 
rehabilitative terms, highlighting the role of psychology, social work and 
special needs treatment in disabled peoples’ lives (Barnes, 2012; Goodley, 
2012). Emphasis placed upon a person’s productivity worked to Other 
disabled bodies as deficient and inferior entities, serving to substantiate 
medical discourse as a definitive institution, legitimised in its fixing of 
unconventional and unproductive bodies (Abberley, 1987; Finkelstein, 1990). 
This medical labelling sustained the belief that disability was a private and 
personal tragedy which was to be overcome and portrayed the idea that the 
root cause of experience and disadvantage was individual impairment (Oliver, 
1996; Crow, 1996). These traditional, medical and individualistic 
understandings of disability have gradually been replaced by the socio-
political account known widely as the ‘social model’ (Barnes, 2000). This 
perspective has tended to focus on “materialist, neo-Marxist and structuralist 
perspectives” of disability which have historically excluded disabled people 
from the mainstream (Goodley et al, 2012: 3). As we saw in chapter one, the 
historical exclusion of disabled people has often been attributed to a 
combination of classical liberal thinking, industrial change, increased 
medicalisation and social Darwinist and eugenicist thinking (Barnes, 2012). 
For many disability activists and scholars, the social model of disability is the 
only appropriate and effective definition and analysis of disability, 
functioning as an “ideological litmus test of disability politics”, without which 
it is alleged there can be no political progress or social movement of disabled 
people (Shakespeare and Watson, 2001: 3; Shakespeare, 2014). In identifying 
the dominant non-disabled values and practices which permeate society, the 
social model highlighted how vast sections of society were constructed as off 
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limits to those with impairments whilst at the same time constructing the 
idea that these individuals should be separated from mainstream society 
(Hughes and Paterson, 1997).  The social model also highlights a distinction 
made between biologically based impairment and disability, distinguishing 
disability as a social situation which arises from the unnecessary exclusions, 
disadvantages and restrictions imposed on top of impairment by 
contemporary social organisation (Oliver, 1996; Shakespeare and Watson, 
2001). Conceptualising impairment as separate from disability in this way 
lead Oliver (1996) to argue that disability was entirely social and relegated 
impairment as theoretically unimportant (Thomas, 2007).  The social model 
therefore provided the political strategy of removing barriers which denied 
disabled people full citizenship as well as a new positive way of thinking 
about disability as rooted in social oppression rather than individual deficit 
(Shakespeare and Watson, 2001; Hughes and Paterson, 1999). For 
Shakespeare (2006), the social model could be said to have provided disabled 
people with an intra-psychic buffer against medicalised negativity which may 
otherwise threaten an individual’s psycho-emotional qualities of self-esteem, 
self-respect and self-confidence which he posits as integral to our life-
project. At the same time, Shakespeare (2014) has also acknowledged that 
the medical model and medical sociology have become besmirched terms 
within disability studies, despite their increased recognition of how 
environmental and social factors contribute to disability. In point of fact, the 
sub-field of medical sociology known as the sociology of chronic illness and 
disability is going through a period of transition as a result of the engagement 
between medical sociology and disability studies (Scambler and Scambler, 
2010). 
The success of the social model in politicising social and physical space and in 
defining disability as a form of oppression imposed through problematic 
social organisation is widely recognised (Hughes and Paterson, 1997, Goodley, 
2012). However, in constructing disability as social and political exclusion and 
as a matter of citizenship, the social model has relegated impairment to the 
biomedical domain and failed to include an embodied, subjective account of 
the diverse social and political experiences of impairment (Hughes and 
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Paterson, 1997, Hughes, 2004). Whilst impairment is the logical prerequisite 
of disability, the social model was said to rely entirely upon the “conceptual 
severing of any causal connection between impairment and disability” 
(Thomas, 2004: 571). As Crow (1996) has suggested, the reluctance of the 
social model to engage with impairment reflects an impractical denial of the 
body for fear that it should be perceived as broken, weak and vulnerable and 
thereby grant legitimacy to the prejudices against impaired bodies. Whereas 
the various corporealities of other civil right movement groups (such as 
sexuality, skin colour, sex) are not intrinsically unpleasant, difficult or 
problematic, impairment can constitute painful and unmanageable 
embodiment (Crow, 1996). This silencing of impairment within social model 
thinking therefore produces it as a taboo topic and denies the subjective 
experiences that disabled people have of their bodies (Crow, 1996). In this 
respect, the classical social barriers approach to disability has prioritised the 
experiences of disabled men (Morris, 1991) even though the experience of 
disability is interwoven with issues of sex, gender, race and so on (Thomas, 
1999). Crow (1996) therefore suggests that changing the perceptions and 
interpretations of impairment is crucial to ameliorating the disabling 
attitudes of society but that impairment must be included as part of the 
experience of disability for the sake of peoples own physical and 
psychological well-being. Similarly, Shakespeare (1994) has recommended the 
re-conceptualisation of the social model to acknowledge that people with 
impairments are disabled by prejudice which manifests in cultural 
representation, language, socialization and interpersonal relations. 
Thomas (2004) notes that the social model perspective arose partly from 
thinking from Vic Finkelstein in the 1970s when he stated that disability could 
be regarded in one of two ways, as either a personal tragedy or a form of 
social oppression and that it was imperative that disability should be seen as 
the latter. Finkelstein’s thinking at the time was in response to the social 
treatment of disabled people “in its welfarist form: residential care, minimal 
benefits, exclusion from employment and the educational mainstream, and 
blocks on access to the built environment” (Thomas, 2004: 571). Whilst 
Finkelstein acknowledged that living with impairment could feel like a 
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personal tragedy and that it could impose substantial difficulties, this should 
remain a private matter and personal experiences should only be discussed if 
it promoted wider social change (Thomas, 2004).  As such, it has been 
suggested that the social model does not automatically preclude 
understandings of impairment as a source of disability and that this kind of 
criticism arises from the model being largely interpreted as a social barriers 
approach which has diluted the early social relational thinking of its 
proponents (Thomas, 2004). For Thomas (2004: 580), a social relational 
account of disability is “sorely needed within disability studies” and would 
provide an understanding of disability as only coming into play when 
“restrictions of activity experienced by people with impairment are socially 
imposed”, therefore acknowledging that impairments may restrict activity 
but that this does not automatically constitute disability. These might be 
better understood as impairment effects: 
“Impairment effects: the direct and unavoidable impacts that 
‘impairments’ (physical, sensory, intellectual, emotional) have on 
individuals’ embodied functioning in the social world. Impairments and 
impairment effects are always bio-social and culturally constructed in 
character, and may occur at any stage in the life course” (Thomas, 
2010: 37). 
Thomas (2010: 37) therefore suggests that a new sociology of disability would 
revolve around disablism, defined as “the social imposition of avoidable 
restrictions on the life activities, aspirations and psycho-emotional well-being 
of people categorised as ‘impaired’ by those deemed ‘normal’”. This 
approach would recognise that impairment is significant in the lives of 
disabled people but that this is not the main focus in the study of battling 
disability as social oppression (Thomas, 2004). 
Shakespeare and Watson (2001) have pointed to understanding disability as 
“embodied ontology” which would argue that there is no qualitative 
difference between disabled and non-disabled people because “No one’s 
body works perfectly, or consistently, or eternally” and that as part of the 
human condition, we are all inherently vulnerable and frail and limited by our 
bodies. The task is therefore exposing how the continuum of embodiment is 
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translated into a dichotomy between able-bodied and disabled (Shakespeare 
and Watson, 2001). They raise that whilst an embodied ontology approach 
would highlight our universal mortality, there remains a proportion of people 
who face further disabling practice.  Understanding these exclusionary and 
discriminatory practices which falsely dichotomises the continuum of 
embodiment is therefore key to producing an empowering disability studies 
(Shakespeare and Watson, 2001). However, Hughes (2007: 677) has noted 
that whilst in theory this approach seems to ameliorate the existential 
negativity associated with disability, it does so at the expense of a politicised 
disability identity and therefore only delivers a “hollow scholastic victory”. In 
appealing to frailty of the universal condition, disabled people are impelled 
to make a claim to humanity, a requisite not necessarily expected of those 
who are non-disabled (Hughes, 2007). Moreover, whilst the ontological 
negativity may be removed from the categories of impairment and disability, 
Hughes (2007) notes that negative lived experience is not so easily negated so 
long as the normative non-disabled body remains undisrupted within the 
public imaginary. As Bourdieu (2000: 65) might have argued “To grant 
‘humanity’ to all, but in a purely formal way, is to exclude from it, under the 
appearance of humanism, all those who are deprived of the means of 
realizing it”. This “purely theoretical universalization leads to a fictitious 
universalism” which can only be sustained so long as there are no reminders 
of the social and economic conditions which mediates access to this 
universalism (Bourdieu, 2000: 65). 
What is more, theorising embodiment in this way seems to “give way to a 
body that is over-endowed with nature and over-determined by its natural 
limitations” (Hughes, 2007: 677). For Hughes (2007), disability questions 
about ontology should therefore problematise non-disablement and reveal 
the forms of invalidation at the centre of disabling culture. The social model 
has therefore been well critiqued for the way in which it constructs the rigid 
dichotomy between impairment and disability, creating an unsustainable 
distinction in the binary of social vs. biological (Hughes and Paterson 1999; 
Shakespeare and Watson, 2001). Noting the “untenable separation between 
body and culture, impairment and disability”, Hughes and Paterson (1997), 
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amongst others (Morris, 1991; Crow, 1992; Shakespeare and Watson, 2001), 
called for the expansion of the social model to include embodied notions of 
disability and experiences of the social nature of impairment. In “bringing the 
body back in”, a dialogue between disability studies and the sociology of the 
body has created opportunities to further disability identity discourses. 
However, Hughes (2009a: 400) notes that this dialogue has been “profoundly 
uneasy because it threatens to undo the distinction between disability and 
impairment that is at the core of social model thinking”. Shakespeare (2014: 
22) has noted that this distinction between biological impairment and 
structural disability is “conceptually and empirically very difficult to 
sustain”, evidencing the experience of stigma and discrimination as an area 
in which individual deficits and social responses become entangled and thus 
obscure the contribution of each factor. Moreover, impairments can cause 
discomfort and pain and this is a consequence of the interaction of 
“physiological, psychological and socio-cultural factors” and therefore can 
never be fully separated from the social (Shakespeare, 2014: 22). As Reeve 
(2006) has argued, the social model of disability has ignored anything to do 
with the psychological in case the individual tragedy model of disability is 
evoked by suggesting that disabled people may need some psychological help. 
 Hughes (2009a: 399) has also talked about the ventures of sociology into 
disability as conflating it with the ontology of human frailty or being purely 
descriptive when accounting for structural exclusion and as a result “tells us 
very little about the specific forms of invalidation experienced by disabled 
people”. He suggests that tropes such as wounded, monstrous and abject may 
tell us about the processes through which disabled people are misrecognised 
but do not fully explain the experiences of disabled lives. 
Cultural disability studies in America is more entrenched in the liberal arts 
and humanities (Hughes, 2009a) and like critical disability studies (CDS), have 
been keen to demonstrate how disability has been ideologically constructed 
and therefore seeks to deconstruct and destabilise contemporary 
understandings of disability (Goodley, 2012). Shildrick (2012: 31) has raised 
that the socio-political gains and materialist understanding of disability is not 
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sufficient and that social model thinking has neglected subjectivity, and 
posits that the primary question that all those in disability studies must be 
concerned with is why is society “so unsettled by non-normative forms of 
embodiment”? To this, she adds that we “should try to understand the 
psychosocial dimensions which mobilise normative exclusions” (Shildrick, 
2012: 35). She raises that whilst we have seen the “formal integration of 
disabled people into the standard rights, obligations and expectations of 
normative citizenship” and despite the huge variation in human bodies, to be 
disabled is to be exceptional and seen as not properly human. The proper 
attributes of personhood are elaborated as agency, autonomy, rationality, 
control over ones’ body, and a “clear distinction between self and other” 
(Shildrick, 2012: 32). For Shildrick (2012: 35) we have to go beyond the 
formal model in which disabled people are invoked to “maximise their status 
of good citizens of the neo-liberal polity” and instead “must seek ways of 
first critiquing and then transforming the nature of those entrenched and 
scarcely acknowledged obstacles to fundamental change”. In order to contest 
the ableist values underpinning such normative functioning CDS focuses on: 
“the significance of embodiment; an awareness of the workings of the 
cultural imaginary; a deconstruction of binary thought in favour of the 
fluidity of all categories; and a recognition that emotion and affect are 
as important as the material aspects of life”. (Shildrick, 2012: 32) 
For Shildrick (2012: 35), the disabled body has the potential performative 
capacity to radically queer and disrupt normative embodiment and thus 
directly challenge the attitudes and able-bodied values of society. As Goodley 
(2012) suggests, when we examine disability closely the reality of the 
disabled or impaired body begins to break down, advocating the 
conceptualisation of the body as fluid and that disabled bodies can 
performatively and productively challenge the normative ideas of able-
bodiedness.  However, this neglects that to take part in these kinds of 
performative politics presupposes access to other forms of capital and 
neglects the “inextricable entwinement of material and discursive relations” 
(McNay, 2004: 182). For disabled people, the material and economic 
inequalities that so often characterize their lives can and do have alienating 
consequences for political agency and their investment in it. This is to say 
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that prolonged exposure to inequalities and social suffering can create 
feelings of disempowerment and resignation and therefore neglects the 
deeply embodied dispositions which make acting in our best political interest 
more challenging (McNay, 2014). To suggest that performative politics is a 
liberating practice that agents can adopt therefore ignores that this type of 
political agency falls well outside the norms of everyday life for many 
disabled people. Moreover, it is “naive, even dangerous to suppose and 
suggest that one has only to ‘deconstruct’ these social artefacts in a purely 
performative celebration of ‘resistance’ in order to destroy them” (Bourdieu, 
2000: 108). The affirmative approach of performative politics therefore 
overlooks the depoliticising and disempowering effect that inequality and 
social suffering may exert on subjectivities (McNay, 2014).  As will be further 
developed in the remaining chapters, the insidiousness of disablism and 
disabling practices draws its strength and efficacy from the deeply embodied 
doxic knowledge of disability and doxic structures and is not reducible to 
simply a matter of discourse. This is to say that a belief and commitment to 
the able-bodied norm and its value is not ideological (although it may be 
ideologically reinforced) because it does not have to be stated. Moreover, to 
performatively disrupt discourse does not equate to a transformation of 
subjectivity, practice or structure. As Bourdieu (2000: 108) states, we can 
“doubt the reality of a resistance which ignores the resistance of ‘reality’”. 
In this respect, there are those who have questioned the political impact of 
CDS, suggesting that it may be more appropriate to speak of a mildly critical 
disability studies (Barry Barnes cited in Shakespeare, 2014: 56). 
Vehmas and Watson (2016) have also noted that in reducing disability to 
discursive norms, these analyses fail to explore “the economic processes, the 
social relational and organizational life and the material interests and other 
non-discursive forms of power that create disability”. In this respect, CDS 
neglects “the complex ensembles of power where systemic forms of 
oppression mediate embodied identity” (McNay, 2008: 120). In addition to 
this, Vehmas and Watson (2016) have recently highlighted that normativity 
has taken on a pejorative meaning within critical disability studies due to it 
being conflated with ideas about what is normal or the normate and 
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therefore being viewed as a major source of oppression experienced by 
disabled people. They point out that if we muddle the concept of normativity 
with the trope of normality, we may “restrict or even prevent fruitful 
evaluative discussion on important ethical and political issues that relate to 
disabled people’s lives” (Vehmas and Watson, 2016: 2). Conceptualising 
normativity as a broad term to cover “evaluative judgements of an ethical 
sort” they note that normative thinking is concerned with what kind of 
practices we should or ought to do in order to provide people with the good 
life. In this respect, they argue that the ideals of normative ethics are not 
the problem but the way in which they are applied and used to discriminate 
against disabled people leading them to caution that “we should be careful 
not to throw out the baby with the water” (Vehmas and Watson, 2016: 8). 
Vehmas and Watson (2014) also highlight that CDS has attempted to show 
how the binary thinking about disability and able-bodiedness deceives people 
into valuing one side of this division over the other and that the solution is to 
deconstruct such binary thinking so that identities can be produced “free 
from the normative constraints imposed” by such a dualism. In these terms, 
disability is seen to be a socially produced difference which has negative 
ramifications in terms of social arrangement for those who fall into the 
category. Social organisation which reifies or enforces this negative 
difference are therefore morally wrong, and as such, demonstrates that CDS 
“contains strong normative dimension that implies what is right or wrong as 
regards social arrangements”. However, they also point out that CDS treats 
impairment as though it is part of a spectrum of acceptable embodiment, 
neglecting that “some forms of embodiment are preferential to others” and 
that impairment effects are neither neutral nor benign and have very real 
and visceral consequences for experience. This is to say that “one reason why 
people generally prefer not to have impairments is ethical” (Vehmas and 
Watson, 2014: 641). In this respect, while CDS demonstrate a commitment to 
normative questions about what is good or bad regarding social organisation, 
they fail to take on the normative dimension of living with impairment. 
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Williams (1999) characterises this kind of commitment to the discursive 
nature of the body as one which constructs the body as though it doesn’t 
really matter at all. This is said to reduce the body to “what is known about 
it” so that statements about the body are assessed in terms of the systems of 
knowledge we have of bodies, that is, epistemologically rather than 
ontologically. Vehmas (2012) suggests that an ontological discussion of 
disability has significant political ramifications because of the way in which 
our understanding of certain phenomena inevitably instructs social and 
institutional responses to it. 
Vehmas (2012) makes the distinction between brute facts as those facts 
which exist independently of human beings, and institutional or social facts, 
those which can exist only within human institutions. Before we can agree on 
a social fact, we must have a physical realisation of this in the form of a 
brute fact, a thing upon which we can impose social functions. Vehmas (2012) 
expands that social facts are therefore hierarchically structured and exist 
atop brute facts. This leads Vehmas (2012) to the inevitable critique of the 
social model of disability as ontologically insufficient in that disability cannot 
be entirely conceptualised in terms of the institutional fact of oppression 
without the underlying brute fact of physical impairment. Vehmas (2012: 
301) therefore states that ontological analysis must address the “physical 
origins of impairment and the relational nature of disability” so that we may 
identify, with the aim to eradicate, both the social and physiological factors 
of distress. This is said to afford us greater flexibility and efficiency in our 
aims to increase equality and well-being when we are able to identify 
whether people require physical or social responses, or both (Vehmas, 2012). 
Disability and impairment as phenomena are therefore composed of both 
natural and social factors; impairment refers to natural properties which, in 
certain situations, limit functionality although the limiting properties of the 
environment can be explained in terms of social facts as well (Vehmas, 2012). 
Vehmas (2012: 301) states that impairment therefore always involves a 
physical or organic basis, “a condition of some sort which is seen as 
undesirable regarding people’s organic or social functioning”. As Williams 
(1999) notes “The body in short, diseased or otherwise, is a real entity, no 
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matter what we call it or how we observe it”.  As such, no matter how fluid 
you envisage embodiment and no amount of unsettling ideas about disability 
breaks down the visceral realities of impairment. 
At this stage I would like to suggest that Bourdieu can provide some 
important contributions to understanding disability. Whilst the social model 
provides strong political purchase in its social barriers approach and rejection 
of medical labelling, it has been criticized as failing to fully incorporate an 
understanding of impairment and, as Thomas (2004) has argued, has not 
made best use of its social relational approach. I would argue that Bourdieu 
provides a relational approach which is simultaneously political, embodied 
and cultural. Bourdieu has refused to separate the micro and macro aspects 
of social life and through his conceptualization of the political economy of 
symbolic power, fuses together an approach to practice which is both 
phenomenological and structural (Wacquant in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992). 
For Bourdieu, the body, conceptualized as habitus and bodily hexis, is 
inherently socio-political and expressive of our relation to power. Bourdieu 
illuminates how unequal relations of power are disguised as natural and posits 
that the role of the sociologist should be to “destroy the myths that cloak the 
exercise of power and the perpetuation of domination” through 
denaturalizing and defatalizing the social world (Wacquant, in Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992: 49). This commitment to uncovering hidden exclusion allows 
us to identify not only the disabling material and organisational structures 
which exclude disabled people, but also the mental dispositions emerging 
from and constitutive of this exclusionary practice. 
Bourdieu’s work also incorporates a phenomenological and corporeal 
perspective through his analysis of embodied practice and how we develop 
ways of being through preferences, dispositions and leanings. Based on our 
social position, an agent will develop a sense of ease or unease, belonging or 
alienation, our bodies will remind us when we are in and out of place and 
socially guide us through our tastes and distastes, our discomfort, and 
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through feeling as though we have a right to be. As well as this, Bourdieu’s 
conceptualization of symbolic power also enables us to think through the 
complex mutuality of material and symbolic relations and provides an 
account of how the disabling social order interacts with a psychic framework 
of disablism through doxa and symbolic capital which I will cover in Chapter 
Three. I will also suggest that although Bourdieu did not contend with 
normative thought within his own work, doxa provides a useful way of 
conceptualising how normative judgements pervade and help consolidate our 
practice as well as how these judgements may become negatively skewed by 
the symbolic power of doxa. The embodied experience of symbolic capital 
demonstrates Bourdieu’s sensitivity to the existential toll of symbolic struggle 
and opens up space in which to develop a psychosocial understanding of the 
habitus, disability and inequality, which I will discuss in Chapter Four. 
Moreover, his thinking allows us to conceptualise disability as composed of 
both social and organic factors. 
I suggest then that a Bourdieusian approach to disability can provide complex 
analyses at the level of the body, psychological, cultural, social and political. 
Whilst recognising there are problems with some of Bourdieu’s work “we 
should best defend his achievements by putting his theories to work in fresh 
ways, yet always, of course, with a critical gaze” (Fowler, 2003: 487). The 
chapter will now introduce how the work of Bourdieu can contribute to 
disability studies, indicating some of his criticisms before developing an 
account of the importance of the body to his project. Integral to this account 
is a consideration of Bourdieu’s most powerful analytical tool, the habitus. 
2.3 Bourdieu 
Bourdieu’s work has been subject to an array of fierce criticisms with many 
of his critics arguing that his work is overly deterministic, pessimistic7 and 
displays a reproductionist bias (Crossley, 2002; Shilling, 2003; Jenkins, 1992). 
                                         
7 Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) would argue that his critics view him as in 
favour of a pessimistic determinism when in truth, he sees it as his job to report on the 
nature of things, even if he did not approve of this nature. Moreover, he envisages the 
habitus as having the potential to disrupt determinisms through providing socio-analysis of 
the self. This will be further developed in the Chapter Five. 
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For many, Bourdieu’s writings are notoriously verbose and have been 
criticised for their abstruse, often imprecise and muddied quality (Jenkins, 
1992). According to Jenkins (1992), the esoteric nature of Bourdieu’s work 
has alienated many would-be readers and as such rendered him a theorist to 
be read about rather than critically engaged with and has therefore largely 
precluded the potential expansion of his concepts. At the same time, it is 
Bourdieu’s enigmatic writing style which has equipped his social theory with a 
certain slipperiness, granting it an equivocal status which permits multiple 
interpretations of his work and allows for it “to mean all things to all people” 
(Jenkins, 1982: 271). 
Bourdieu (1984: xi) cautioned his readers that his work would strike them as 
“very French”, acknowledging that the French intellectual field informed his 
ambition to tackle Kant’s critique of judgement. Noting that his work’s focus 
has been the persistence of Parisian model of ‘court society’, Bourdieu (1984) 
suggests that his model of relationships may be more broadly applied, even 
when based on a system of distinctive features and social differences which 
varies considerably from his own research. Bourdieu (1984: xii) therefore 
encouraged his readers to “correct my mistakes and perhaps pursue the 
search for equivalents”. It is in this vein that this thesis seeks to theorise how 
(British, neo-liberal) society produces systems of classification which 
structures the position, perception and experience of disability. 
Wacquant (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) has highlighted that much of 
Bourdieu’s work is read in bits and pieces and that this fragmented and 
partial reading of Bourdieu has resulted in his work being largely 
misinterpreted and misunderstood. At the same time, Bourdieu’s work was 
very much a work in progress which unfolded over a great length of time and 
in different analytical spaces (Wacquant in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) 
and so as might be expected, it is hard to find a concise and comprehensive 
account in which he brings all of his work together. Wacquant (in Bourdieu 
and Wacquant, 1992: 5) expands that English-speaking readers of Bourdieu 
have tended to cluster around one of his major books (namely Reproduction 
in Education, Society and Culture for specialists in education and Distinction 
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for sociologists of culture and class), treating them in isolation to much of his 
other writings and thereby ignoring the substantive theoretical connections 
and developments which permeate his work. However, Bourdieu’s writing is 
so vast and abstruse that it seems unfair to expect anyone to be deeply 
familiar with even a moderate portion of it or that a partial understanding is 
somehow the fault of the reader. Two decades later, Swartz (2013) reiterates 
that within the United States and Britain, Bourdieu remains to be seen as a 
sociologist of culture, class and education or as an anthropologist, making the 
application of Bourdieu in disability studies seem perhaps less than obvious. 
Whilst his work may be primarily associated with class, culture and 
education, Bourdieu’s social theory has been successfully developed in 
various ways to advance discussions on gender and attendant notions of 
identity and social order, progressing understandings of gender relations and 
hierarchies as well as an analysis of their own self-evidence (Thorpe, 2009). 
Adkins (2004) states that although Bourdieu’s social theory paid relatively 
little attention to gender or women8 (with the exception of his later work in 
Masculine Domination), his work has been adapted by numerous feminists to 
analyse problems of agency, social movements, recognition, power and 
embodiment. 
It is important to raise that there are those who have argued that Bourdieu is 
in danger of treating other features of embodiment (such as sex, gender, 
sexuality and race) as peripheral to that of social class in terms of positioning 
(Lovell, 2000; Reay, 2004). As has already been noted, this could equally be 
said of disability and it might also be argued that this is a trait he shares with 
early disability studies. For Bourdieu, the habitus is acquired through 
socialisation and therefore will reflect the socio-economic conditions in 
which it exists. However, the socialisation of the habitus will also reflect 
values and practices not reducible to class alone; it will reflect the relational 
conditions we encounter in our interactions with others as well as the 
physical and cultural environmental conditions in which we live. In this 
                                         
8 It could be argued that Bourdieu (1977) did write quite a bit on women and gender in 
Kabyle society but that this is not the kind of work on gender that feminists have sought. As 
Reay (2004: 436) has noted, although Bourdieu’s theoretical framework allows an 
examination of gender domination his focus has primarily been on “gender divisions in 
Algeria in the 1960s”. 
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respect, the socialisation of the habitus’ will have important bearing on the 
values attached to disability (as well as gender, sexuality, race). 
Barton (1993) has advised that in attempting to understand the exclusion of 
disabled people, we need to understand material conditions (given that 
disabled people are often out of work, dependent upon welfare or at the 
bottom of the income ladder [Borsay, 2005]), social relations and ideology. 
This is important because “Being disabled entails social and economic 
hardships as well as assaults upon self-identity and emotional well-being. 
However, the difficulties and responses to being disabled are influenced by 
class, race, gender and age. These can cushion or compound the experience 
of discrimination and oppression” (Barton 1993: 238). I suggest that a 
Bourdieusian approach to disability enables us to think about the position of 
disabled people within social space through a comprehensive understanding 
of the habitus, capital and their relative values within this social space. In so 
doing, the habitus provides us with a mode of understanding the point of view 
of those in these social spaces and therefore provides us with a way of 
thinking of both the agent’s position and dispositions (Lovell 2002). Therefore 
the dispositions of the habitus will correspond not only to social class, but to 
intersecting features of embodiment like sex, race and disability. 
Also worth noting is that Bourdieu has rarely been read as a political 
sociologist but the epicentral position of symbolic power and the concomitant 
significance of representation, legitimacy and misrecognition within his work 
constitute untapped concepts with which to think about politics9 (Wacquant, 
2004). What perhaps makes Bourdieu so useful in thinking about disability is 
how he seeks to uncover the double naturalisation of the socio-political 
order, that is, the naturalisation of value, legitimacy and politics in things 
and in bodies which are themselves naturalised (Wacquant, 2004). For 
Bourdieu (1977; 1984; 1990; 2000), bodies are inherently political. This work 
is interested in how Bourdieu’s theory provides an account of power as it 
manifests at macro, micro and meso levels, and specifically in and through 
                                         
9  Swartz (2013) has also observed that Bourdieu has been fundamentally concerned (if 
overlooked) with power and politics. This will be further explored within Chapter Three. 
Chapter 2 Page 83 
Disability, Bourdieu and Bodies 
bodies. Bourdieu’s commitment to revealing power in its disguised forms as 
well as the significance of the body within his theory makes his analysis a 
potent political and embodied sociology for disability studies. As we saw in 
Chapter one, the inequality and exclusion that disabled people face is 
undoubtedly mediated by experiences of material poverty and socio-
economic structure, but inequality and disabling attitudes extend much 
further, becoming embodied in everyday practices and thinking. The chapter 
will now examine the habitus and body within Bourdieu’s work in order to 
show the deeply embodied nature of practices and the importance of 
dispositions, as well as their capacity to function as means of inclusion and 
exclusion through (dis)tastes. 
2.4 Habitus and Bodies as Bearers of Value 
At the heart of Pierre Bourdieu’s social theory lies the body as a “bearer of 
symbolic value” (Shilling, 2003: 111). Central to this statement is an 
assessment of the body as a form of physical capital which is both reflective 
of and constituted by an individual’s social location and which possesses 
“power, status and distinctive symbolic forms” (Shilling, 2003: 111). In this 
sense, Bourdieu positions the body at the centre of understanding the social, 
cultural and political and as such, body management becomes integral to the 
process of acquiring status and distinction (Shilling, 2003). This analysis of 
the body illuminates the extent to which it has developed as a more nuanced 
form of physical capital, referring not only to the way in which physical 
bodies are converted as a form of labour power but how they are produced as 
symbolic forms of capital which possess different values in different fields 
(Shilling, 2003). Conceiving of the body in this way enables a richer 
understanding of the exercise of power through bodies as a result of the 
specifically classed and classifiable ways of relating to our bodies. 
Bourdieu (1977; 1984; 1990) stated that the various physical acts necessary 
for social action come to shape our bodies in very visceral ways, instilling 
deeply embedded corporeal dispositions and creating stable forms of bodily 
comportment allegorical of the classed conditions of existence of which they 
are a part. Bodies are therefore said to be marked by social class through 
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three interrelated means; social location, the habitus and taste (Shilling, 
2003). As such, it is helpful to think of the body in and through the habitus 
when trying to unpack the topic of embodiment within Bourdieu’s social 
theory. 
According to Bourdieu (1990), social action should not be thought of in terms 
of compliance to objective rules nor as the consequences of rational thinking 
from free subjects but instead as embodied dispositions developed through 
the experiential interplay of objectivism/subjectivism, structure and agency. 
The social world, as perceived through our own body, inculcates a corporeal 
understanding or embodied sense of the wider social structures and 
relationships within the field and our bodily relation to it, characterised as 
the habitus (Bourdieu, 1990). Bourdieu (1977: 72) states that the habitus 
contains “systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures...[it is] an acquired system 
of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in 
which it is constituted” (1977: 95). This is to say that individuals possess a 
cognitive structure that internalises the external structures and conditions 
that they encounter in everyday life which then informs their thoughts, 
behaviour and actions. These subjective schemas in turn come to shape the 
external world through the actions and meaning that individuals exert upon 
it, which in turn can influence and develop the antecedent schema, 
demonstrating the synergistic quality of the habitus. This demonstrates how 
the body “is not a passive component in politics. It may well be shaped by 
social relationships, but it also actively contributes to the shape that they 
take” (Paterson and Hughes, 1999: 600). 
There are those that suggest that this simply affirms the workings of the 
habitus as a “closed feedback loop” (Jenkins, 1992: 51). Bourdieu’s use of 
“structured structures” in describing cognitive dispositions certainly seems to 
play into the hands of his critics who argue that his theory produces 
automatons who cannot help but reproduce the social order (Jenkins, 1992). 
Similarly, Archer (2010: 123) has argued that this conceptualisation of the fit 
between the habitus and space is unsustainable given that “social life is an 
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open system” and that people’s practice can never be understood as entirely 
routinised. For Archer (2010) this apparent feedback loop between the 
habitus and field produces thought which is considered to be unreflexive and 
unconscious. 
In this case I would argue that both Archer (2010) and Jenkins (1992) 
emphasise the durability of the habitus rather than the transposable and 
generative quality Bourdieu attempted to portray. Although Bourdieu 
certainly emphasised the long-lasting nature of dispositions he never 
envisaged them as permanent or impervious to change (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992). For Bourdieu, it was important to understand how the 
habitus was interlocked with his other concepts of capitals and field so that 
practice was understood as the relationship between the habitus and the 
nature of our current circumstances (Maton, 2008). In this sense, the habitus 
and the field represent the “objective and subjective realisations of the same 
underlying social logic” which, whilst mutually forming each other are also 
both evolving so that the relation between the two is “ongoing, dynamic and 
partial” (Maton, 2008: 56). As such, the habitus and field do not necessarily 
match perfectly and the relationship between the two will be characterised 
by degrees of fit and mismatch, ease and unease (Bourdieu, 2000). Bourdieu 
stated that the fit between the habitus and field can range from a “perfect 
mutual fit”, to “out of sync” and even “radical disjunction” (Bourdieu in 
Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 130). Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) 
therefore argued that practical logic characterized through the immediate fit 
of the habitus to field is perhaps the most prevalent mode of practice but did 
not rule out reflexive practice10. It might therefore be suggested that it is 
Jenkins who misunderstands agents as bearers of social structures whereas 
Bourdieu conceptualises the mediatory importance of agents in the activation 
of social practices, it is the agent who makes a difference (even if that 
difference is small) in the sequence of events (Hage,1994). 
                                         
10 As we will see in Chapter Five, within the last decade of his life Bourdieu (2000; 2007) 
portrayed a more transformative side to the habitus through notions of the habitus clive and 
destabilised habitus. Within the remaining chapters, I will indicate that there may be more 
space for reflexive practice than Bourdieu acknowledged through my analysis of doxa, 
symbolic capital and power as well as through Bourdieu’s (1992; 2000) little used concept of 
hysteresis. 
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Bourdieu (1990; 1977: 94) stressed the unconscious and corporeal nature of 
this practice, indicating that “the principles embodied in this way are placed 
beyond the grasp of consciousness, and hence cannot be touched by 
voluntary, deliberate transformation”. The individual then, as a social body, 
arbitrates and reconciles between the subjective and objective conditions of 
existence, producing unthinking ways of being which enable the actor to pre-
consciously comprehend the world, constituting an embodied practical sense 
or practical logic. This unthinking way of being is characterised by the 
ontological complicity or ‘sense of fit’ between the habitus and field and 
which allows us to practice much of daily life intuitively and in the taken-for-
granted way described by Bourdieu as doxic experience11 (Bourdieu, 1984; 
1990; 2001). Our practice is predominately experienced as pre-reflexive 
agreement, a second nature or as a feel for the game (Bourdieu, 1984). As 
Sweetman (2003) and Crossley (2003) have both observed, we do not wake up 
each morning and decide how we will walk, talk, eat and so on, we cannot 
simply reprogram the self, but depending on where we are, we might also 
modify these behaviours. The habitus provides us with a means of 
understanding how practice comes so easily to us and the relative strength 
and enduringness of our dispositions and preferences as well as an embodied 
knowledge of where and when this practice is appropriate (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992). 
The habitus, situated within a system of social stratification, is said to reflect 
the composition of capital and socialisation processes of the particular social 
location of the individual and creates a malleable understanding of the 
lifestyle appropriate to this position (Bourdieu, 1985; Inglis and Hughson, 
2005). As Bourdieu (1977: 87) has stated: 
“in a class society, all the products of a given agent, by an essential 
overdetermination, speak inseparably and simultaneously of his class – 
or, more precisely, his position in the social structure and his rising or 
falling trajectory – and of his (or her) body – or, more precisely, all the 
properties, always socially qualified, of which he or she is the bearer – 
                                         
11 The unthinking aspect of the habitus and naturalised belief will be further discussed in 
relation to doxa in the next chapter. 
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sexual properties of course, but also physical properties, praised like 
strength or beauty, or stigmatised”. 
In consideration of this, we can identify that Bourdieu treats social position 
as deeply embodied and that his work highlights how our physical bodies and 
how we use them communicate our social position through the value attached 
to certain physical properties. Our relational position is inscribed in the body 
as a “way of bearing one’s body, presenting it to others, moving it, making 
space for it, which gives the body its social physiognomy” (Bourdieu, 1984: 
474). The habitus, as located within the body, inculcates a world-view which 
impacts upon our physicality to such an extent that even the most mundane 
of bodily actions are said to reflect our social position (Shilling, 2003). 
Bourdieu (1984: 190) elaborates that the way in which people treat their 
bodies “reveals the deepest dispositions of the habitus12” so that the body 
becomes the most “indisputable materialisation of class taste”. For Bourdieu 
(1984), the classed body is shaped in various ways, the first and foremost of 
which is the ostensibly natural characteristics of the body such as height, 
weight, shape, gait etc. These physical features are said to attest to a whole 
range of classed behaviours towards the body, how it is cared for, fed, 
maintained, exercised and put to work so that our bodies and their 
dispositions are said to reflect our class condition (Bourdieu, 1984). This is 
what Bourdieu (1984; 1990) refers to as bodily hexis and constitutes a basic 
way of sensing our social orientation and experiencing and expressing our 
social value. 
Bodily hexis is assumed to convey the “deep being” and the “true ‘nature’” 
of a person and instils practical and ‘rationalised’ knowledge whereby 
psychological and moral qualities are associated with certain features of 
embodiment. For Bourdieu (2001: 64) “this language of nature, which is 
supposed to reveal both what is most hidden and what is most true, is in fact 
a language of social identity, thereby naturalised in...what is called ‘natural 
distinction’”. Bodies are comprehended through the habitus’ schemes of 
perceptions which reflect the evaluation of the body as it is located within 
                                         
12 I will return to this claim in the final section of this chapter to provide a critique of this 
over-determinism. 
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social space and hierarchizes properties amongst the dominant and 
dominated (Bourdieu, 2001). Bourdieu (2001: 65) suggests that our social 
representation of our body is therefore acquired through applying a “social 
taxonomy whose principle is the same as that of the bodies to which it is 
applied”. This leads Bourdieu (2001: 65, my emphasis) to state that: 
“The gaze is not a simple universal and abstract power to objectify, as 
Sartre maintained: it is a symbolic power whose efficacy depends on the 
relative position of the perceiver and the perceived and on the degree 
to which schemes of perception and appreciation that are brought into 
play are known and recognised by the person to whom they are 
applied”. 
Bourdieu’s work on the formation of bodily hexis will be critically assessed 
towards the end of this chapter with reference to the absence of impairment 
within his theorisation. The chapter will now look at bodily hexis as it relates 
to taste. 
2.5 Taste and Differentiation 
Identifying the role that the habitus plays in the formation of the bodily 
hexis, it is important to acknowledge the ways in which bodies correspond to 
the development of social taste, seen in the lifestyle choices and preferences 
of individuals which, whilst experienced as autonomous predilections are 
actually mediated by material constraints (Bourdieu, 1984; Shilling, 2003). 
This has led Bourdieu (1990: 69-70) to state, somewhat over-determinedly, 
that “bodily hexis is political mythology realised, embodied, turned into a 
permanent disposition, a durable way of standing, speaking, walking, and 
thereby of feeling and thinking”. Bourdieu (1984: 172) laboriously catalogued 
the elective affinities prescribed by different habitus’, noting that lifestyles 
represent the “systematic products of the habitus” which simultaneously 
emerge as a system of social classification as a result of agents’ 
misrecognition of cultural arbitraries. For Bourdieu (1977; 1984; 1990), the 
cultural arbitrary refers to the cultural regularities and social hierarchies of 
the social order which appear natural and necessary but whose 
institutionalisation have no intrinsic basis. Rather, these regularities, 
hierarchies and modes of organisation appear self-evident and are recognised 
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because agents are socialised to anticipate them (Bourdieu, 1977; 1984; 
1990). 
For Bourdieu (2001; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992), one of the most obviously 
arbitrary and misrecognised dominations is the domination of women through 
the naturalization of their bodies and practices as inferior. Our 
misrecognition is therefore that we understand the social order as self-
evident and fail to realize, or rather that we are successfully socialised so as 
not to see, that the social order is produced and reproduced through unequal 
relations of domination, instead recognizing it as a natural and inevitable 
outcome. As Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 168) capsulised “I 
call misrecognition the fact of recognizing a violence which is wielded 
precisely inasmuch as one does not perceive it as such”. One example from a 
disability perspective might be that the social model likes to highlight the 
arbitrary cultural structures which exclude disability, but ignores the body as 
a source of experience and limitation. Bourdieu however acknowledges the 
cultural arbitraries which exclude but acknowledges the body’s involvement 
in this exclusion.  One such cultural arbitrary might be that we do not teach 
sign language and this excludes Deaf people13, but, Deafness as embodied in 
our habitus and hexis has its own consequences for experience which would 
not be mediated by universal signing. This kind of misrecognised oppression 
will be further developed in my discussion of the disablism contained within 
doxa in Chapter Three. 
The reproduction of the social order is maintained through the mutual 
befittingness and naturalisation of practice and structure and relies heavily 
upon an individual’s sense of reality and their sense of limits or more 
precisely, the forgetting of these limits (Bourdieu, 1977; 1984). Emerging out 
of a distinct social space, the habitus is structured through specific conditions 
reflective of our social location and produces individual and collective 
practices which are congruent to this social position (Bourdieu, 1990). The 
habitus as an “embodied history, internalised as second nature and so 
forgotten as history” enables infinite potentialities for action within a space 
                                         
13 Or may even produce Deaf culture through this exclusion 
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which is circumscribed by the socially and historically specific context in 
which it develops (Bourdieu, 1990: 56). For Bourdieu (1990) it is this 
embodied history which grants agents their relative autonomy, that is, the 
reactivation of their past when faced with the imminence of the present. 
However, it is also the paradox of the habitus as “the unchosen principle of 
all ‘choices’”, it is this embodied history which inclines itself to self-
reinforcing and self-validating experiences and therefore protects itself 
against circumstances which do not fit through excluding things which are 
‘not for the likes of us’(Bourdieu, 1990: 61; 1984: 478).  As such, Bourdieu 
(1990) states that the logic of practice verifies itself by creating a vocational 
appeal in an individual’s undertakings, what he has termed an amor fati or 
love of fate. 
The various ways in which our preferences and choices become inculcated 
through the habitus develop as ways of being or stylisations of life, some of 
which represent dominated lifestyles (Bourdieu, 1984). According to Bourdieu 
(1984: 175), this taste is born of “a virtue made of necessity which 
continuously transforms necessity into virtue by inducing ‘choices’ which 
correspond to the condition of which it is the product” resulting in an 
apparent contentedness with one’s own taste. Taste then, as a classificatory 
scheme, becomes a “generator of practices” harmonious to the social order 
in which it has developed, constructing “necessities into strategies, 
constraints into preferences” and naturalising amor fati, “the choice of 
destiny” and instilling a “sense of one’s place” (Bourdieu, 1984: 172-178; 
466). Importantly, it is the naturalization of the order of things which renders 
inequalities and injustices politically invisible, and what Bourdieu (in 
Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) described as the disguised soft domination of 
symbolic violence. This sense of place and the experience of fit are important 
aspects of the habitus as it interacts with capital and field. Taste becomes “a 
class culture, turned into nature, that is, embodied” so that we might say 
taste as a feel for the game represents a further form of symbolic capital 
achieved through the correct application in practice  (Bourdieu, 1984: 190, 
original italics). Each habitus is instilled with different values, beliefs and 
capitals which provides the agent with the feel for the game and as agents 
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move within fields, their habitus differentially equips them with this 
embodied know-how. Depending upon the various compositions of the 
habitus, agents will feel more or less at ease within certain fields and 
reminded when they are out of place. 
This embodied history is said to ensure appropriate action across fields and 
through a process of reactivation in other areas, tends to self-perpetuate 
within the system of practice (Bourdieu, 1977; 1990). For this reason, history 
is said to repeat itself and the status quo is maintained (Jenkins, 1992). The 
inscription of social order in bodies through the taste of necessity is said to 
secure the relative inertia of the habitus through its proleptic adjustment to 
the conditions of existence, an adaptation which Bourdieu (1984) argued was 
most clearly felt by the working-classes. Thus, the taste of freedom or luxury 
is constituted in conditions of existence which are distanced from need or 
urgency (Bourdieu, 1984). 
Bourdieu (1984; 1992) was quick to defend against accusations of mechanism, 
stating that whilst our experience of the world and our various stylisations of 
life are cognitively appreciated, this cognition is one of misrecognition owed 
to the fact that the dominated classes employ schemes of perception which 
are informed by the embodied relation of social power and so reflect the 
values of the dominant. Thus, in order for the most basic and unconscious 
principles of the working-class identity to be realised Bourdieu (1984: 384) 
stated that the dominated would have to see themselves “through the eyes of 
the dominant class, that is, in terms of the dominant definition of the body 
and its uses”. 
It is easy to see why Bourdieu’s work has attracted so much criticism. His 
work appears, at times, overly deterministic and displays a strong 
reproductionist bias (Adams, 2006; Shilling, 2003). It seems that for Bourdieu, 
“agency is still a bounded process, compromised and attenuated, via habitus, 
by social structure and unconsciousness” (Adams, 2006: 515). Bourdieu’s 
(1990) stress on the unconsciousness of our guiding cognitive schemas makes 
it problematic to think of agents as anything more than self-reproducing 
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automatons and makes it “difficult to know where to place conscious 
deliberation and awareness in Bourdieu’s scheme of things” (Jenkins, 1992: 
77, also cited in Adams, 2006). For Lovell (2000: 15), Bourdieu often reads as 
a structuralist “with an ‘oversocialized’ concept of the individual” who is 
compelled to become what they “always already” are. Bourdieu has often 
written too firmly on the dominated love of fate, stressing their “resigned 
accommodation” and “adaptive collusion at the expense of their unhappy 
consciousness” (Fowler, 2003: 474-486). As such, what Bourdieu may relegate 
to amor fati might instead be explained as the lack of opportunities to 
change one’s fate rather than a fatalistic acceptance of it (Lane, 2012). 
Bourdieu (1977; 1984; 1990) heavily emphasised the unconscious character of 
the habitus and its dispositions which he premised on their nature as 
embodied states. This is to say that because the dispositions of the habitus 
operate at an affective and embodied level, they lie beneath the scope of 
consciousness and are therefore resistant to change and remain in a state of 
relative inertia (Lane, 2012). Bourdieu (2000) contends that the simple 
raising of consciousness is not enough to politically liberate agents and would 
instead require a thorough counter-training involving deliberate and 
reiterated exercises in order to durably transform the habitus. According to 
Bourdieu (2000), the motivations of the dominated habitus – a social law 
made into a corporeal law – cannot be suppressed by will. He then, however, 
goes on to state that the agent who resists his dispositions is said to feel 
“betrayed by his body, which recognises paralysing taboos or calls to order” 
(2000: 180). Whilst this highlights how Bourdieu conceived of affect as 
reinforcing practice it seems to suggest that the habitus is more malleable 
and even contestable than Bourdieu largely portrayed and as a result rather 
than in spite of affectivity. However, it is this deeply internalized sense of 
unease and discomfort that makes modifying our practice so challenging. 
Lane (2012) has argued that it is therefore crucial to challenge Bourdieu’s 
assumption that our capacity to question our habitus is mediated by our 
dominated relation. Instead, Lane (2012) has said that, contrary to Bourdieu’s 
belief in dispositions as affective, embodied and therefore pre-reflexive and 
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unconscious, agents are capable of questioning and rejecting the habitus on 
the basis of aversive emotions such as disgust14. The crucial point then is not 
a question of capabilities for conscious reflection but instead the recognition 
of the relative chances to realise change by differentially socially situated 
agents. To illustrate, disabled people are less likely to own their home and 
are twice as likely to be in social housing than their non-disabled peers as 
well as being economically worse off (Pearson and Watson, 2007; Borsay, 
2005). Given the shortage of accessible social housing and the shortage of 
funding to make adaptations, 300,000 disabled people are living, sometimes 
trapped, in unsafe and unsuitable homes and have little choice or control 
when it comes to choosing a more suitable place to live (Foster, 2015). The 
situation is therefore not one of misrecognition or collusion in a dominated 
relation but the lack of means (power and capital) to effect change. 
In this respect, Bourdieu’s theorisation of agent’s choices as amor fati often 
seems to portray agents as affectively numbed dupes, neglecting that in some 
cases, choices are forced through circumstances which exist externally to 
class and may be unpleasant and generate suffering. It is hard to conceive of 
how a person who regularly experiences the pain and discomfort associated 
with impairment, or hate crime on the basis of their disability, or the worry 
that their disability might reduce employment opportunities or that they 
might lose their benefits, might come to love their fate. Instead it might 
more accurately be thought of as adapting to their lifestyle as we all do, and 
getting on with it, whilst simultaneously reflecting on how it might be 
improved. I am not denying that for some disabled people, their disability is a 
positive feature and something that they would not want to change, but for 
others, it can be less than pleasant.  Bourdieu’s idea that the dominated do 
not comprehend their dominated position as problematic overlooks our 
capacities as agents who are concerned about our own welfare and well-
being (Sayer, 2005).  This will be further discussed in the remaining chapters. 
                                         
14 Questions of the unconscious and preconscious nature of affect and emotions will be more 
fully developed in Chapter Four. 
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Lane (2012) goes on to suggest that there is no reason to think that aversive 
reactions such as disgust cannot play a role in the drive for social change. 
However, there is perhaps more to be done in terms of understanding how 
exclusion and inequality produce disempowered dispositions. In defence of 
Bourdieu’s durable affective dispositions, one could point to the pain we 
experience in the aftermath of a break-up when sometimes we know we 
shouldn’t love someone but it takes, amongst other things, time and 
experience to weaken this disposition. Note that Bourdieu was in the middle 
of his doctoral research on the phenomenology and temporal structures of 
affective life before he was called away by the Algerian war, drastically 
altering his theoretical focus (Grenfell, 2008). What this critique of the 
exclusion of affect perhaps illuminates is that Bourdieu’s habitus would 
benefit from a psychosocial re-theorisation to develop our understandings of 
the affective nature of habitus and practice. This is the focus of Chapter 
Four. It might also be argued that Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of amor fati 
as the working classes’ collusion in their own domination is most apparent 
within the very distinct analytical space of Distinction (1984)15, which as we 
know, and were warned, is very French. He subsequently argued that 
“habitus is not the fate that some people read into it” and instead conveys 
the probability associated with certain social conditions (Bourdieu in 
Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 133). 
Importantly, Bourdieu appeared to adopt a more flexible theorisation of the 
habitus as his work progressed. Bennett (2007) has highlighted that 
Bourdieu’s early writings emphatically endorsed the rigidity and uniformity of 
the habitus which ensured the logic of reproduction. Subsequently, Bennett 
(2007: 203) notes, Bourdieu’s theorising of the habitus becomes more elastic, 
providing more “probabilistic expectations” of practice rather than 
deterministic forecasts. Within Weight of the World (1999) Bourdieu 
recognises the suffering of those experiencing hysteresis, a mismatch 
between habitus and field, and observes their strategies for improvement. In 
this respect, Bourdieu recognises that the dominant know the suffering of 
                                         
15  And perhaps Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture (Bourdieu and Passeron, 
1990). 
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their dominated position, but that their position means that they are left 
with few feasible means of improving their lot. As well as this, within one of 
his final books, Pascalian Meditations (2000) Bourdieu acknowledges the 
capacity for habitus to be destabilised and transformed. Here, Bourdieu 
(2000) concedes that the habitus is more heterogeneous and characterised by 
the occupation of multiple and sometimes contradictory social positions than 
he accounted for within his earlier writings. Likewise, within Masculine 
Domination he notes that there are more opportunities for agents to contest 
meaning through the “partial indeterminacy of certain objects [which] 
authorises antagonistic interpretations, offering the dominated a possibility 
of resistance to the effect of symbolic imposition” (Bourdieu, 2001: 14). As 
we can see, Bourdieu’s thinking developed over a long period of time and his 
reworking of habitus (as well as doxa) show the import he placed on these 
concepts. Bourdieu (2000) admitted to overstating the reproductive logic of 
his work but countered that it was only to underline how much we take for 
granted. Despite his overstressing of amor fati, his work on the elective 
affinities and embeddedness of practice attributable to different lifestyles 
remains an important recognition of the static nature of everyday choices and 
practices. 
Therefore, whilst Bourdieu’s theorisation of the deeply embodied habitus 
could be argued as displaying a strong inclination for over-determined and 
reproductive practice, this thesis would like to contend that this portrays a 
narrow conceptualisation of this analytical tool. These deterministic and 
reproductive readings of Bourdieu rely upon the perfect synchronicity of 
habitus and field to produce a self-reinforcing doxic adherence to the social 
order and neglect how Bourdieu’s theory developed over his career. As we 
shall see in following chapters, the match between the habitus and field is 
not a guarantee, leading us to think about how mismatches might be 
theorised and their potential to generate critical and reflexive thought. 
Importantly, Bourdieu’s habitus enables an understanding of the agents’ 
world-view, practice and experience which is located within a socio-political 
and historical context. Applied within disability studies, the habitus would 
allow us to focus on structural and material factors that characterise social 
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position, as well as a consideration of the perspective of the agent which is 
deeply embodied and therefore inclusive of the experience of impairment. 
The corporeal nature of the habitus demonstrates that the body has 
significant consequences in every aspect of life so that bodies, and 
impairment, would never be understood as separate to practice. 
The chapter will now address issues of aesthetic value and differentiation 
through Bourdieu’s work on taste. This is an important consideration within 
disability studies as Hughes (1999: 155) argues the oppression of disabled 
people is not reducible “to social restrictions which are the outcome of 
structural determinations... the oppression of disabled people is also 
umbilically linked to the visual constitution of impairment” and is significant 
when thinking of how disabled people are made to feel in interactions with 
non-disabled people. 
2.6 Differentiation and (Dis)Tasteful Bodies 
Having demonstrated the way in which the habitus and social location is 
deeply embodied and the impact that this was said to have on lifestyle 
choices, this chapter will now examine how Bourdieu (1984) conceived of 
taste as an embodied capacity to differentiate. In exploring how bodies were 
differentiated as distasteful within his work, this section highlights the 
importance of the body as the physical basis for social inequality (Shilling, 
2003). 
According to Bourdieu (1984: 175), taste constitutes the acquired ability to 
differentiate and appreciate and therefore “...raises the differences 
inscribed in the physical order of bodies to the symbolic order of significant 
distinctions”.  He elaborated that taste is “the capacity to discern aesthetic 
values – [it] is social necessity made second nature, turned into muscular 
patterns and bodily automatisms” (Bourdieu, 1984: 474). This lead Bourdieu 
(1984: 49) to state that “tastes are perhaps first and foremost distastes, 
disgust provoked by horror or visceral intolerance (‘sick-making’) of the 
tastes of others”. According to Cregan (2006: 80), every aspect, disposition 
and use of the body is therefore said to “betray the habitus to which one 
Chapter 2 Page 97 
Disability, Bourdieu and Bodies 
belongs” and produces ideas about body civility to which certain forms of 
deportment attest. These classed ways of being become durably inscribed in 
the body, creating distinct bodily forms which possess different values within 
different fields and are therefore central to Bourdieu’s process of social 
reproduction (Shilling 2003). 
The depiction of working-class taste is frequently portrayed as vulgar and 
uncouth when juxtaposed against the pure taste of the upper classes 
(Bourdieu, 1984). The upper and middle classes are said to more closely align 
with the Kantian philosophy in which the notion of pure taste is allegedly 
derived through a disinterested and transcendental distance to objects 
(Bourdieu, 1984). In contrast, lower class taste is described in terms of 
barbarism; as facile, visceral and primitive (Bourdieu, 1984). Moreover, 
working-class taste is also infantilised, as premised in the satisfaction derived 
from sickeningly sweet foods, and even animalised when speaking of the 
“quasi-animal gratifications of sexual desire”. Bourdieu (1984: 489) 
elaborates that the Kantian imperative of pure taste represents nothing more 
than disgust at the facile, that is to say, disgust for things which reduce us 
“to animality, corporeality, the belly and sex, that is, what is common and 
therefore vulgar”. It is this “common animality on which and against which 
moral distinction is constructed” so that culture is seen as “anti-nature” and 
asserts itself as a predilection based on reflection rather than the senses or 
sensual (Bourdieu, 1984: 489). Thus, in distinguishing “that which pleases 
from that which gratifies”, taste becomes a marker of cultural competence 
(Skeggs, 2004: 28). 
According to Shilling (2003), the dominant seek to maintain their distinction 
through claims to legitimacy, specifically through claims to legitimate bodies, 
tending to distance themselves from the instrumental body through ascetic 
measures of reserve and control. Bourdieu (1984: 490) further argues that the 
Kantian ethic is established in the social relations of opposition in what is 
described as the “antithesis between culture and bodily pleasure (or nature)” 
or between the cultivated bourgeoisie and uncultivated natural. It is this 
opposition between nature and culture which expresses “a relationship which 
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is that of the body to the soul, between those who are ‘only natural’ and 
those whose capacity to dominate their own biological nature affirms their 
legitimate claim to dominate social nature” (Bourdieu, 1984: 491). Those who 
wish to be successful must pay for their “accession to everything which 
defines truly humane humans by a change of social nature, a ‘social 
promotion’ experienced as ontological promotion, a process of ‘civilisation’, 
a leap from nature to culture, from the animal to the human” (Bourdieu, 
1984: 251). As such, Bourdieu (1984: 499-500) concludes that the principle 
underlying our sense of distinction is that of “visceral disgust at vulgarity” 
and which renders our taste as “an internalised social relationship, a social 
relationship made flesh”. 
Bourdieu (1984: 192) elaborates that the body is perceived as the “the most 
natural expression of our innermost self” as a result of the physiognomic 
moral economy in which we become socially characterised. The cultural 
signifiers which enable the differentiation of groups based on their cultural 
composition or “distance from nature” legitimise some (privileged) uses of 
the body as morally superior when juxtaposed with the uncultured body 
(1984: 193). According to Bourdieu (1984: 192), “strictly biological 
differences are underlined and symbolically accentuated” through our 
deportment and behaviours and are said to reflect our relationship to the 
social world. Bodies are then said to speak of minds, specifically of whether 
minds are “naturally ‘natural’ or naturally ‘cultivated’”, vulgar or 
distinguished (Bourdieu, 1984: 193). Legitimate uses of the body are 
therefore said to be perceived as moral maxims, and their opposite – the 
natural body – as a “culpable surrender to facility” (Bourdieu, 1984: 193). 
Accordingly then, Bourdieu’s (1984: 193) explanation accounts for a system of 
embodied class distinctions which allows us “to map out a universe of class 
bodies, which (biological accidents apart) tends to reproduce in its specific 
logic the universe of the social structure”. 
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Whilst it is unclear what is meant by the clumsy use of “biological 
accidents”16 or indeed why they are not accounted for or included within the 
system of class and social reproduction, this statement provides a useful 
point of departure for unpicking the corporeal misgivings contained within 
Bourdieu’s work on taste. Having discerned that Bourdieu considered the 
body hexis as expressive of classed and classifiable behaviours, those of us 
interested in the body and disability are left wondering about the place of 
impairment. Reading Distinction (1984) we might think that there is almost 
an acknowledgement of impairment in his account. Bourdieu (1984) 
highlighted the way in which the working-classes were perceived as having a 
more instrumental relationship to their body and therefore, as a result of 
poor diet and more labour-intensive and dangerous jobs, produce bodies 
which are more prone to poor health, injury and disability (Shilling, 2003). 
Conversely, the wealthier classes were able to dedicate more time and 
resources to caring for their body and have less physically demanding jobs 
(Bourdieu, 1984). As is well known, the management and care of the body as 
it is mediated by our socio-economic position highlights how impairment may 
become more or less disabling within different social locations. Those with 
more economic and cultural capital are better equipped to manage or 
ameliorate disabling features and the exacerbation of impairment. 
However, within Distinction (1984), Bourdieu seems to ultimately subsume 
issues of impairment under class as though the body is simply weathered and 
worn by class position. Elsewhere Bourdieu (2001: 65) suggests that if it 
weren’t for “accidents of genetics” then “bodies would have every chance of 
being valued strictly in accordance with the positions of their owners in social 
space” demonstrating how Bourdieu has sidelined other features which 
socially qualify us with value. Our socio-economic class has obvious important 
consequences for how a person copes will ill-health, impairment and 
                                         
16  Upon first inspection this could be viewed as a poor translation of Bourdieu’s work. 
However, within Masculine Domination Bourdieu (2001: 65) appears to add clarification to 
what he means by this; “bodies would have every chance of being valued strictly in 
accordance with the positions of their owners in the social space if... accidents of genetics 
did not sometimes deprive the ‘great’ of the bodily attributes of their position such as 
beauty or height”. 
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disability. But what do the practices and properties of impaired bodies say 
about social location for Bourdieu? 
It might be argued that Bourdieu’s (1984) account of taste, which he 
arduously portrays as deeply embodied, is actually rather disembodied. 
Bourdieu is primarily guilty of treating the body as though it is reducible to or 
analogous of class and in speaking of taste as the physically inculcated 
predilections of class fractions, Bourdieu appears to concede that our biology 
is dominated, as though class culture is written on top of or simply translated 
into the body as opposed to being intricately interwoven with the corporeal. 
It might even be suggested that Bourdieu relies upon culture to produce 
biology (Skeggs, 2004). Bourdieu’s account of taste relies upon the 
quantification and measurement of cultural units and relies upon culture to 
“produce gender: women are nature, men are culture, not dissimilar to the 
working-class having base emotions whilst the middle-class develop 
refinement and disinterest” (Skeggs, 2004: 28). 
Moreover, when Bourdieu (1984) speaks of the control exerted over bodies, 
he speaks of cultural control as opposed to what might be called corporeal 
control. The working-classes are therefore understood as distasteful because 
they are perceived as being closer to nature as a result of their cultural 
deficit. As Bourdieu (1984: 251) has said, the nature against which culture is 
contrasted is simply that which is popular, low, vulgar and common. Control 
over bodies then, whilst conceived of in terms of distance from the more 
carnal and natural representations of the body only reflects, to a greater or 
lesser extent, a degree of cultural competency whilst an account of the more 
visceral dimensions of embodiment is neglected. Impairment can mean that 
our bodies leak in unpredictable and uncontrolled ways (Reeve, 2014). If 
being closer to nature is more appropriately conceived of as cultural lack, 
what is to be said in terms of taste when confronting the corporeal properties 
of the ‘natural’ body?  Although Bourdieu does seem to portray the body as 
both a biological and social entity, he does not examine the physiological 
processes and functions which constitute an integral part of our embodiment. 
It seems that taste becomes a tricky word to negotiate when confronting 
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aspects of embodiment not accounted for by Bourdieu’s measured units of 
culture. Taste as predilections, preferences or appreciations imply a degree 
of choice, even if those choices appear subsumed in amor fati, but the idea 
of tasteful bodies becomes a problematic notion when thinking through 
aspects of embodiment which go beyond the prescriptions of the class habitus 
due to the symbolically loaded nature of the word taste. If the body is said to 
be the materialisation of class culture and taste is the generator of practices 
or an individual’s distinctive way of being, what is to be said of the instances 
in which impaired bodies do not fit the values inculcated in the habitus and 
aspects of embodied lifestyles which go beyond questions of taste? In this 
respect, it might be argued that applying categories of taste or distaste to 
bodies is in some ways dysfunctional and provides only a partial explanation 
for the feelings we experience in the presence of other bodies. The 
classification of bodies as (dis)tasteful ultimately only reflects a certain 
relationship to the cultural arbitrary whilst implying a degree of agentic 
control which neglects that there are some aspects of embodiment which 
cannot be controlled in this way.  It might be suggested then, that his 
conceptualisation of the deeply embodied nature of taste therefore 
presupposes a corporeal standard on top of which class is written and as a 
result, problematises the incorporation of impaired bodies into a system of 
class. The qualification of value to bodies becomes more diversely understood 
within Bourdieu’s later work, specifically when he suggests that 
differentiation takes place through sexual distinction within Masculine 
Domination (2001) and his acknowledgement of the symbolic struggle for 
value that different ethnicities face (2000). Of course it is recognised that 
Bourdieu’s account is primarily of class and not the corporeal, but given the 
prominence of the body as a bearer of symbolic value and the body 
management necessary to acquire status and distinction documented within 
his work, it is disappointing that Bourdieu did not flesh out his account of the 
body. 
Having shown how Bourdieu (1984) portrayed the embodiment of social 
inequality as a matter of class taste as located within the bodily hexis, the 
chapter will now examine the able-bodied bias implicit within his theorisation 
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on how the hexis is socio-biologically produced. As we saw earlier in the 
chapter, Bourdieu (1984; 1990) conceived of bodily hexis as the corporeal 
manifestation of the habitus which produces an embodied orientation and is 
expressive of our social value. 
2.7 Able-body hexis 
Bourdieu (1977; 1998) explained that the formation of the habitus and bodily 
hexis begins with an understanding of sexual identity gained through our 
early experience of the sexual division of labour within the family which itself 
relays a much wider pattern of the division of labour. The relationship 
between the child and the paternal and maternal body inculcates an 
awareness of gender practice which comes to regulate “all bodily 
experiences, not least sexual experiences” (Bourdieu, 1977: 93). Within his 
early writings, Bourdieu (1977: 87) argued that the most fundamental aspect 
of the habitus as a kind of practical mastery is its ability to be practically 
transmitted so that children do not copy models but instead acquire actions 
through practical mimesis; “body hexis speaks directly to the motor function, 
in the form of a pattern of postures that is both individual and systematic” 
(Bourdieu, 1977: 87). This bodily learning as an unconscious process, “without 
going through discourse”, is not reducible to a mechanistic understanding of 
the body but is instead gained through the unconscious assimilation of 
objective regularities already predisposed to function in a manner that is 
coherent to corporeal practice (Bourdieu, 1977:88). Moreover, our practice is 
guided and developed between processes of familiarisation or explicit 
transmission through the societal provision of “structural exercises tending to 
transmit this or that form of practical mastery” (Bourdieu, 1977: 88). 
Through these negotiations between the body and social space, Bourdieu 
(1977: 89, my emphasis) states that one can identify the paragon of 
“structural apprenticeship which leads to the embodying of the structures of 
the world, that is, the appropriating by the world of a body thus enabled to 
appropriate the world”. 
Therefore, in order for us to understand how this spatial organisation (which 
is simultaneously temporally orchestrated) directs practice, it is essential 
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that we “grasp the dialectic of objectification and embodiment” and 
specifically within the context of our early experiences inside the home 
(Bourdieu, 1977: 90). As Bourdieu (1984: 474) has said, our social position in 
the world “is never more clearly expressed than in the space and time one 
feels entitled to take from others; more precisely, in the space one claims 
with one’s body in physical space”. He subsequently wrote in Masculine 
Domination (2001: 28) that even though women may have broken with the 
traditional norms and modes of restraint, they were “taught to occupy space, 
to walk, to adopt appropriate postures...postures which are charged with 
moral significance” and which ultimately represented “symbolic 
confinement”. Importantly, this symbolic confinement is not simply 
performative in that it does not simply portray a symbolic representation. 
Rather, it “culminates in a profound and durable transformation of bodies 
(and minds)... through a process of practical construction imposing a 
differentiated definition of the legitimate uses of the body” (Bourdieu, 2001: 
23).  Bourdieu (2001: 55) elaborates that the production of differentiated 
and differentiating bodies is achieved “partly through the effects of mimetic 
suggestion, partly through explicit injunctions and partly through the whole 
symbolic construction of the view of the biological body”. The social order 
which is inscribed within social space communicates a “dominant definition 
of practice” which is recognised as universal and legitimate (Bourdieu, 2001: 
62). At this point I would like to argue that Bourdieu has overstated the 
propensity for bodily hexis to be reflective of social position. As we have 
seen, Bourdieu has argued for the tendency of women’s bodies to reflect 
their subordinate position through subservient and docile postures such as 
stooping, bowing, lowering their gaze and so on. Similarly, Bourdieu (2000: 
169) suggests that bodily gait such as inarticulacy, clumsiness and trembling 
are all visible manifestations of submission to dominant judgement. However 
we might argue that some of these apparently subservient bodily bearings are 
reflective of the natural processes in ageing and impairment and therefore do 
not directly correspond with a person’s dispositions or status. Moreover, we 
would not go so far as to say that a disabled body that regularly evinces these 
“submissive” properties automatically occupies a dominated social position. 
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In this respect, Bourdieu is sociologically reductionist in his conceptualisation 
of the body. 
“Strictly biological differences” are emphasised and become “symbolically 
accentuated” through the whole relationship of the body to the social world 
(Bourdieu, 1984: 192). The actions that take place within this symbolically 
mediated and spatially/temporally organised space operate as the structural 
exercises which inform our practical mastery and shape the bodily hexis so 
that it becomes “political mythology realised, embodied, turned into a 
permanent disposition, a durable manner of standing, speaking, and thereby 
of feeling and thinking” (Bourdieu, 1977: 93-94). In this sense, an individual 
comes to embody the hierarchical components of the social order and their 
relation to it in a way that is beyond conscious awareness, as a “mnemonic 
form”, allowing it to gain an ineffable quality, that is, it becomes a political 
philosophy misrecognised through embodiment – the “best-hidden 
manifestation of submission to the established order” (Bourdieu, 1977: 95). 
What is more, the social order is said to inscribe itself upon the body and its 
dispositions at the deepest level through “regulating the use of time, the 
temporal distribution of collective and individual activities and the 
appropriate rhythm with which to perform them” (Bourdieu 1990: 75). 
The internalisation of the social order, its norms, structures and dominant 
modes of practice, precludes “lateral possibilities” through producing 
practice consistent with the conditions in which the habitus is formed 
(Bourdieu, 1977: 95). Bourdieu (1984: 172) defends against accusations of 
mechanism stating that whilst the social world is cognitively apprehended, 
“the primary cognition is misrecognition, recognition of an order which is also 
established in the mind”. It is no surprise then when Bourdieu (in Bourdieu 
and Wacquant, 1992: 171) asserts that gender domination is the most 
“paradigmatic form of symbolic violence” as a result of its age-old 
institutionalisation. Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 171) 
elaborates that the immediate and harmonious fit between social structures 
and the habitus “inscribed in bodies and in minds”, can be explained by 
identifying that the dominated apply categories of perception which are 
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formed by the “embodiment of this relation of power” to the social world 
and therefore come to understand this relation through the lens of the 
dominant. This has lead Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 172) to 
describe gender domination in terms of “constraint par corps, an 
imprisonment effected via the body” which has enabled male sociodicy to 
rule through legitimating domination as a biological fact “which is itself a 
biologized social construction”. Agents are therefore said to be caught up 
within a “circular logic” where the social order is naturalised in its inscription 
upon the body, the cognitive effects of which are experienced as doxa and as 
a result, further compound the naturalisation of social inequality (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant, 1992; McNay, 1999: 100). 
In conceptualising the efficacy of the state as a regulator of practices, 
Bourdieu (1998: 53-54) highlights the extent to which the classificatory 
schemes of the habitus are produced through the embodiment of our group 
structures, instilling a “common historical transcendental” or nomos through 
which a commonsense view of the world is perceived. Bourdieu (1998: 54) 
asserts that the state creates durable dispositions through the uniform 
imposition of mental and corporeal disciplines, producing stable patterns of 
apperception which enables the “immediate orchestration of habitus”. 
According to Bourdieu (1990: 57 my emphasis), the extent to which 
institutions can be actualised is dependent upon the “body’s readiness” to 
incorporate the social. Crucially, Bourdieu (1990) states that the social order 
exploits this readiness, detailing that the body (and language) represent a 
kind of archive of thoughts which may be activated through re-placing the 
body into a position which evokes by association, thoughts, feelings and 
emotions, seeming to portray the body as dis-positional. Conscious of the 
critique of dispositional concepts, Bourdieu (2000: 136) contends that in 
speaking of dispositions we are merely recognising the “natural predisposition 
of human bodies... a conditionability in the sense of a natural capacity to 
acquire non-natural, arbitrary capacities”. Moreover, he argues that in 
refuting the existence of dispositions we “deny the existence of learning in 
the sense of a selective, durable transformation of the body through the 
reinforcement or weakening of synaptic connections” (2000: 136). 
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It is therefore argued that symbolic power functions through controlling 
bodies, specifically, certain kinds of bodies and their attendant belief which 
is instilled by “the collectively recognised capacity to act in various ways on 
deep-rooted linguistic and muscular patterns of behaviour” leading Bourdieu 
(1990: 69) to say that “arms and legs are full of numb imperatives”. Bourdieu 
(1998) has therefore contended that submission to the social order is not an 
act of conscious consent or mechanical compliance but instead an affective 
and corporeal disposition; “The social world is riddled with calls to order that 
function as such only for those who are predisposed to heeding them as they 
awaken deeply buried corporeal dispositions”. Furthermore, “Practical belief 
is not a ‘state of mind’...but rather a state of the body” (Bourdieu, 1990: 
68). As I argued earlier, this seems to reflect Bourdieu’s marginalization of 
affective practice as unconscious and therefore non-reflexive. Practical sense 
then, as the lived category of relations of the social order, which is instilled 
in our early learning and which treats the body as a mnemonic entity and 
hence “leads the mind unconsciously along with it”, is the purest form of 
Leibniz’s “blind or symbolic thought” (elsewhere described as the use and 
exchange of signs rather than the conscious understanding of ideas) 
(Bourdieu, 1990: 68). Practical sense is thus conceived of as a kind of 
symbolic gymnastics (1990: 34) which transforms necessity into nature, it is 
“converted into motor schemes and body automatisms” (1990:69). 
Therefore, Bourdieu (1990: 58) states that the functioning of an institution, 
and the economy, is only feasible in so far as it is objectified in the social 
logic and structures of fields, as well as in bodies – “in durable dispositions to 
recognise and comply with the demands immanent in the field”. The extent 
to which these practices are intelligible and seem appropriate is therefore 
dependent upon the homogeneity of the habitus “inscribed in bodies by 
identical histories” (1990: 59). This doxic submission to the established order 
relies upon the compatibility between embodied dispositions, the product of 
phylogenesis and ontogenesis, and the objective regularities of the social 
world to which these dispositions are applied (Bourdieu, 1998: 55). It is the 
harmonious, immediate and tacit fit between the habitus and the social 
world, experienced as doxa, which facilitates our unconscious integration 
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with the order of things (Bourdieu, 1998). The recognition of legitimacy is 
therefore not a conscious reflection but is instead grounded in the pre-
reflexive accord between embodied and objective structures (Bourdieu, 
1998). 
The normative able-body inherent within Bourdieu’s thought seems quite 
clear here. Bourdieu (1990) theorises the acquisition of the bodily hexis and 
dispositions through the unconscious assimilation of objective regularities and 
structural exercises which are predisposed to function in a way that is 
coherent to corporeal practice. This arguably neglects conceptualisations of 
the body which fall outside the parameters of the able-bodied norm. These 
objective regularities and structural exercises through which we are said to 
acquire a habitus which conforms to the social order are themselves created 
by and reflective of a social order which maintains and reproduces the non-
disabled body as the norm. The self-evident coherency of practice could 
therefore be said to presume a homologous corporeality with which to 
interact. As Bourdieu (1977) has not evidenced examples of these structural 
exercises and regularities and how they correspond to the body, it is difficult 
to unpack or make explicit just how these may be problematic to impaired 
bodies. This emphasis upon the unconscious conciliation between the 
subjective body and objective structures bears no recognition that for some 
bodies, such encounters require far more negotiation and that this can be 
quite a deliberate and conscious experience. 
In stating that the “body hexis speaks directly to the motor function, in the 
form of a pattern of postures that is both individual and systematic”, 
Bourdieu (1977: 87) infers the socio-biological nature of practice. Indeed, in 
Pascalian Meditations (2000: 156-7), Bourdieu’s commitment to a socio-
biological conceptualisation of the body is once again evidenced: 
“Because the social is also instituted in biological individuals, there is, 
in each biological individual, something of the collective, and therefore 
properties valid for a whole class of agents... Habitus understood as an 
individual or a socialized biological body, or as the social, biologically 
individuated through incarnation in a body, is collective, or 
transindividual – and so it is possible to construct classes of habitus”. 
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It might be argued that whilst this may well be the case for individuals who 
conform to the corporeal norm, it is made problematic when considering the 
impaired body. Indeed, Bourdieu (2000: 157) went on to elaborate that the 
“incorporated social – for example, cultural capital in its incorporated state - 
owes to the fact that it is linked to the biological individual and therefore 
dependent on the weakness and failings of the body – declining faculties, 
especially of memory, or the possible impairment of the heir to the throne, 
or death”. Whilst Bourdieu (2000) has at least acknowledged the biological 
tenuity upon which the collectivisation of bodies relies, he does not develop 
this point any further and as a result, provides only a flimsy recognition of 
the potential sticking points met by impaired bodies. In addition to this, the 
relative symbolic capital which is differentially attached to bodies may 
problematise the incorporation of the social in so far as a consensus of 
meaning, upon which symbolic capital rests, cannot be reached. This will be 
further discussed in Chapter Three. 
I do not mean to deny that the social is physically incorporated into the 
habitus/hexis, but it seems that in order to make the durability and stability 
of the habitus stick, Bourdieu has over-relied on biological analogies without 
a proper address of the physiological and affective processes involved and has 
relied on an un-nuanced oversimplification of the corporeal.  The argument 
then that institutions exploit the body’s readiness presupposes this readiness. 
It takes for granted the conditionability of bodies – that we are naturally 
predisposed to acquire the structures of the social and that the body can be 
durably transformed through repeated activity. To say that we act on “deep-
rooted linguistic and muscular patterns of behaviour” and that our “arms and 
legs are full of numb imperatives” is a biological overstatement and bears no 
consideration for the impairment of functionality (Bourdieu, 1990: 69). This 
overstatement of the biological and innate capacities of agents is problematic 
in that in asserting that the body has an innate capacity to assume 
normatively prescribed cultural practices, Bourdieu once again privileges 
culture as the dominant feature of embodiment whilst implicitly equating this 
capacity with the able body. Moreover, in stressing this bodily readiness, 
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Bourdieu seems to presume that the incorporation of the social will be 
reflected in a normatively prescribed bodily readiness17. 
2.8 Conclusion 
Bourdieu (1998: 2) was keen to remind us that his work in Distinction should 
be understood “as analysis of French social space in the 1970s [and] is 
comparative history”. Moreover, he wrote that he wished to dispel a 
“frequent, yet disastrous, misunderstanding” about Distinction which was 
that his book argued that “the driving force of all human behaviour was the 
search for distinction” (Bourdieu, 1998: 9). As Bourdieu felt compelled to 
argue almost twenty years after the original publication of Distinction: 
“The very title Distinction serves as a reminder that what is commonly 
called distinction, that is, a certain quality of bearing and manners, 
most often considered innate... is nothing other than difference, a gap, 
a distinctive feature, in short, a relational property existing only in and 
through its relation with other properties” (1998:6). 
Writing on social space and symbolic power within Practical Reason (1998: 6), 
Bourdieu seemed keen to demonstrate the more political nature of his 
theory, emphasising position-takings instead of taste, stating that they are 
the “‘choices’ made by the social agents in the most diverse domains of 
practice, in food or sport, music or politics, and so forth”. His work on taste 
therefore exemplifies how the habitus differentiates the practices and tastes 
of others which demonstrates its capacity to include or exclude which I will 
further develop in the next chapter. As Bourdieu (1998: 6) goes on to say, it 
is the “idea of difference, or a gap, [which] is at the basis of the very notion 
of space” and social positions. 
                                         
17 To illustrate, we might think of Paterson’s (2012: 166) work on speech impairment and 
how agents are experienced as out of sync: “The ableist nature of temporal norms means 
that people with speech impairment find it nigh impossible to acquire and sustain the 
physical and cultural capital necessary to participate in social encounters” (Paterson, 2012: 
166). In this instance, disrupted communication is not reflective of the person’s capacity 
(bodily readiness) to communicate but of the temporally organized social order of 
communication.  Bourdieu’s theory that the social order is inscribed in bodies through the 
regulation of temporality and rhythm is therefore reflective of the “organisation and 
orchestration of time [which] is formed and informed by the carnal needs of non-disabled 
people” (Paterson, 2012: 168). 
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Bourdieu was of course not simply interested in class tastes but the way in 
which these lifestyle preferences “arise out of, and are mobilised in, 
struggles for social recognition or status” (Jenkins, 1992: 129). In this 
respect, his account of embodied dispositions becomes a more general model 
of understanding a “hierarchy of legitimacies” (Jenkins, 1992: 132). As Tobin 
Siebers (2003: 185) has noted “Aesthetics tracks the emotions that some 
bodies feel in the presence of other bodies, but aesthetic feelings of pleasure 
and disgust are difficult to separate from political feelings of acceptance and 
rejection”. Therefore, whilst Distinction (1984) draws attention to the 
distaste felt for the working classes in 1970s French society, his work on 
‘taste’ as the embodied capacity to aesthetically differentiate provides the 
foundations for understanding a broader logic of inclusion/exclusion through 
the symbolic value attached to different bodies. 
Specifically, his work highlights the symbolic struggle in being perceived as 
legitimate and that social inequalities continue to be perpetuated through 
the different value that is attached to various bodily forms which has 
significant consequences with respect to acquiring further capitals (Bourdieu, 
1984; Shilling 2003). As we saw in Chapter One, disabled people have been 
persistently excluded from legitimate citizen status as a result of being 
perceived as unproductive, dependent and non-contributory which can have 
an accumulatively marginalising effect. Therefore we might extend 
Bourdieu’s thinking to consider the symbolic negotiations that take place in 
the valuing of disabled bodies in order to conceptualise the negative 
positioning of disability. 
Within this chapter I have shown how the habitus allows us to understand the 
effect of social position on our dispositions, preferences and practices and 
how this produces an embodied know-how which is experienced as a sense of 
place and the ease or unease of our fit within social space. Bourdieu’s work 
can therefore provide an account of disability which is thoroughly embodied 
and at the same time has a political focus. I have noted the criticisms of 
Bourdieu as too deterministic and as a reproductionist but I have also 
highlighted that his work was one which was constantly developing and as 
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such, the ontological complicity between the habitus and field and the 
rigidity and stability which he accorded to habitus’ within traditional 
societies was not necessarily how he would characterise the practice of 
habitus within modern societies.  I have also criticised Bourdieu in terms of 
his physiological analogies and argued that he had a tendency to overstate 
the biological basis of habitus without thoroughly addressing corporeal 
realities and limits. As a result, his theory of practice has worked on the 
assumption of a mythic non-impaired and non-disabled body and has 
disregarded the disruptive potential of our bodies. Incorporating an 
understanding from a disability perspective therefore allows us to more fully 
consider the nuances of embodied practice. As well as this I have raised and 
disputed that Bourdieu has often treated the dominated as though they have 
no awareness of their position, instead suggesting that the inertia of social 
position stems from their inability to effect change rather than an 
unawareness. 
Although he is guilty of sidelining other aspects of embodiment which socially 
characterise us and qualify us with value, the habitus as a generative matrix 
does provide us a way of thinking about the many different, intersecting 
layers of our socialisation and social positions and allows for an analysis of 
disability which is sophisticated and cognisant of the multiple disadvantages 
and overlapping inequalities that disabled people face. In this respect, his 
work fuses together the micro, meso and macro aspects of disability through 
a complex understanding of the entwinement of symbolic and material 
relations. As I suggested within the discussion of disability models, a theory 
which encompasses both personal and political accounts, the social and the 
organic, is much needed. Moreover, as I will go on to show in subsequent 
chapters, his work provides a rich explanation of how cultural understandings 
of disability are much more than a matter of discourse and function within a 
system of embodied symbolic power. 
Having demonstrated the negative social positioning of disabled people within 
the neo-liberal context and having introduced how Bourdieu’s theoretical 
repertoire can provide a composite understanding of disability the next 
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chapter will develop an account of how the disabling social order interacts 
with a psychic framework of disablism and devalues the disabled body 
through the working of symbolic power and doxa. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided an overview of some of Bourdieu’s key 
concepts, namely the habitus and bodily hexis and their relation to social 
position, highlighting that whilst some of Bourdieu’s work appears overly 
deterministic and displays reproductionist tendencies, his approach fuses the 
phenomenological with the structural and provides an account which is both 
political and embodied. I also argued that although ‘taste’ may accurately 
describe the socio-economically rooted dispositions of the habitus, it neglects 
an account of embodied orientations which may be otherwise hierarchically 
constructed and organised. As such it was suggested that applying the 
category of tasteful or distasteful to bodies was somewhat dysfunctional as it 
served only to portray a classed relationship towards culture, within which 
implicit assumptions about corporeal standards and capacities were 
contained and which therefore ignored aspects of embodiment, specifically 
impairment and disability, which remain external to both class and agentic 
control. However, the significance placed on taste as a deeply embodied 
capacity to differentiate through negation (and/or alignment) and as a 
corporeally significant experience demonstrated how Bourdieu theorized it as 
an embodied means of exclusion/inclusion and provides the underpinnings to 
further examine corporeal divisions that exist alongside and intersect with 
class. This allows this chapter to explore how Bourdieu’s concepts might be 
expanded to include an account of differentiation which contends with 
broader symbolic negotiations of bodies and their values. Within this chapter 
I intend to focus on how symbolic power mobilizes exclusions through the 
symbolic system of doxa and through my own development of the concept of 
(negative) symbolic capital. 
In agreement with Wacquant (1993: 1-2), this work identifies that the 
principle force and purpose of Bourdieu’s work has been to illuminate the 
“symbolic dimension of domination” so as to generate an understanding of 
how symbolic power continues to obscure the relations of structured 
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inequality, oppression and exploitation “under the cloak of nature, 
benevolence and meritocracy”. Wacquant (1993: 2) contends that the work of 
Bourdieu is therefore primarily a “political economy of symbolic violence” or 
a “political sociology of symbolic forms”. As we saw in Chapter Two there has 
been an Anglo tendency for Bourdieu to be primarily read as a sociologist of 
culture and education and seldomly as a political sociologist, for which his 
work on symbolic power has much to offer (Swartz, 2013). In identifying the 
centrality of symbolic power to Bourdieu’s work, I will assess the disguised 
and obscured uses of symbolic capital in order to elucidate the insidious 
practices which contribute to the reproduction of social domination and the 
exclusion of disabled people (Olson, 1995). An understanding of the power of 
symbolic capital is crucial for knowing how power “as an abstract and 
relational feature of social interaction, is brought down to the level of 
individual bodies, habits and lives” (Olson, 1995: 23). As Bourdieu (2000: 168) 
would say, but perhaps does not fully explore, “the social order is merely the 
order of bodies”. 
Pursuing the recurring themes of embodiment and value and the focus given 
to the body within his writings, I will combine Bourdieu’s thinking on symbolic 
power and the consecration of identities in order to discern an understanding 
of the under-theorised concept of negative symbolic capital and its potential 
to jeopardise a disabled person’s legitimacy and sense of worth.  This chapter 
will begin by introducing Bourdieu’s work on symbolic power and his use of 
symbolic capital which, although often understated within his writings, acts 
as a kind of implicit meta-species of capital. I then progress to a depiction of 
the symbolic system and the functioning of doxa within social fields, 
demonstrating how a Bourdieusian account of the differentiation and 
evaluation of bodies must acknowledge the wider corporeal ideologies and 
doxic knowledge against which they are measured. Here I will show how 
symbolic power functions through doxa to legitimize the non-disabled body 
whilst excluding disabled bodies. 
I will then turn to the embodied nature of symbolic capital, demonstrating 
the powerful potential of symbolic capital as a psychosocially significant 
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sense-making asset. Through looking at what Bourdieu (2000) termed sense 
relations this chapter demonstrates the embodied experience which takes 
place through the actualisation of symbolic capital and suggests that this 
process may produce significant psychic consequences. In opening up 
discussion of the psychic effects of symbolic capital, this chapter illustrates 
that symbolic capital is much more than a matter of recognition and evinces 
the individual harm that negative symbolic capital can wield. 
3.2 Symbolic Capital 
Lebaron (2014) has observed the fuzzy conceptual space of symbolic capital, 
noting that Bourdieu flitted between recognising it as a genuine species of 
capital and at other times only referring to it indirectly as in his 
identification of symbolic effects, collectively recognised credit and even 
symbolic profit. It is worth noting that when scholars have made use of 
Bourdieu’s symbolic capital it is frequently downplayed as honour or 
prestige, often neglecting the obscure character of symbolic capital as the 
transmutation of other forms of capital into power when (mis)recognised as 
legitimate (Lawler, 1999). If symbolic capital has assumed a relatively 
understated position amongst the more familiar figurations of capital then 
Bourdieu’s idea of negative symbolic capital has registered even less 
attention. Though the import of symbolic capital is variously implicitly or 
explicitly coded throughout his work, Bourdieu makes scant reference to the 
converse concept of negative symbolic capital. This chapter seeks to address 
this theoretical shortcoming. As Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 
112) has acknowledged, “Sometimes we must refurbish concepts – first, to be 
more precise, and second, to make them more alive”. 
Within The Forms of Capital (1986), Bourdieu notes the three main capitals 
as economic, social and cultural. It is only in a footnote that a distinct 
definition of symbolic capital appears as “capital – in whatever form – insofar 
as it is represented, i.e., apprehended symbolically, in a relationship of 
knowledge or, more precisely, of misrecognition and recognition, presupposes 
the intervention of the habitus, as a socially constituted cognitive capacity” 
(1986: 91). Whilst this is the only explicit acknowledgement of symbolic 
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capital, the chapter is constellated with cases for the power of the symbolic 
and within other works, Bourdieu (1991a; 2000; 2001) does seem to more 
clearly identify the importance of the symbolic as a meta-species of capital. 
For instance, Bourdieu (2000: 242) states that “Every kind of capital 
(economic, cultural, social) tends (to different degrees) to function as 
symbolic capital (so that it might be better to speak, in rigorous terms, of the 
symbolic effects of capital) when it obtains an explicit or practical 
recognition”. This leads Bourdieu (2000: 242) to argue that symbolic capital is 
therefore “what every kind of capital becomes when it is misrecognised as 
capital, that is, as force, a power or capacity”.  Bourdieu (2000) stressed the 
intermediary role of the habitus in the transfiguration of symbolic capital, 
that is to say, symbolic capital always requires the intervention of the habitus 
as it manifests through a relationship of knowledge and (mis)recognition of 
value. Whereas incremental units of economic or cultural capital can be 
objectively measured and counted (as in profits, prizes, degrees, 
qualifications), symbolic capital relies upon the habitus as a socialised 
capacity to read, absorb and interpret “distinctive signs”  in order that they 
may be cognitively apprehended and recognised as legitimate (Bourdieu, 
1998b: 9). This implies a complex relationship of power between the 
perceiver and the perceived and leads Bourdieu (2000: 242, my emphasis) to 
state that symbolic capital is “produced by the transfiguration of a power 
relation into a sense relation”, which, through giving meaning, “rescues 
agents from insignificance”. In this case, we can identify how symbolic 
capital creates a practical and corporeal knowledge of one’s social and 
symbolic space, “the sense of the social world, its present meaning and the 
direction in which it is going and should go”, or as Goffman (cited in 
Bourdieu, 2000: 184, original italics)  says “sense of placement”. 
In dealing with the sense of place construed by symbolic capital, we can 
identify that an agent, endowed with various capitals, attributes and 
capacities relative to his habitus, obtains his symbolic capital upon entering a 
doxa-specific field. Thus far, we have seen that the concept of symbolic 
capital is configured in various ways throughout Bourdieu’s work and 
therefore necessitates a more astute definition of symbolic capital and its 
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uses.  The use of symbolic capital within this chapter will refer to the 
collectively recognised and hierarchically placed value accorded to an agent 
based on the respective types and volumes of capital that they possess and 
dispositions particular to that habitus. 
Bourdieu (1991a) variously described the benefits attached to possessing 
large amounts of symbolic capital, noting that positively consecrated 
identities enjoy the privilege of being allowed to transgress boundaries as 
well as having ridiculous behaviour which might otherwise be seen as 
undignified excused as eccentric.  In short, “the person who is sure of his 
cultural identity can play with the rules of the cultural game” (Bourdieu, 
1991: 125). However, less time has been spent discussing the attribution of 
negative symbolic capitals. Bourdieu (2000) notes the positive 
“manifestations of social recognition which make up symbolic capital, all the 
forms of perceived being which make up a social being that is known, 
‘visible’, famous, admired, invited, loved, etc” as a form of saving grace 
which redeems agents “from the distress of an existence without 
justification”. Here, he contrasts the State nobility who possess a theodicy of 
existence against the “stigmatised pariah... [who] bears the curse of a 
negative symbolic capital” (Bourdieu, 2000: 241, my emphasis). Bourdieu 
(2000: 241) states that there is “no worse dispossession, no worse privation, 
perhaps, than that of the losers in the symbolic struggle for recognition, for 
access to a socially recognised social being, in a word, to humanity”. This is 
the first and last use of negative symbolic capital and its consequences within 
Pascalian Meditations and it is seldom mentioned let alone unpacked within 
much of his other work. Elsewhere he briefly mentions the experience of 
North African immigrants within the education system stating that the 
difficulties faced in both school and the work place are exacerbated by the 
negative symbolic capital “linked to the external signs of their body hexis 
that function as stigmata” but little else is added to the concept (Bourdieu, 
1999: 185) 18. Whilst Bourdieu’s account provides an understanding of the 
                                         
18  Although Bourdieu (1989; 2000) admires and draws upon Goffman he discerns the 
difference between stigma and negative symbolic capital in terms of the symbolic power of 
negative symbolic capital which exists twice, objectively in things and subjectively in minds. 
The strength of and struggle for symbolic power therefore does not simply take place at the 
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positive effect that possessing various amounts of symbolic capital can have, 
or that to possess less symbolic capital is and can be disadvantageous, he 
does not open up the concept of negative symbolic capital to any great 
extent. 
The concept has also not been used to any great extent outside of Bourdieu’s 
own work, although Wacquant (2000: 383) makes passing reference to it as 
“as “an incarnate property perceived to make its contact degrading by virtue 
of... ‘negative social estimation of honor’”. Elsewhere he has fleetingly 
referred to it in terms of culturally and economically successful African 
Americans compensating “for the negative symbolic capital of blackness 
[with] their high-status cultural capital” (Wacquant, 2001: 99).  This leaves a 
considerable space in which to question the consequences to those endowed 
with symbolic capital which is negatively received or those who are conferred 
a stigmatised quality instead of titles of nobility. My use of negative symbolic 
capital then denotes the collective recognition and social positioning of 
individuals with negatively valued capacities and capitals linked to the 
external indicators of disability in their bodily hexis. Moreover, negative 
symbolic capital should be seen as distinct to simply a lack of capital because 
it marks bearers out with negative values. Importantly, symbolic capital must 
be understood as it corresponds with doxa. The chapter will now examine 
Bourdieu’s concept of doxa before demonstrating how it consolidates non-
disabled norms at both the individual and structural level. 
3.3 The Symbolic System and Doxa 
In order for symbolic capital to function as a recognised power, there must 
exist a “convergence of the social conditions” which enables the symbolic 
imposition of a given phenomena to be recognised as important (Bourdieu, 
1991a: 72). The exertion of symbolic power through bodies is dependent upon 
the status of the perceiver and the perceived and the extent to which these 
corresponding schemes of perception and evaluation are applied, known and 
                                                                                                                      
level of presentation of the self as this overlooks the person’s social position within social 
space (Bourdieu, 1989). In this respect, the micro-management of stigma in personal 
interactions does not challenge the macro structures of symbolic power. 
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recognised by the individual at whom they are directed (Bourdieu, 2001). In 
this sense, symbolic systems perform three explicit but interconnected 
functions; cognition, communication and domination (Alawattage, 2011). 
Bourdieu (1991a) states that the economic and social world informs us with a 
practical knowledge of the game throughout the life-course and that the 
social order exerts itself upon agents in the form of knowledge effects (or 
cognition). The objective structures and schemes of classification contained 
within the doxic order of things prescribes and imposes representations and 
an incorporated recognition of this social order. According to Bourdieu (1979) 
then, symbolic systems as systems of knowledge exert a structuring force 
insofar as knowledge is also structured. Through the various distributions and 
properties particular to any given social field, the social world constitutes a 
symbolic system which functions through the logic of difference, that is, 
distinction (Bourdieu, 1985: 730). 
Bourdieu (1985) was keen to demonstrate that his use of the term distinction 
did not reflect a Veblen-esque pursuit of distinguished visibility but instead 
conveys that all practice is distinctive and therefore capable of carrying and 
communicating distinctive signs. As such, the symbolic power attached to 
these various distinctive practices has the ability to construct realities and 
tends to institute a gnoseological order (from gnosis), a kind of intuitive 
grasp of symbolic relations within the individual habitus (Bourdieu, 1979). 
Bourdieu (1979) describes this sense of order at the collective level as a 
consensus of meaning or doxa, that is, a kind of mutually coherent and 
classificatory sense of reality which, as the product of incorporation of the 
social, endows us with a more or less aligned capacity to interpret and adapt 
to subsequent experiences. 
Bourdieu (1991b: 3) writes that the capacity for symbolic systems to function 
as a means of exclusion or inclusion, distinction or integration, is owed to 
their “systematic application of one and the same principle of division” 
through which the whole social and natural world is categorised into 
“antagonistic classes (owing to the fact that they gave birth to meaning and 
consensus on meaning by the logic of inclusion and exclusion)”. Here, 
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Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the divisive power of symbolic capital seems 
to adhere to a rigid and fairly undifferentiated vision. Nearly thirty years 
later however, Bourdieu’s (2000: 139) understanding of the incorporated 
symbolic schemes of classification is far less prescriptive and is described as 
the “generally applicable principles of vision and division which, being the 
product of incorporation of the structures and tendencies of the world, are at 
least roughly adjusted to them”. Within the last decade of his life Bourdieu 
(2001) conceded that doxa was far less stable within modern societies and 
open to contestation and resistance. This increased flexibility shows not only 
how Bourdieu’s thinking had progressed but signified the importance of the 
concept of doxa to his social theory. For Bourdieu, doxa performs a political 
function, ensuring the relative stability of the social order through the 
correspondence between habitus and field. Doxa is therefore not only a 
system of knowledge, but a system of domination (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992). 
Symbolic systems therefore contribute to the covert imposition of principles 
of perception and thinking through furnishing practices which appear to 
correspond with the “natural-supernatural structure of the cosmos” 
(Bourdieu, 1971: 5). Bourdieu (1985: 731) therefore states that all symbolic 
systems are predisposed to include or exclude through the functioning of 
“Symbolic capital – another name for distinction”, it is our symbolic capital 
which gives us our “distinctive value” (Bourdieu, 2004: 56). To make explicit 
and take his thinking one logical step further then, I would suggest that 
symbolic capital acts as a mechanism for inclusion whilst negative symbolic 
capital has the power to exclude. For Bourdieu (1991a: 73), the profit of 
distinction, acquired by means of this symbolic imposition, is of course 
derived from the relations of domination structured around and through the 
imposition of the (arbitrary) social order, although the most crucial 
component of this profit is that it “appears to be based on the qualities of 
the person alone”. In speaking of what constitutes the arbitrary, this work 
refers to the structures of social formation, that is, the positions and 
relations of a given field, which are, through a process of naturalisation, 
perceived as endowed with legitimacy and self-evidence and therefore the 
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dominance to impose principles of perception. The imposition of this 
pedagogy has cognitive effects as it becomes internalised as doxic knowledge 
and thus further naturalises the arbitrary quality of what is considered 
legitimate within a field (McNay, 1999). 
Doxa describes the natural attitude and commonsensical understanding of 
the world that an agent experiences due to the sense of fit between their 
habitus and field. It represents the “unexamined ways of acting that are at 
the root of each group’s mode of being in the social world” (Inglis and 
Hughson, 2003: 167).  This doxic knowledge which functions as a register of 
‘collective expectations’ enables the collective social to apprehend, evaluate 
and (mis)recognise the individual as legitimate (or illegitimate as the case 
may be) and accords them a space within the social hierarchy specific to this 
field (Bourdieu, 2000: 160). Bourdieu (1998b) suggests that doxa may be 
understood as a diffuse form of symbolic capital which may have once been 
more explicitly esteemed but which now pervades so much of thought that it 
resides in our background knowledge. 
At this stage I would like to make clear that my use of symbolic capital 
acknowledges that the diverse and intersectional nature of social life opens 
up spaces in which doxa and an individual habitus may not correspond 
exactly. As I highlighted in Chapter Two, although Bourdieu’s work certainly 
emphasised the reproduction of social order he did not preclude the 
possibility for resistance 19, rather, whilst he did not explicitly develop a 
theory of change, his theoretical framework enables his work to be extended 
so as to account for how transformation may take place within the habitus 
(Swartz, 2013). Within one of his final books Bourdieu (2000) concedes that 
he over-emphasised this unthinking aspect of doxa but that he did so often in 
reference to more traditional societies and in order to demonstrate how 
much of social life is taken-for-granted. Although Bourdieu’s tendency to 
speak of either the natural attitude of doxa or the critical thought of 
                                         
19 Bourdieu (2000: 173) acknowledged that he overplayed the doxic order, saying that he 
“needed to awaken people from their doxic slumber by ‘twisting the stick in the opposite 
direction’, this is not done… to deny the existence of strategies of resistance, individual or 
collective, ordinary or extraordinary”. 
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reflexivity seemed to polarise his conceptualisations of consciousness (Myles, 
2004) his recognition that doxa is less stable within modern societies perhaps 
indicates that he came to acknowledge this polarity as untenable. As Myles 
(2004) has highlighted, Bourdieu even allows for doxais which are relative to 
different fields. We live in a society in which we are hierarchized through 
many features such as disability, class, sex, gender, sexuality, race, and 
religion and thus occupy multiple positions which therefore affords greater 
potential for differentiated dispositions and statuses and varied social 
interpretations (or what Bourdieu (1977) would call ‘heresies’ or 
‘heterodoxy’) of what is considered legitimate within different fields. Our 
relation to doxa may be uneven20 and agents do not relate to doxa equally, 
however, it remains the dominant vision to which individuals more or less 
align and tends to consolidate the social order as a result of the “homology of 
position, a resemblance within difference” (Bourdieu, 1985: 737). In this 
sense, social space is always contestable but characterised by enough shared 
understanding that we usually ‘have a feel’ for how things fit.  Doxic 
knowledge can therefore be questioned, disrupted and challenged, especially 
when the order is challenged by someone perceived as outside of the social 
field. As Bourdieu (2001: 14) stated “The partial indeterminacy of certain 
objects authorises antagonistic interpretations, offering the dominated a 
possibility of resistance to the effect of symbolic imposition”. However, the 
extent to which this can be said to reorder doxic thought tends to be limited 
as I will go on to show. 
As well as this, attributes and capitals which may manifest as positively 
consecrated or negatively sanctioned symbolic capital in one field do not 
necessarily translate into other fields, allowing for an understanding of how 
disability can be relationally produced. Therefore, while the doxic perception 
                                         
20
 Doxa “varies by the extent orthodoxy is challenged by heterodoxy, by type of society 
(degree of heterogeneity), and by one’s position held in society” (Swartz, 2013: 236). For 
Bourdieu (1977: 169), orthodoxy represents the “straight, or rather straightened opinion 
which aims, without ever entirely succeeding, at restoring the primal innocence of doxa”. It 
reinforces doxa through the imposition of “orthodox discourse, the official way of speaking 
and thinking” (Bourdieu, 1977: 169). 
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of disability might be that disability is bad, tragic, problematic, deserving of 
pity or constitutive of the abject (Hughes, 2009a), there are spaces in which 
and individuals for whom the experience of disability is less mired with 
negativity. For some disabled people, the rejection of the medical model and 
its negative implications in favour of the social model can provide a positive 
sense of identity, sometimes described as a process of “coming out” 
(Shakespeare, 1996). Shakespeare (1996) does however raise that this 
positive self-identification tends to take place in a collective context and 
may be problematic for those who are socially isolated. Moreover, even those 
who bear a strong and positive disability identity may harbour deeply 
internalized oppressions (Shakespeare, 1996), evidencing the psychosocial 
significance that negative symbolic capital may wield. Therefore, although 
the transfiguration of our various stock of capitals into symbolic capital and 
the subsequent sense of place it instils often takes place at a collectively 
aligned pre-conscious level and as such go unnoticed, there are many 
instances in which this process may be disrupted or more consciously felt, 
especially with the experience of negative symbolic capital. In such cases, 
the attribution of negative value may be psychologically harmful and difficult 
to ignore. 
This malleability may seem antithetical to some of Bourdieu’s critics who, as 
we saw in the second chapter, perceive his habitus as a rigid and inflexible 
structure. However, this analysis of doxa and negative symbolic capital will 
emphasise the plasticity of Bourdieu’s theory. As Bourdieu (2000: 160) has 
noted “Habitus is not necessarily adapted to its situation nor necessarily 
coherent. It has degrees of integration- which correspond in particular to 
degrees of ‘crystallisation’ of the status occupied”. He elaborates that in 
instances of conflict and crises, the destabilised habitus may be identified, 
“torn by contradiction and internal division, generating suffering” (Bourdieu, 
2000:160). In addition to this, Bourdieu (2000: 160-1) himself notes that the: 
“diversity of conditions, the corresponding diversity of habitus and the 
multiplicity of intra- and intergenerational movements of ascent or 
decline mean that the habitus may, in many cases, be confronted with 
conditions of actualisation different from those in which they were 
produced”. 
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The capacity for symbolic capital to instil a sense of place whilst relying upon 
a relationship of knowledge which can at times be contested and disputed 
therefore presents a precarious situation for negotiating a personal sense of 
value and legitimacy. However, I would argue that these situations may also 
afford individuals more opportunities to negotiate the meaning within these 
spaces and engage in critical reflection21. 
The chapter will now look at how doxa as an unquestioned and taken-for-
granted knowledge facilitates the functioning of symbolic power and 
inculcates our misrecognition of the true nature of social inequality in the 
context of disability (Swartz, 2013). To assess the place of impairment within 
the doxic order, I will show how the pedagogy of structures, practices and 
dispositions which construct the non-disabled body as doxic to the detriment 
of non-normative bodies. Using Bourdieu in this way enables an understanding 
of how disabled bodies become insidiously devalued and coded with negative 
symbolic capital against the doxic body. I would suggest that this 
demonstrates how exclusionary responses and practices to disability 
perniciously take shape through the doxic underpinning of mundane, 
everyday, taken-for-granted knowledge. 
3.4 Doxa, Orthodoxy and the Realms of Normalcy 
In order to discern the doxa of normalcy, focus must be given to the 
discourses and principles of thinking which legitimate certain subjectivities 
and practice. In conceptualising how doxa functions in social fields, it is 
helpful to conceive of a multi-dimensional space comprised of various 
coordinates of value which, according to the specific logic of that field and 
the differential distribution, combinations and transmutations of capital, 
accord agents social positions relevant to that hierarchy (Bourdieu, 1985). 
These coordinates of value act as guiding principles and inform those who 
enter the field of the rules of the game and engender an implicit knowledge 
of the value we possess in terms of how our capitals align with the demands 
and expectations of the field (Bourdieu, 1985; Shilling, 2004). The self-
                                         
21 These moments of disjuncture and their potential as spaces for more critical and reflexive 
thought will be more fully developed in Chapter Five. 
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evidence of doxa is secured through the “habitual and unquestioned 
consensus on the regularities of shared experience” which is continually 
reinforced through the quotidian interactions which take this cultural 
background for granted (Olsson, 1995). 
Wacquant (2011: 85) suggests that understanding the field and the place of 
agents within it becomes a question of how we develop an embodied social 
competency “transmitted through a silent pedagogy of organisms in action”. 
The pedagogical work that takes place within a given field consolidates a 
doxic mode of being, a harmonious fit between habitus and field experienced 
as a feeling of normalcy which is realised so completely that the norms which 
underpin it cease to exist and instead become a self-evident base of practical 
knowledge (Bourdieu, 1977). We therefore might expect that someone who 
has little or no experience of impairment or no familiarity with disability to 
have a doxic conceptualisation of the body as ‘non-impaired’ whereas for 
someone who encounters disability and impairment as the norm, or as we age 
and experience our own failing bodies, the body is less taken-for-granted. 
Here, I would suggest that for people who experience impairment as the 
norm, disability forms part of their background, gnoseological thinking within 
the habitus and informs and shapes their relation to doxa. A doxic approach 
to disability might be that it is a personal tragedy and medical problem, but 
personal experience as a disabled person provides plethoric examples of how 
this is not the case. This understanding that your experience diverges from 
the doxic expectation highlights that there is a gap between your own 
knowledge and the knowledge that others have of you. I would suggest that 
this provides the potential for reflexive thinking as the disabled person’s 
social practice becomes more consciously considered and challenges the self-
evidence of doxic belief.  I will return to this in the final chapter. 
The pedagogies specific to various fields therefore instil ideas around which 
practices and subjectivities are appropriate and legitimate within this social 
space and in so doing, largely reproduce the doxic beliefs of the field.  In this 
respect we might suggest that the doxic knowledge we have about boxing 
would lead us to anticipate upright, athletic and agile bodies and that in this 
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social space the impaired body would appear, at least for most people, out of 
place. What I suggest here is that what remains implicit within many, if not 
most, social fields is a doxic conceptualisation of the corporeal as non-
disabled. As I have previously shown in Chapter Two, our relationship to 
cultural structures nurtures assumptions about corporeal standards. The doxic 
assumptions which underlie our conceptualisation of the body and corporeal 
practices may be most saliently evidenced through heterodoxy or heretics 
(Bourdieu, 1977), that is, the presence of visibly impaired or unruly bodies.  
Hodge (2014: 655) has described the unruly body as that which comes into 
being “when there is a misfit between bodily expression and the imposed 
disciplines of a particular cultural and social environment” or as Bourdieu 
would say, a misfit between the habitus, expressed through bodily hexis, and 
the doxic demands and expectations of the field. 
3.5 Doxic Bodies, Doxic Space 
Knowing already how much our social class, gender, age and so on, shapes 
the taken-for-granted way we treat our bodies, if we think of our day-to-day 
practices and experiences, we soon realise how often the non-disabled body 
is re-legitimised in the diffuse symbolic capital of doxa. So much of what we 
do is always already imbued with an idea of what constitutes a legitimate 
body and legitimate forms of bodily comportment. I should add that this 
section may seem, true to Bourdieu’s style, to overstate the doxic body but 
that I do this to emphasise just how self-evident the body is taken to be. As I 
have already highlighted, the extent to which we relate and align to doxa is 
approximate if uneven. 
From the very architecture of our homes, the furnishings and goods within 
them, the access to public spaces and technology, even our clothes and the 
tempo of social interaction and the expectation of social conduct and 
manners, transmit a doxic knowledge of what the body is, what it should do 
and how it should look. These are the “unspoken conventions” of what 
constitutes being ordinary (Boys and Shakespeare, 2009: 1).  These are 
reinforced with more or less explicit messages about the normal body and it’s 
well-being through images in the media, health promotion campaigns and 
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dietary advice, safety regulations within the workplace, medical 
recommendations, hygiene expectations, fitness instructions and prenatal 
care and consultations. We anticipate that people should smell fresh or at 
least “devoid of odour” (Howson, 2013), we anticipate that people will speak 
at a certain speed (Paterson, 2012). We worry about cancer and about 
getting into accidents, we take vitamins and supplements, we try to eat well 
and we know we should exercise, we feel guilty (and unwell!) when we drink 
too much and know we should stop smoking, we check on loved ones, we 
worry about them travelling, we wear seatbelts and we are glad when we 
hear that they ‘made it there in one piece’. Many of these practices are 
guided by normative thinking which reflects the valid and justified concern 
that we have for our own and other’s health and well-being (Vehmas and 
Watson, 2016) and are experienced as self-evident common-sense. 
The non-disabled body as metaphor for normal is ubiquitous; we ‘jump’ in the 
shower, tell people to ‘stand up’ for themselves, we ‘lend a hand’, ‘it’s as 
plain as the nose on your face’. You have a good eye if you exercise good 
judgement or we see eye to eye if we agree. Even the cultural use of the 
body as metaphor reflects the experiences of non-disabled speakers if we 
think of the literal thinking of some people with autism/Aspergers. Analogous 
to the non-impaired body as metaphor for normal, the metaphor of 
impairment is frequently used to denote negative, dysfunctional and 
abnormal situations; blind spots, fall on deaf ears, the economy is crippled, 
political correctness gone mad and so on. 
Practically speaking, doxa can often seem remarkably like lay normativity, 
with many of the practices we engage in considered as facilitative of the 
good life (Vehmas and Watson, 2016). However, for Bourdieu (1996), doxa 
serves a political function through maintaining the stability of the social 
order. Doxa therefore works as a mechanism of domination integral to the 
functioning of symbolic power and the perpetuation of inequalities and must 
be understood in its relation to the formation of habitus. Therefore whilst we 
may not perfectly correspond to doxic conceptualisations, for any number of 
reasons (constraints of social location, deeply embedded nature of behaviour) 
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we still recognise and align with ideas about the non-disabled body because it 
is naturalised in so much of what we do as well as a normative want. In this 
respect, we can begin to see how the non-disabled body becomes imbued 
with negative symbolic capital through the accumulative effects of doxa. At 
the same time it demonstrates that symbolic capital is contingent upon 
people feeling invested in it and identifying it as important (Farrugia, 2010). 
Our relationship to achieving (or as the case may be, not achieving) the doxic 
body is also naturalised and the extent to which we meet this expectation is 
not usually critically questioned so that, for example, we are more likely to 
blame being overweight on perceived character deficits rather than the lack 
of access to resources and education that encourages and embeds healthful 
lifestyle choices. Similarly, we might think that a wheelchair user is denied a 
doxic body because of the lack of accessible public space. In this case, this 
exclusion is naturalised because the ‘problem’ of misfit between the disabled 
person and social space is not perceived as the result of inaccessible space, 
rather, it is perceived as the result of the impaired body, highlighting how 
the doxic understanding of space and body collude to produce their own self-
evidence. It reproduces an idea about what constitutes natural movement 
within a taken-for-granted space so that, for instance, observing someone 
with limited mobility struggle to gain access to public spaces reifies the 
legitimacy of the non-disabled body within this space. Here, the environment 
organised around the doxic body demonstrates the symbolic power carried by 
the non-disabled body which in turn reifies deficit thinking about disabled 
bodies and reiterates the negative value attached to them. In this case, doxa 
transmits the message that disability is located in the body and is not seen as 
the outcome of social structures and organization (Grue, 2015). As such, we 
might argue that the doxic order produces disabled bodies as imbued with 
negative symbolic capital. 
It is worth noting that although our social location can mediate our 
relationship to doxic conceptualizations of gender and that we may reject 
these ideas of femininity and masculinity on the basis of our class (Skeggs, 
2004), the same cannot be said of impairment. Class may certainly mediate 
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the extent to which impairment becomes disabling and social location may 
determine what we perceive to be disabling but the non-impaired body is still 
desirable, no matter your class. Whilst disability studies scholars have worked 
to show the problems of the medical model and that by quantitatively 
substantiating the corporeal norm the biomedical model excludes all those 
that fall short of this ideal, an idea of this norm already exists so repletely 
within the habitus and is reiterated in the minutiae of everyday life. The 
biomedical model as scientific capital consecrated as symbolic capital 
(Bourdieu, 2004) might certainly be said to act as the orthodoxy to doxa; it is 
an official discourse which consecrates and reinforces what is already a 
common-sense approach to our bodies. The non-disabled subject which 
characterises doxic knowledge might be further reinforced through the 
negative terms and representations of disability but our embodied 
dispositions already equip us with a feeling for what is normal, natural and 
desirable. As we saw in Chapter Two, this is a large part of the problem with 
performative challenges which seek to deconstruct and unsettle ideas about 
disability. This is not to suggest that the omnipresent picture of non-
disablement is unproblematic but that it is the “trump card” (Bourdieu, 1985: 
733) and constitutes doxic structures, knowledge and practice which mutually 
reinforce each other and is experienced as self-evident and as that which 
makes sense. In fact, taking the body for granted produces what Bourdieu 
(2003) would describe as an arrogant sociodicy which never thoroughly 
anticipates that what is could be drastically different. However, when 
symbolic power is institutionalized and embodied in this way, it is largely 
impervious to performative tactics of persuasion. In this respect he argues 
that “what is problematic is the fact that the established order is not 
problematic” and that the legitimacy of doxa is never questioned, except in 
crisis situations (Bourdieu, 1998b: 56). 
Although I have mostly dealt with how non-impairment is naturalized as part 
of the social order and therefore consecrates its legitimacy in the structure 
of doxa, I would like to add that there are real reasons to reject impairment. 
It is worth noting that while Bourdieu often referred to the arbitrary 
structures of the social order so as to identify the capricious nature of what 
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becomes consecrated as legitimate and to demonstrate that the order could 
be very different if other arbitrary elements had been imposed, this does 
leave questions about the validity of such arbitraries. Although Bourdieu saw 
doxa as reinforcing oppressive and often arbitrary social structures, pain and 
discomfort are not arbitrary aspects of the social order. As I have shown, 
much of the practices which reinforce the non-disabled body as doxic are 
normative and reflect a concern for our well-being that cannot be reduced to 
social conditioning. This is to acknowledge that impairment can be deeply 
unpleasant and is not a positive, neutral or irrelevant experience for many 
(Crow, 1996) and that medicine plays a huge role in improving the quality of 
our lives. As Ferrie and Watson (2015) describe, Motor Neurone Disease is a 
brutal condition which leads to extensive motor weakness so that affected 
persons cannot walk, move in bed, talk, cough, eat or breathe. The pain, 
tremors, numbness and weakness associated with Multiple Sclerosis, the 
seizures and premature death in Tay-Sachs, the agony of blistering skin in 
epidermolysis bullosa or harlequin icthyosis, or the heart and lung disease 
and early onset arthritis of Marfan syndrome are intrinsically unpleasant. 
Pain, depression, fatigue and chronic illness can be a constant fact for many 
disabled people and may prompt worry and concern about the future with 
respect to the progressive and degenerative nature of some impairments 
(Crow, 1996, Morris, 1991). The visceral experience of impairment is not 
benign, and the pain, incapacity and various impairment effects which a 
person may face are reason enough not to want to be impaired. 
I would suggest however, that it is when these deeply embodied beliefs gain 
commonsensical self-evidence and combine with other accumulative and 
unexamined ways of thinking, as they do in doxic thought, that they produce 
and naturalise harmful common-sense approaches to non-normative 
embodiment which may obscure forms of oppression that disabled people 
experience. The commonsensical approach to pain and incapacity would instil 
a deeply embodied feeling about why having a spinal injury is detrimental to 
well-being and to be avoided, and that may well be normative, but the 
embodied response to human well-being couple with doxic understandings of 
disability as unable and so on, has consequences for how we treat people we 
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perceive as in pain or incapacitated, namely, the symbolic violence of 
psycho-emotional disablism through expressions of pity and fear (Reeve, 
2012). As such, normativity is not in and of itself the source of oppression 
experienced by disabled people, rather, doxa is the mechanism of oppression 
through which normative thinking may be skewed and accumulate with other 
negative thinking about disability. 
The doxic conceptualisation of the non-disabled body is therefore partially 
determined by the collectively recognised legitimacy of the body as well and 
able, and consequentially, partially by the collective recognition that 
impairment and disability are negative, unpleasant and constitutive of 
illegitimate embodiment. It is the ubiquity of these common-sense 
approaches which tell us how things should be which frames disability and 
endows it with negative symbolic capital. 
While we can recognise that non-doxic bodies which do not correspond to 
doxic thought may pose as challenges to the norm we can also question the 
extent to which different bodies can really resist let alone contest the 
legitimacy of doxa. Recently we have seen disabled fashion models such as 
Madeline Stuart and Jillian Mercado and actress Jamie Brewer reaching New 
York Fashion Week, prompting people to suggest that we are reaching a 
“golden age of diversity in fashion” (Marriot, 2015). Of course it is important 
that we see disabled models to counter the cultural invisibility of disabled 
people, but they remain a minority in a huge industry and often attract 
patronizing coverage, becoming a tokenistic “fuzzy, inspirational human 
interest story, aimed at a non-disabled audience” (Marriot, 2015). Moreover, 
these disabled models tend to align closely with dominant definitions of 
beauty, we are a long way off from seeing models with neurofibromatosis at 
fashion week for example. The presence of these models remains exceptional 
and could hardly be said to change a multi-billion pound global industry. For 
those involved, disability in the fashion industry is a vicious cycle: “Modelling 
agencies say they don’t have disabled models on their books because brands 
won’t hire them; brands blame the modelling agencies, saying there are no 
models with disabilities there for them to hire” (Marriot, 2015). 
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Similarly, the London Paralympic games were surrounded with positive 
rhetoric and proclamations that attitudes towards disability would never be 
the same again (Braye et al, 2013; Birrell, 2015; Crow, 2014). However, a 
survey conducted by Scope (2014) found that 58% of disabled people had not 
noticed any change in people’s attitudes towards them as a disabled person, 
and that one in five disabled people believed that attitudes had worsened. 
Braye et al (2013) have documented the concern surrounding how the 
Paralympics misrepresent what being disabled is really like for most people. 
Portraying inaccurate images of disability through a focus on the sporting 
elite ultimately pushes the reality of living with impairment further from the 
public imaginary. It is hard to conceive how the achievements of Paralympic 
athletes unsettle and change our attitudes toward disability when “eight in 
10 people have never worked alongside a disabled colleague, and even fewer 
have had a disabled person in their house for a social occasion” (Birrell, 
2013). Enjoying this sporting event might have highlighted the successful 
sporting careers of a disabled minority, but it has not transformed the 
underlying attitudes, structures, organization and understanding of disability 
which continues to (re)produce disabling and exclusionary doxic spaces and 
practices. As Bourdieu (2000) would argue, in order to challenge the 
legitimacy of doxic structures (and their reproduction), these 
institutionalized values must be seen as in a state of uncertainty or crisis 
although he does not really expand on what this would entail. I would suggest 
that whilst exposure to non-doxic bodies, meanings and practices may 
broaden the visibility of impairment it does so moderately. Doxic modes of 
thought, official discourses, structures and institutions circumscribe and 
reinforce the realm of normalcy so that impaired corporealities may often 
reaffirm the doxa of the legitimate body. As Bourdieu puts it (1992: 80): 
“the dominated…can always exert a certain force, inasmuch as 
belonging to a field means by definition that one is capable of producing 
effects in it (if only to elicit reactions of exclusion on the part of those 
who occupy its dominant positions)”. 
What is more, although agents can actively resist the social order the issue is 
whether this resistance is empirical rather than conceptual “whether 
resistance manages to overturn existing patterns of domination or not” 
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(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 80). One might also question the extent to 
which looking or acting non-doxic necessarily equates to resistance. 
Thinking about the double naturalisation of the non-disabled body at a doxic 
level illustrates the efficacy of symbolic power in explaining the continuing 
exclusion of disabled people. The non-disabled sociodicy acquires its strength 
through firstly legitimizing inequality as the result of an inherent nature 
which is always already a socially mediated and naturalized construct 
(Bourdieu, 2001). It is this double naturalisation of the body that makes it so 
difficult to challenge and resist. The negative symbolic capital that is 
attributed to disability through relations of doxic knowledge therefore 
furthers poor understandings about disability as well as the idea of disabled 
people as deficient, negative and abnormal and obscures the symbolic 
violence done to disabled people as natural (not addressing a disabled person 
directly and instead talking to the person they are with or infantilizing 
disabled people, asking a disabled person intruding questions that you would 
not ask a non-disabled person22, psycho-emotional disablism and so on). In 
other words, our symbolic capital, that is, our distinctions, become 
naturalized and therefore obscure the social inequalities underlying our 
position. 
Having shown how doxa insidiously produces negative symbolic capital by 
maintaining a social order in which the disabled body is overwhelmingly 
negatively interpreted, I would now like to turn to a few examples of the 
impact of negative symbolic capitals in doxic spaces and how this may shape 
the habitus. To experience these negative encounters as the norm is to be 
constantly reminded that you are different. Not only this but to have this 
same difference regularly realised, not accommodated and seen as 
problematic is to live in a state of recurring devaluation. This can be an 
emotional and distressing experience with an accumulative negative effect on 
the person’s sense of value and therefore could durably transform aspects 
and dispositions of the habitus, demonstrating the real suffering that can 
                                         
22 In the same way that white people feel justified in asking Black or Minority Ethnic (BME) 
people “where are you really from?” 
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take place when ones legitimacy is questioned. On the other hand, Watson 
(2003) has shown how for some disabled people, the daily experience of 
oppression becomes routinely denied and downplayed through various 
strategies of resistance. This demonstrates how being different to the doxic 
expectation might allow us to develop psychological forbearance as well as 
critical thought. However, given the increasingly negative portrayal of 
disabled people as illegitimate welfare users and their precarious entitlement 
to benefits and citizen status amongst many more exclusionary and 
discriminatory practices and multiple oppressions, I would suggest that there 
are markedly more chances for such negative symbolic capital to take its toll. 
In this respect, the increasing deprivation of material and symbolic resources 
makes it unduly difficult for some disabled people to attach value and 
meaning to their lives and practices. Arguably then, there is a case that for 
some groups of disabled people, it is harder to deny daily experiences of 
oppression and inequality and this may have significant psychosocial costs. 
At this point I would like to draw upon the work of Sara Ryan and Donna 
Reeve to further demonstrate the power of doxa and negative symbolic 
capital in contributing to the exclusion of disabled people from social space. 
Ryan (2005; 2008) has raised questions around access and exclusion in her 
research on the everyday use of space by learning disabled children and their 
mothers. Ryan (2005: 292) states that “rights to public spaces are more 
apparent than real. Public spaces are not egalitarian, in fact, the rights to 
access are hierarchically and logically arranged” so that we might say that 
space is characterised by a doxic arrangement. Ryan (2008: 730) posits that 
public spaces are “saturated with regulations of ‘proper ways’ to perform 
symbolic displays and self-representation. Those with more power are able to 
monopolise space and relegate the less desirable to less desirable 
environments”.  Within public spaces, disabled people are seen as 
problematic and often made to feel like outsiders as a result of the 
inaccessible environment, organisation and reactions from non-impaired 
people, serving to remind them that they are out-of-place and do not belong 
(Ryan, 2005). As well as this, mothers are often attributed a devalued status 
through the negative and inappropriate judgements made by others about 
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their children’s behaviour (Ryan, 2008). More recently, a report by charity 
Sense (2016) found that 92% of parents with a child with multiple needs felt 
that they did not have the same opportunities as their non-disabled peers and 
81% reported difficulties in accessing mainstream local play spaces. Of the 
multiple barriers faced, many parents reported that negative attitudes 
towards disability were the most significant barrier and that 51% of children 
with multiple needs had been excluded from play spaces by providers of play. 
Significantly, the report highlights that access to play is crucial for children’s 
physical, emotional and cognitive development and that early childcare 
settings are where most children develop social and communication skills. 
These play spaces are often also where parents develop support networks and 
expand their social circle. Exclusion from these doxic spaces therefore 
reduces both parents and children’s opportunities to develop social capital as 
well as other vitally important aspects of children’s development. 
Ryan (2005: 293) has documented that learning-disabled children are 
increasingly regulated in terms of their behaviour in public spaces, 
demonstrating the illegitimacy or unworthiness of their selves which requires 
close monitoring to “protect the orderliness of public spaces”. Importantly 
for both Bourdieu’s work and for Ryan (2008: 731), the rules which govern 
our behaviour are implicit, “the code governing these rules is incorporated in 
etiquette rather than comprising of law, morality and ethics. These rules are 
so deeply engrained and taken-for-granted that they are taken to be ‘natural’ 
and it is when they are challenged they become more visible”, clearly 
demonstrating the doxic expectations of our social conduct and the perceived 
disruption that disabled bodies present.  Ryan (2005: 293; 2008) expands that 
this becomes more of a negotiation for mothers of learning disabled children 
“who are not able, and may never be able, to conform to appropriate ways of 
behaving or using space”. In this sense, doxic spaces and attitudes continue 
to reproduce disability as imbued with negative symbolic capital. 
Similarly, Reeve (2002, 2006, 2012) discusses how spatial barriers can 
contribute as a form of indirect psycho-emotional disablism, stating that 
encountering inaccessible social spaces can arouse hurtful emotional 
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responses. For Reeve (2012), exclusion happens at both the material and 
psycho-emotional level because the message transmitted through inaccessible 
environments is that the disabled person does not belong and that they are 
out of place. In some cases, this can lead to the person withdrawing from 
social spaces as it has a negative effect upon their self-esteem and 
confidence. Reeve (2012) later describes this as an example of Leder’s “dys-
appearing body”, a body that is experienced as absent most of the time until 
an inter (occurring from interactions with the social) or intra (a reminder of 
the physicality of our body such as pain and discomfort) corporeal experience 
foregrounds it. Here, Reeve (2012) quotes Paterson and Hughes’ (1999) work 
on the dys-appearing body to further her argument that disabling spaces 
“produce a vivid, but unwanted, consciousness of one’s impaired body” and 
represents instances of socially enforced dys-appearance which are 
psychically harmful. She states that “part of the problem lies with a social 
and physical world which is set up to accommodate certain kinds of normate 
bodies” (Reeve, 2012: 84) or what we might call doxic bodies. 
This theorisation of the psycho-emotional experience of disablism echoes 
much of what Bourdieu has said in terms of how the habitus directs and 
mediates our experience within social fields, reminding us when we are out 
of place or granting us ease within social space. As Bourdieu (1984: 474) has 
said, our social position in the world “is never more clearly expressed than in 
the space and time one feels entitled to take from others; more precisely, in 
the space one claims with one’s body in physical space”. Moreover, Bourdieu 
(2001: 39) has noted that where certain groups (in this case, women) were 
previously formally excluded from certain social spaces (educational, 
political, occupational), their subsequent official inclusion did not guarantee 
their presence as a result of embodied dispositions which linger on as a self-
enforced and “socially imposed agoraphobia”. In this respect we can identify 
the strength of doxic knowledge to exclude and self-exclude due to the 
lasting effects and embodied nature of dispositions and their relation to 
power. As we saw in the first two chapters, although disabled people have 
been formally integrated into the expectations of citizenship, this by no 
means guarantees their inclusion. 
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By using Reeve’s work on the psycho-emotional to modify Bourdieu, the 
theorisation of the symbolic capitals attached to various bodies within certain 
doxic mediated spaces allows us to understand psycho-emotional disablism in 
terms of embodied relations of symbolic power. By seeing that psycho-
emotional disablism is entwined with the structures of symbolic power we are 
able to develop an understanding of the psychological consequences of 
disability as the transfiguration of negative symbolic capital as it is realised 
through oppressive doxic structures. Understanding psycho-emotional 
disablism in this way also allows us to conceptualise how these doxic 
structures function as a mechanism of domination and inequality and 
demonstrates the negative psychological experiences which come to shape 
the habitus and demonstrates internalisation of oppressive structure. 
Within public space, non-disabled agents may not think about what kind of 
bodies they expect to encounter, their expectations of what bodies will look 
like exists dormantly as a background knowledge and it is not until they meet 
a person who is visibly impaired that this taken-for-grantedness may be 
disputed. The congenial interaction between objectified structures and our 
bodies and dispositions reifies corporeal expectations and the correct way of 
doing things which ‘makes sense’ to us, consolidating the non-disabled body 
as legitimate and our doxic mode of being. The non-disabled body is written 
into a legitimate way of life that reaffirms itself in the most quotidian of 
ways. The practice of a body which fits the field in a legitimate way is 
therefore granted the “symbolic profit of normality” which allows the body 
to be experienced as self-evident and grants a sense of ease (Bourdieu, 
1998b: 69). This doxic conceptualisation is doubly reinforced when we 
consider the absence of disabled people from mainstream social activities 
and practices which itself stems from the non-disabled doxa around which 
environments and practice is organised. This absence of disabled people in 
public space and the more general lack of accessibility further deepens a 
knowledge about space and which bodies are able to legitimately occupy 
space. 
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For Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) this creates an asymmetry of 
status for those who are prevented from accessing this symbolic capital and 
requires that they must always work harder to accumulate capital than those 
to which legitimacy is more readily bestowed. In this respect, I would suggest 
that in order for disabled people to accumulate positively consecrated 
symbolic capital, they are often already pitted against deficit thinking 
associated with their perceived negative symbolic capital. As we saw in 
Chapter One, the struggle to be seen as a legitimate citizen is made that 
much harder when we recognise how so much of it depends on having a doxic 
body with which to meet the expectations of neo-liberalism. In some sense, 
doxa, as it is entwined with symbolic capital and reinforced through orthodox 
discourses, might be argued to impose a kind of “invisible censorship” in that 
it tends to reify its own logic whilst obscuring alternatives (Bourdieu, 1977, 
1999: 15). 
3.6 Symbolic Capital and Sense Relations 
So far I have shown how non-disablement contained in doxa as a diffuse form 
of symbolic capital works as a mechanism of domination which continues to 
reproduce insidious disabling structures, subjectivities and practices. I have 
also suggested how psycho-emotional disablism is entwined in these relations 
of symbolic power and draws its strength and efficacy from the deeply 
embodied doxic knowledge of disability. In this final section I want to unpick 
how negative symbolic capital is attributed to disability as well as the unease 
this may produce as a result. Bourdieu (2000: 184, my emphasis) states that 
the bodily knowledge gained from our sense of position: 
“takes the form of emotion (the unease of someone who is out of place, 
or the ease that comes from being in one’s place), and it is expressed in 
behaviours such as avoidance or unconscious adjustments such as the 
correction of one’s accent”. 
Here we see that emotion is central to the functioning of symbolic capital. 
Thus, Bourdieu (2000: 187) posits that the social world is both a product of 
and a stake in the symbolic struggle over knowledge and recognition, a 
struggle in which each actor seeks to impose “an advantageous 
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representation of himself or herself, with the strategies of ‘presentation of 
self’ so admirably analysed by Goffman”. It is perhaps the embodied sense of 
place instilled by symbolic capital which makes it feel so personal, loaded 
with affectivity and ontologically significant. Within Pascalian Meditations, 
Bourdieu (2000) makes repeated reference to the importance of symbolic 
capital used by players in the game and begins to depict a more ethereal 
target that exists alongside the more traditionally conceived and tangible 
profits. It is here that Bourdieu (2000: 238, original italics) recognises the 
existential toll of “the symbolic struggle of all against all in which what is at 
stake is the power of naming, or categorisation, in which everyone stakes his 
being, his value, the idea he has of himself”. Here he writes: 
“man is and knows he is mortal, the thought that he is going to die is 
unbearable or impossible for him, and, condemned to death, an end… 
he is a being without a reason for being, haunted by the need for 
justification, legitimation, recognition” (Bourdieu, 2000: 239). 
Further to this he adds that symbolic power can question the “legitimacy of 
an existence, an individual’s right to feel justified in existing as he or she 
exists; and this question is inseparably eschatological and sociological” 
(Bourdieu, 2000: 237, original italics). For Bourdieu (2000), the legitimacy 
attached to our existence is inextricably tied to our feelings of self and 
symbolic capital in relation to others.  The emphasis placed on how symbolic 
power evokes feelings to do with our sense of being and questions our value 
demonstrates that the realisation of our symbolic capital can be an uneasy 
experience. Bourdieu (2000: 241) establishes here that the social world is 
essentialist and as such, creates hierarchies of “worth and unworthiness, 
which can never be perfectly superimposed on the hierarchy of wealth and 
powers”. These ontological hierarchies, ranked in terms of symbolic capital, 
endow agents with a social mission, “To be expected, solicited, overwhelmed 
with obligations and commitments is...to experience...the feeling of counting 
for others, being important for them, and therefore in oneself” (Bourdieu, 
2000: 240).  Bourdieu (2000: 240) describes some of the positive effects of 
consecration, that is to say the attribution of positively recognised symbolic 
capital, stating that “the more that agents are endowed with a consecrated 
social identity, that of husband, partner, etc., the more they are protected 
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against a questioning of the sense of their existence”. Here, Bourdieu (2000: 
241) concedes the ability of symbolic capital to give meaning to life and, it 
would seem, to defend against the attribution of negative symbolic capitals. 
In this respect, embodying socially esteemed symbolic capitals is significant 
for our sense of worth and evidences the psychosocial import of such 
capitals. It is worth noting that the experience and value of capitals is 
mediated by the social space in which we are engaged, so that being an 
active participant in the Disable People’s Movement provides space in which 
disability is positively valued while it occupies a position of negative value 
elsewhere. 
Given the very personal, psychosocial and affective experience of symbolic 
capital as one which attributes meaning and value as well as a sense of 
position, I would suggest that there is the potential for symbolic capital to 
persist in our embodied orientations as an enduring sense relation. Of course 
this sense relation is experienced at different intensities in different spaces 
but its’ significance is felt in how it shapes us overall, as it realizes itself in 
our practices, dispositions and character. In this respect, symbolic capital is 
not only a force or a power when it is recognized in us by others through 
relations in social space but also meaningful sense-making asset which 
through its perpetuation transforms the owner’s relationship to it and can 
become a personal, psychosocial architecture within the habitus. 
If symbolic capital has the ability to attribute meaning and value to life it 
might equally be suggested that negative symbolic capital questions the 
meaning of lives and denigrates their value. This raises some interesting 
questions about our ability to reject and resist negative symbolic capital. 
Watson’s (2002; 2003) work has shown how for the majority of his research 
participants, despite the daily experiences of oppressive practices, 
impairment and the negative cultural perceptions of disability were not seen 
as significant to their sense of identity or self.  Watson (2002: 514) shows that 
“For many who took this view, any difference between themselves and non-
disabled people were simply the result of discrimination and prejudice”. In 
this respect, one participant was described as deciding what was symbolically 
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important to his identity. Symbolic capital in this respect is contingent upon 
people being invested in it so that people who reject the conventional 
markers of symbolic capital do not feel judged by them (Farrugia, 2010). To 
this extent we might argue that a disabled person is able to reject 
impairment and its attendant negative symbolic capital as a defining feature 
of identity, of course. There are disabled people who reject that their 
impairment or that to be disabled is negative. These are important narratives 
and again, negative symbolic capital is likely to be felt differently and to 
varying intensities within different social spaces so that although disability is 
negatively valued in many social spaces, it can also be a source of positive 
identity, especially for those aligned closely with social model politics and 
the Disabled People’s Movement (Shakespeare, 1996). In such situations, the 
social model has enabled us to identify the often arbitrary social structures 
and organisation which oppress and exclude disabled people and locates the 
problem in society rather than in the individual. In this sense, the DPM has 
allowed many disabled people to challenge and disrupt the status quo and the 
social model might therefore be considered an example of the kind of 
reflexive socio-analysis that Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 199-
201) advocated which should seek to illuminate the “hidden principles” of our 
domination so that agents are able to “assume their habitus without guilt or 
suffering”. The social model may therefore provide a means of challenging 
the self-evidence of doxa and doxosophers. The social model has clearly 
provided many disabled people with a positive political identity which I would 
suggest is experienced as an enduring sense relation within the habitus so 
that these disabled people will continue to feel these positive associations 
even when outside of disability positive spaces. 
Negative symbolic capital is of course mediated by time, place and context as 
Reeve (2012: 81) shows by drawing on evidence from her interview with a 
younger woman, Sue, who has MS and uses a Zimmer frame to walk and who 
“resists the normative gaze and manages social encounters in productive 
ways”. Sue uses her interactions with others to challenge how we 
conceptualise disabled people, saying that it is good for people to see a 
younger person with a Zimmer frame. Reeve (2012) notes that this way of 
Chapter 3 Page 142 
Symbolic Power, Doxa and Negative Symbolic Capital 
returning the gaze is a means of retaining control in this situation and that 
this is a response that not all disabled people can elicit. She remarks that it 
“takes a degree of self-worth and self-confidence, as well as energy, to be 
able to adopt this approach” (Reeve, 2012: 81). Reeve (2012) attributes Sue’s 
ability to negotiate social encounters in this way as likely encouraged through 
other aspects of her life, namely, through being in paid employment. In this 
sense we might think of how the value of work as a highly consecrated 
symbolic capital enables Sue to negate the negative symbolic capital 
associated with impairment. However, as we saw earlier, there is still an 
asymmetry of status which disabled people must work against. 
Whilst negative symbolic capitals associated with disability may be strongly 
rejected or resisted by some disabled individuals and therefore does not 
denigrate their personal sense of value, it is arguably more difficult to 
challenge dominant beliefs and practices. In dealing with the symbolic power 
of negative symbolic capital attributed to impairment and disability, 
rejection of this negative value is not quite so straightforward. In speaking of 
how a person is attributed value through symbolic capital, Bourdieu (1990: 
140) states that “It is based not only on the indices of collective judgement 
but also on the objective indicators of the position really occupied in the 
distributions, which the collective judgement already takes into account”. 
The symbolic power of negative symbolic capital is not confined to individuals 
and their personal interactions or challenges but forms part of the system of 
symbolic power because it exists in collective schemes of perception and in 
institutions and objective structures. As Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992: 127) puts it “Social reality exists...twice, in things and in minds, in 
field and in habitus, outside and inside of agents”. Therefore when we begin 
to think through the doxic conceptualisation of disability as it exists in mind 
and in structures, we might expect that the natural attitude towards 
disability is that it is unpleasant and that the disabled person is unable, 
unproductive or vulnerable, that they are dependent, and require help/care 
or “reasonable adjustments” and perhaps that they take more sick days than 
a non-impaired person. Negative symbolic capital therefore may have 
negative consequences when a disabled person is being considered for a job 
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despite this person’s personal capacity to resist such negative value, such as 
Sue.  As a consequence of the negative symbolic capital attached to 
disability, the disabled applicant is turned down, perhaps more than once, 
and as the unemployed spell gets longer and longer, they find it harder to 
gain employment. This consolidates and reproduces an image of the disabled 
person as unemployable, furthering this exclusion and feeding back into doxic 
thinking, leading to a longer time spent on benefits and the accumulation of 
yet more negative symbolic capital through the risk of being perceived as a 
fraudulent claimant. Symbolic capital as part of the symbolic system is then 
reified in the economic system, just as it is reified through doxic space and 
organization. As we saw before, resistance of negative symbolic capital is 
often personal rather than empirical as it does not change the pattern of 
domination. Although I acknowledge that the responses to and feelings about 
disability may be diverse, I feel that Bourdieu’s social theory adds a valuable 
means of understanding how many social structures (reflective of a doxic 
order which problematises the disabled body and practice) shape the lives of 
disabled people. This does not dismiss the heterogeneous experience of 
individuals but locates them within a wider framework of symbolic power. 
Therefore, although not everyone will perceive disability in terms of negative 
symbolic capital, we live in a society which is overwhelmingly organized to 
disadvantage and devalue disabled bodies and practice. In this respect, it 
emphasises the symbolic power of structure and doxic organisation which 
characterizes individual lives rather than the individuals who comprise the 
structure. 
3.7 Consecrated and Sanctioned Identities 
Within Language and Symbolic Power, Bourdieu (1991a) talks about rites of 
institution which he describes as the various social acts which consecrate, 
sanction, sanctify and legitimate certain identities and a particular social 
order. He notes that the institutionalisation of symbolic capital serves to 
consecrate symbolic boundaries through encouraging belief in the legitimacy 
of these boundaries as well as legitimising the sanctioning of difference (pre-
existent or not) “by making it known and recognised; it consists of making it 
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exist as a social difference, known and recognised as such by the agent 
invested and everyone else” (Bourdieu, 1991a: 119). Bourdieu (1991a: 120) 
goes on to note that through the institution of an identity “which can be a 
title of nobility, or a stigma (you’re nothing but a ...)” classifications are 
imposed upon agents and they are attributed a social essence: 
“To institute, to assign an essence, a competence, is to impose a right 
to be that is an obligation of being so (or to be so). It is to signify to 
someone what he is and how he should conduct himself as a 
consequence... To institute, to give a social definition, and identity, is 
also to impose boundaries...acting in keeping with one’s essence and 
nothing else” (Bourdieu, 1991a: 120 my emphasis). 
Bourdieu (1991a: 72) noted that the consecration of symbolic boundaries act 
as a kind of benchmark and that “the weight of different agents depends on 
their symbolic capital, i.e. on the recognition, institutionalised or not, that 
they receive from a group”. He then proceeds to acknowledge that “the most 
unequal of all distributions, and probably, in any case, the most cruel, is the 
distribution of symbolic capital, that is, of social importance and of reasons 
for living” (Bourdieu, 2000: 241, my emphasis). 
Here Bourdieu (2000) displays an acute sensitivity to the importance of 
legitimacy of personhood. Feelings of worth and purpose and our sense of 
personal value are inextricably tied to the recognition of symbolic capital. My 
interpretation of the significance of symbolic capital revolves primarily 
around the previously mentioned notion of ‘sense relations’, affording a 
closer look at the embodied nature of symbolic capital and the intermediary 
role of affect within the habitus more generally. In this respect, it is 
important to consider not only how the negative image of disability contained 
within doxa produces an idea of who counts as a disabled person, but also the 
embodied experience of this symbolic burden which I will return to in 
Chapter Four. 
When considering the weight of negative symbolic capitals attached to 
disability and which are sustained by doxic thought we might begin by 
thinking about the disability stereotypes that would likely be evoked if you 
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were to ask someone what a disabled person looks like. They might typically 
say a wheelchair-user, a person with a white stick or a double amputee, for 
many disabled people living with invisible or less obvious impairments, “you 
don’t look disabled!” is a familiar exclamation (TUC, 2015). The Trade Unions 
Congress (2015) has recently published a good practice guide to support those 
with invisible impairments who are often met with similar statements of 
disbelief when they disclose their disability. They state that “at a national 
level, government messages reinforced by sections of the popular press that 
people claiming benefits are defrauding decent hard-working taxpayers” 
serve to reinforce the deserving and non-deserving binaries through disability 
stereotypes (TUC, 2015: 2). 
The doxic conceptualisation of the disabled figure seems more stark when we 
consider how many disabled people have reported being the target of abuse 
because they are perceived as faking it, especially blue badge holders, as a 
result of not being visibly impaired or disabled enough (Quarmby, 2015). In 
such instances it might be said that doxic knowledge about who the 
legitimately disabled are is met with an image of disability which is 
unfamiliar and dissonant to the perceiver. This is even more significant when 
we think of how these doxic expectations may have helped facilitate the 
political paternalistic rhetoric of protecting the most vulnerable and the 
truly disabled. What do the most vulnerable and truly disabled look like? 
Doxic understandings of disability will tell us of the various negative symbolic 
capitals attached to disability, that disability is in the body, that it is a 
personal deficiency or abnormality and that the disabled figure is someone 
who is unable, needy and pitiable. Doxic belief won’t tell us about the social 
complexities of disability, the variability or fluctuation of impairment, the 
diversity of disability experiences or social model thinking. In this respect, 
although social model thinking may be formally co-opted in policies, it does 
not present a strong enough heterodox message to disrupt the self-evidence 
of doxa. 
We saw in Chapter One that welfare spending and fraudulent claimants have 
been longstanding concerns and the public have been grievously misled about 
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the level of benefit fraud within disability benefits and the media has 
constructed the disabled benefit claimant as a pathologically idle fraud 
(Jensen and Tyler, 2015; Briant et al, 2013; McEnhill, and Byrne, 2014). 
Disability benefit recipients, portrayed as work-shy, fraudulent claimants, are 
negatively compared and juxtaposed against the doxic benchmark and 
consecrated identity of the legitimate citizen as moral, tax-paying 
enterprising individual. The state acts as the “bank of symbolic capital that 
guarantees all acts of authority… [which] institute socially guaranteed 
identities (as citizen, legal resident...)” (Bourdieu, 1998c: 52). For Bourdieu 
(1986) this is the ability to make entities exist through producing 
commonsense by constantly and explicitly stating and classifying groups “the 
State institutes and inculcates common symbolic forms of thought, social 
frames of perception, understanding or memory” (Bourdieu, 2000: 175). The 
state, helped by the media, produces ways of seeing through neo-liberal doxa 
which consecrates the active citizen at the same time as it sanctions the 
illegitimate identity of welfare user. Through imposing ways of seeing, the 
state also produces the disability category through “bringing a more or less 
extensive part of the doxa to the level of explicit statement”, reinforcing the 
doxic idea of disability through the orthodox restatement of the truly 
vulnerable and disabled, producing disability as exceptional tragedy 
(Bourdieu, 2000: 184). As such, the state and media “mobilize feelings” 
against an already marginalized and stigmatized group and creates 
“phantasms, fears, and phobias, or simply false representations” leading to a 
profound misrecognition of the true nature of disability as either faker or 
tragically wounded (Bourdieu, 1998c: 20-52; Hughes, 2009a). It might be 
suggested that this kind of misrecognition is better described as allodoxia, a 
term that Bourdieu (1984; 1996; 2000) used to describe mistaken identities 
and misplaced beliefs as a result of a misapprehension which leads us to take 
one thing for another. Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) described 
allodoxia as the errors in perception that occur as a result of the imposition 
of ways of seeing which are uncertain and discontinuous. As Bourdieu (1996: 
219) stated: 
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“The categories of perception that agents apply to the social world are 
the product of a prior state of this world. When structures are modified, 
even slightly, the structural hysteresis of the categories of perception 
and appreciations gives rise to diverse forms of allodoxia”. 
For Bourdieu (2000: 144) the hysteresis, or mismatch between perceptions 
produces the mistaken identity because the habitus is primed to recognise 
such an identity - “allodoxia, the mistake we sometimes make when, waiting 
for someone, we seem to see that person in everyone who comes along, gives 
an accurate idea of this tension”. 
In claiming to protect the most vulnerable and the truly disabled, the state 
has wielded significant symbolic power in redefining who can be considered 
the legitimately disabled and appeals to our doxic commonsense about who 
might counts as a disabled person. Moreover, in restricting the disability 
category, the state forces disabled individuals into a position where in order 
to qualify themselves for meagre benefits, they must conform to and 
reproduce doxic understandings of impairment as limiting, abnormal, 
deficient and dysfunctional. It seems that to portray life as a disabled person 
as anything less than desperately vulnerable or tragic condemns a person as 
fraudulent. In this respect, Bourdieu (1999:  123) argues that we never know 
the realities of the lives discussed in the media, only “phantasms, which feed 
on emotional experiences stimulated…by words and images such as those in 
the tabloids and by political propaganda or rumour” or what Jensen (2014) 
has described as poverty porn. As Wacquant (2013: 2) suggests, these ways of 
seeing represent a “sociosymbolic alchemy whereby a mental construct, 
existing abstractly in the minds of individual persons, is turned into a 
concrete social reality acquiring existential veracity as well as historical 
potency outside of and over them” (Wacquant, 2013: 2). The negative 
symbolic capital attached to the phantasm of fraudulent benefit claimant 
evokes intense responses demonstrating that  anti-welfare sentiment is 
deeply internalized and affectively characterized,  that is, symbolic 
manipulation has taken place at an embodied level. The disabled person who 
fails to meet the skewed doxic perceptions is perceived as the “false 
mendicant” (Hughes, 2015), endowed with negative symbolic capital which is 
experienced as a positional sense relation, so that feelings of resentment, 
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disgust or anger express the embodied misrecognition of symbolic power 
relations. 
By looking at the cuts to welfare in terms of symbolic power we can see that 
the supporting political rhetoric and scathing media portrayals act to 
symbolically manipulate categories of perception, dismantling the category of 
deserving. The state as the “holder of the monopoly of legitimate symbolic 
violence” symbolically imposes a viewpoint (Bourdieu, 1985: 732). People 
who were previously considered disabled and worthy of support are now, 
quite arbitrarily, as Stone (1984) and Roulstone (2015) have shown, defined 
as illegitimate and undeserving. This constant reiteration of the 
deserving/undeserving category pushes realistic understandings of disability 
further out of doxa and renders the real suffering of disabled people an 
invisible oppression in that is has dropped below the “threshold of public 
visibility” (McNay, 2014: 87). The media has in effect, enacted a censorship 
through portraying increasingly negative and unrealistic news (Bourdieu, 
1998c) and spends no time at all reporting the banalities of ordinary life as a 
disabled person, instead conflating disabled people with benefit frauds or on 
the other hand as objects of pity and charity or inspiration porn (Young, 
2012). I would argue that this prevents disabled people being seen to have 
the mundane symbolic capital of being ordinary and further adds to the doxic 
conceptualisation of disability as exceptional, negative and unable. Through 
enforcing and inculcating these categories of perception, the state 
legitimates the symbolic domination of disabled people by constructing their 
experiences of inequality and poverty as the result of individual deficit, 
whether that deficit is disability or pathological personhood. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the use of Bourdieu’s concepts of symbolic 
capital and doxa in understanding how disablism is consolidated at both a 
structural and individual level. By demonstrating that doxa functions as a 
diffuse form of symbolic capital which reifies the non-disabled body and 
devalues the disabled body, I have argued that doxa functions as mode of 
organization and a mechanism of domination which reproduces disabling 
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structures, subjectivities and practices and which takes shape through 
mundane and taken-for-granted knowledge. We have also seen how symbolic 
capital is experienced as a sense of place and position and that the 
transfiguration of symbolic capital is psychologically experienced as a 
positional sense relation. As such, practices which are positively consecrated 
may encourage a feeling of ease within space and thereby come more easily 
as this disposition is increasingly evoked and reinforced. On the other hand, 
we have also observed how possessing negative symbolic capital associated 
with disability in doxic space may devalue a person, question their legitimacy 
and sense of worth, thereby instigating feelings of unease or being out of 
place. The attribution of negative symbolic capital may therefore discourage 
or prohibit disabled people from accessing space as freely as their non-
disabled counterparts and demonstrates the asymmetry of status which 
disabled people must work against. 
This chapter has also shown that while there are those that may be able to 
individually resist the negative value attached to disability, this is harder to 
effect on a larger scale because of the diffuse power attached to the non-
disabled body over many different levels. In this respect, while certain 
individuals may appear as exceptions to the rule, they do not change the 
rules, structures, organization, practices and organizations which 
characterize social space. 
I have also suggested that the poor understandings of disability contained 
within doxa have helped facilitate a political rhetoric which seeks to absolve 
the government of wrongdoing by emphasizing that it will protect those who 
truly need it when it comes to cutting welfare. In this respect, disabled 
people are forced into a position in which they must conform to and 
reproduce the negative picture of disability in order to receive social support 
or else be labelled as undeserving and imbued with a negative symbolic 
capital of a different ilk. This may encourage individuals to reject and resist 
mainstream collective expectations, or it may encourage actors to emphasise 
other forms of capital to mitigate perceived negative attributes. At the same 
time however, this work suggests that the extra efforts that may be made by 
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individuals in a bid to ameliorate the tensions arising from negative symbolic 
capital can be psychically harmful. Given the embodied and psychic 
experience of symbolic capital, it is also suggested that symbolic capital 
retains a kind of psychological architecture within the habitus. 
The inculcation of these symbolic categories therefore enact a symbolic 
violence in which the true nature of inequality experienced by disabled 
people is shrouded and their ordinary lives obscured. Given the current 
context of welfare cuts and symbolic manipulation of the disability category, 
disabled people are at increased risk of accumulating the negative symbolic 
capitals associated with fraudulent claimants which may have significant 
psychological consequences and which may be especially compounded by 
other aspects of material and symbolic deprivation. The next chapter will 
focus on a psychosocial development of the habitus in order to more fully 
explore the embodied experiences of practice as well as a closer look at how 
affect may characterize the habitus. 
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The Psychosocial Habitus 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter addressed Bourdieu’s concepts of symbolic power and 
negative symbolic capital, demonstrating the negative value which is 
overwhelmingly attached to disabled bodies through a critical interpretation 
of the substance of doxa. Having identified that doxic beliefs about the body 
serve to sustain and reproduce a social environment suited to the 
prescriptively narrow able-bodied norm, which, at best is unaccommodating, 
and at worst, psychologically harmful, attention was given to the highly 
psychosocial element of the habitus, especially associated with negative 
symbolic capital and the disjuncture of habitus and field. Observing the 
existential character that Bourdieu attached to symbolic capital and its 
capacity for giving meaning to social life, this chapter seeks to explore the 
affective and psychosocial elements of the habitus which make this possible. 
Given that the habitus is fundamentally experiential, it is suggested that 
without an understanding of the habitus as characterised by emotion/affect, 
theorisations of social practice can seem estranged to our own experiences 
and may be felt to be mechanistic and disinterested. Theorising the habitus 
allows us to interrogate our ways of behaving, thinking and being and by 
incorporating the psychic element of the habitus we can better understand 
the embodied feelings associated with such practice. Moreover, the 
theorising of a thoroughly psychosocial and affective habitus, equipped with 
moral dispositions and animated with feelings, enables us to further consider 
the complex cognitive processes which shape our dispositions and beliefs. 
This seems crucial to add to our understanding of how disability comes to 
occupy such a negatively valued space. As Bourdieu (1999: 512) suggested, if 
we wish to understand the dispositions of the habitus we must seek to 
understand how “the social order collects, channels and reinforces or 
counteracts psychological processes depending on whether there is a 
homology, redundancy, and reinforcement between the two systems or, to 
the contrary, contradiction and tension”. 
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This chapter begins by foregrounding Bourdieu’s affective, if underdeveloped, 
leanings before exploring the incorporation of affect and cognition within 
social theory in order to demonstrate how these psychological processes 
might be applied to our understanding of the habitus and how affect may 
underpin our social practice. By exploring work on the affective processes 
underpinning social practice, I hope to show the ongoing and dynamic nature 
of the habitus as a socio-biological structure and illuminate what might be 
described as the psychic architecture of the habitus. 
As this was something left untouched by Bourdieu I will draw upon the work 
of other scholars who have worked to theorise a more psychosocial habitus. 
The chapter will then draw upon a collection of scholars who extend 
Bourdieu’s theory into the realms of affect and the psychosocial within their 
own work as well as some of the moral dimensions of the habitus (Wetherell, 
2012; Reay, 2015; Bradford and Hey, 2007; Lawler 2005; Sayer 2005). I will 
also look at how the attribution of negative symbolic capital and experiences 
of disablism may come to shape the habitus and some of the nuances involved 
in securing anti-welfare sentiment. This chapter will finally look at the 
aversive reaction of disgust and how it has been used to account for the 
negative positioning of disability. It will be suggested that the use of disgust 
is not quite sufficient in accounting for the feelings we experience in the 
presence of disabled bodies and that instead, we might use the experience of 
unease to open up a discussion of hysteresis which is the subject of the final 
chapter. 
4.2 A Psycho-sociology? 
We have already seen that although Bourdieu never explicitly addressed the 
role of emotions, perhaps even marginalising them within his work, he did 
make reference to practical and symbolic processes which generate 
emotional capital (Reay 2004). As well as this, Bourdieu (1984; 1990; 2000) 
paid great attention to the corporeality of the thoroughly embodied habitus 
which promises “a way of thinking about emotion and affect as 
simultaneously social and physical” (Probyn, 2004: 334). There are also those 
that have used psychological capital as a means of discussing the 
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psychological experiences of social position. According to Bradford and Hey 
(2007: 600), psychological capital is “an additional resource related to, but 
not identical with, cultural and social capital already specified as part of 
Bourdieu’s theorisation of class and power”. They go on to say that 
psychological capital necessarily intersects with other species of capital and 
similarly, is differentially distributed. Moreover, psychological capital is 
established in “practices of self-esteem, confidence and self-belief which are 
generated in a range of settings (the family, communities of various types, 
friendships and formal institutional settings like schools and youth projects) 
and can be transformed into resilience and the dispositions needed to cope 
with the exigencies of contemporary life” (Bradford and Hey, 2007: 600). 
Elsewhere, Hey (2003) has stated that psychological capital is “produced by 
memories, desires, rage, shame, resentment and pain as well as power and 
pleasure”. 
However, I would suggest that to talk about memories and feelings of rage or 
shame or pain as psychological capital makes them seem as though there 
were some archive of how to feel and, I would suggest, oversimplifies the 
psychological capacities of the habitus.  Whilst it could be argued that this 
work on psychological capital seems to demonstrate the psychosocial element 
of the habitus, it appears to disaggregate affective and psychological 
properties from dispositions and practices. Instead, it might be more 
appropriate then to talk of the psychologised experiences of capital and 
practices rather than psychological capital.  This is to say that the habitus 
itself is a psychologised structure which is cognitive and internalises our 
experiences and produces thoughts, feelings and behaviour. 
Central to the concept of habitus is the notion of dispositions; the embodied 
inclinations, preferences, and anticipations instilled in early life through 
repeated social action which reflects the social practices, relations and 
material circumstances in which the individual is located (Sayer, 2010). It is 
these dispositions, reflective of the environment in which they are acquired 
and developed, which endows us with our “feel for the game” (Bourdieu, 
1990: 66). Although Bourdieu concedes that habitus can change, he is often 
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charged with being overly deterministic and is guilty of understating the role 
of reflection and reason23 at both the stages of acquiring and developing 
dispositions (Sayer, 2010). 
I showed in Chapter Two that Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the embodied 
habitus has also neglected some of the very physiological and psychological 
limits of our bodies. Sayer (2010) has similarly noted Bourdieu’s superficial 
commitment to the biological nature of habitus through his use of libido 
understood as a physiological drive subject to cultural shaping. Therefore 
although we do indeed need an understanding of what drives us to do 
anything, Bourdieu has often been sociologically imperialistic in his approach, 
tending to ‘sociologise’ all behaviour which produces an “unexamined notion 
of human nature” (Sayer, 2010: 111). 
In speaking of emotion and the creation of dispositions, Bourdieu has argued 
that we learn through the body and that the social order is inscribed in the 
corporeal through the constant confrontation between the anticipative body 
and environment, “which may be more or less dramatic...is always largely 
marked by affectivity and, more precisely, by affective transactions with the 
environment” (2000: 141, my emphasis). Moreover, Bourdieu (2000: 167) 
states that the learning of our dispositions through socialisation is “highly 
charged with affectivity.  The child incorporates the social in the form of 
affects”. Emphasising the role of affect in the acquisition of dispositions, 
Bourdieu (2000: 140) states that it is because we are exposed to the “risk of 
emotion, lesion, suffering, sometimes death, [that we are] obliged to take 
the world seriously, (and nothing is more serious than emotion, which 
touches the depths of our organic being)”. What is more, Bourdieu (2000) 
states that our sense of place as well as our feel for the game as a corporeal 
knowledge is informed and mediated by emotion, noting the unease 
experienced when out of place which triggers unconscious adjustments. As 
we saw in Chapter Two, Bourdieu (1984: 474) located our socially held values 
in the “primary, primitive dispositions of the body, ‘visceral’ tastes and 
                                         
23Resistance and reflexivity within the habitus will be more fully developed in the next 
chapter. 
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distastes, in which the group’s most vital interests are embedded”. Whilst he 
may have overemphasised the automatic and unconscious nature of these 
responses, he certainly conceptualised dispositions and practice as affective 
and marked by emotion although this was never explicitly unpacked by 
Bourdieu. At times, his work seems to portray the disruptive quality of affect 
but then he also emphasises that affect plays a significant part in producing 
our acquiescence to dominating relations. An exploration of how affect and 
emotion shape and characterise our habitus and practice is essential if we 
want to understand the embodied and affective nature of symbolic power. As 
Sayer has argued, symbolic domination clearly functions in part through: 
“producing feelings of inferiority or superiority in people, and hence 
shame or pride and low or high self-esteem, and even though these are 
part of the experience of inequality and matter a great deal to people, 
affecting their psychological and physical health, the emotional 
dimension is left largely unexplored and for the reader to imagine” 
(Sayer, 2010: 114). 
Similarly, Wetherell (2012) and Reay (2005: 912; 2015) have shown that 
questions of exclusion and differentiation take place within the “psychic 
economy”. As I described in Chapter Three, the embodied experience of 
capital produces a positional sense relation, demonstrating how affect may 
configure our social relations and judgements of social value and is therefore 
a powerful aspect in social practice. According to Reay (2015), Bourdieu’s 
emphasis upon the scientific and objective obscured the role of affect and 
emotion in social life. In her latest work on the psychosocial, Reay (2015) says 
this is her second attempt at formulating an emotional conceptualisation of 
Bourdieu’s theory, noting that her knowledge of Bourdieu has deepened so 
that an understanding of the psychosocial cannot reside in emotional capital 
alone or even the expansive accumulation of capital but in the habitus itself 
and its relation to the field. Reay (2015: 10) states that the dispositions of 
the habitus should be more widely understood to include affective as well as 
cognitive aspects so that the habitus “can include a propensity to fatalism, 
ambivalence, resentment, certainty, entitlement or even rage, just as much 
as a tendency to either theatre-going or watching soap operas”. 
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Lizardo (2014) has noted the resistance of sociologists to adapting 
psychological and neuro-cognitive approaches whilst Pitts-Taylor (2014: 996) 
has similarly observed that the neuro-cognitive turn that has been identified 
across other disciplines in the humanities has illuminated sociology’s fervent 
“anti-naturalism”. There are some that view the emergent neuro-sociological 
approach as having gone off the deep end, whilst others perceive it as 
reductionist, eugenic and racist (Franks and Turner, 2013). Similarly, 
disability studies has traditionally been reluctant to engage with 
psychologised understandings of disability lest it be seen as validating 
negative attitudes towards disabled people (Reeve, 2006). This is 
understandable however, “given the bloody history of biological politics” 
which took place in the early 20th century (Fitzgerald et al, 2016: 2). 
However, Pitts-Taylor (2014) has suggested that this sociological reluctance 
to engage with biology, especially with neuro-cognitive understandings of 
self, now runs the risk of appearing irrelevant and outdated to 21st century 
understandings of humanity. She (2014: 997) argues that our traditional 
charges of biological determinism and reductionism may now be out-dated 
and poorly informed and that much of the recent research on our biology is 
actually compatible with social theory and supports the idea that we are 
biological beings which are “undetermined, dynamic and entangled with 
sociality and experience”. What is more, many in neuroscience “view the 
brain as a plastic, social organ, and depict the mind as embodied, emotional, 
and situated” (Pitts-Taylor, 2014: 998). Similarly, Fitzgerald et al (2016) 
quote an editorial called Life Stresses by the editors of the journal Nature 
(2012: 143) as saying that the biological sciences have “abandoned any 
concept of biological determinism” because we now know that “although our 
genes are fixed, their expression is highly dependent on what our 
environment throws at us”. The editorial (2012: 143, cited in Fitzgerald et al, 
2016) suggests then that just as biologists need to “learn the language of 
sociology”, sociologists could also benefit from incorporating biological 
understandings. 
The question is therefore not whether we should be developing a more 
biological and psychological approach, but how (Pitts-Taylor, 2014). As 
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Lizardo (2004: 3) has explained, our sociological intention should be “to 
uncover the most deeply buried structures of the different social worlds that 
make up the social universe, as well as the ‘mechanisms’ that tend to ensure 
their reproduction or transformation”. Understanding that Bourdieu’s habitus 
is a socio-biological structure as previously discussed in Chapter Two, we now 
turn to a more in depth psychosocial and affective analysis of its constitution. 
4.3 What do we mean by affect? 
In introducing affect, Seigworth and Gregg (2010) describe it as a visceral 
force that exists beneath, alongside and other than conscious knowing, a 
force which is beyond emotion which drives us towards action, thought or, on 
the other hand, may suspend and overwhelm us. Affect is variously described 
as an open-endedness, as generative quality, a potential, drive, bodily doing 
and immanence. It is an ongoing immersion of our body as a capacity to 
affect and to be affected (Seigworth and Gregg, 2010). For some, affect is a 
creative openness which provides hope and optimism through its disruptive 
and therefore freeing potential (Papoulias and Callard, 2010). 
There are some affect theorists who think of affect as ontologically distinct 
to emotion and as pre-personal, characterising it as beyond consciousness and 
too abstract for language (Shouse, 2005). For some of the theorists who 
conceptualise affect in this way, affect is distinct from cognition, meaning 
that behaviour is determined by affective dispositions which are autonomous 
to conscious thought (Leys, 2011). Although this might be useful when 
describing the fleetingness of some affective experiences it neglects that 
affect can leave indelible marks and produces lasting bodily dispositions 
(Watkins, 2010). Significantly, there are others who argue that affect is 
inseparable to cognition “if for no other reason than thought is itself a body, 
embodied” (Seigworth and Gregg, 2010: 3). Wetherell (2012) has developed 
on this by saying that to conceptualise emotion and affect as functioning 
through fundamentally different logics and by conceiving of affect as 
autonomous to feelings and beyond consciousness runs the risk of artificially 
separating affect from cognition. Neurobiological analyses have shown that 
the distinction between affect and cognition is phenomenological rather than 
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ontological and that affect is deeply involved in our sensory processing and 
therefore responsible for a number of basic cognitive operations (Duncan and 
Barrett, 2007). To speak of affect as Shouse (2005) has, that is, as 
ontologically distinct and separate to other neural functions, appears to 
reproduce the mereological fallacy (Bennett and Hacker, 2003). This is to say 
that we may be attributing qualities or behaviours to a part of what makes us 
human when it is only makes sense to ascribe these characteristics to the 
whole person, that fundamentally, to attribute some aspects of a social being 
to a pre-social or asocial capacity make little sense (Bennett and Hacker, 
2003). 
In choosing affect to talk about what we might commonsensically describe as 
emotions I am in agreement with Wetherell (2012) and Leys (2011) who say 
that the way that emotions tend to be conceptualised is limiting. As I showed 
in Chapter Two, Bourdieu appeared to conceptualise affect and emotion as  
unconscious embodied aspects of the habitus and in opposition to rational, 
critical thought, leading to a polarised conceptualisation of practice as either 
doxic or reflexive (Myles, 2004). In addition to this, emotions have 
traditionally been viewed and categorised as between six and nine distinct 
zones of feeling or “affect programs” which are triggered by emotional 
stimulus (Leys, 2011: 438). These basic emotions include fear, anger, disgust, 
joy, sadness, and surprise and are viewed as universal, genetically hardwired 
and reflex-like (Leys, 2011: 438). As such, it has been common to talk about 
how culture augments these primitive emotional responses (Wetherell, 2012). 
However, within psychology there is now more talk about how culture 
actually transforms and remodels emotional responses (Wetherell, 2012). 
Focus in neuroscience no longer concentrates on the functioning of “whole 
emotions” but instead on how different aspects of emotional processes flow 
and pattern across our neural circuitry in combination with our bodily 
reactions and ongoing thoughts and evaluations (Wetherell, 2012).  Emotion 
might be the label we give to a feeling or a way of characterising our mood, 
feelings and interpretation of bodily states, whilst affect might describe the 
embodied experience of these emotional intensities and flows. It seems that 
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we rarely experience just one basic emotion and our emotional states are 
characterised by so many other embodied, affective and cognitive processes. 
Although I acknowledge that there are many interpretations and definitions 
of emotions and affect, especially within psychology, I am not looking to 
develop on these accounts but instead develop an understanding of the 
habitus and its bodily states or embodied experiences. In this respect the 
affective nature of the habitus should be understood as it relates to practice 
and so my use of affect reflects Wetherell’s (2012) description as “embodied 
meaning-making” which may be more or less recognised as human emotion. 
In talking about affect and emotion in this way I seek to embed them in our 
“corporeal being in the world” (Hughes, 2012a: 67). Through focusing upon 
affect, emotion and feeling, a much needed psychosocial texture (Wetherell, 
2012) may be added to Bourdieu’s social theory which I hope provides a 
richer understanding of internalised power relations and demonstrates the 
impact that negative symbolic capital may have. 
At this stage it is worth clarifying terms such as conscious, non-conscious, 
unconscious, preconscious. Bourdieu (1977, 1984, 1990, 1992, 2000) 
repeatedly made reference to the unconscious aspect of the habitus which 
granted agents an ‘unthinkingness’ to their actions and the ease of practical 
sense and which consequentially contributed to the polarisation of practice 
as either doxic or reflexive, unconscious or conscious (Myles, 2004). This is in 
spite of the fact that Husserl, (whom Bourdieu adopted the concept of doxa 
from) conceptualised a number of doxic modalities with varying levels of 
consciousness (Myles, 2004).  Within the theory of affect, there are numerous 
references to consciousness or non-consciousness, unconscious and even 
preconscious, so that making any use of our sub/pre/un/consciousness can 
become hazy and muddled. As Wetherell (2012) shows, affect is both 
conscious and non-conscious and has bodily and cognitive elements which are 
often seamlessly entwined, illustrating that the brain is always engaged in 
preparing for action in emergent settings and that affect is ubiquitous. What 
we describe as the unconscious has come a long way since Freud’s 
psychoanalysis and what we call the unconscious might better be thought of 
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in terms of procedural unconscious to reflect its regulatory operations 
(Franks, 2012). Akram (2014) on the other hand has suggested that a more 
focussed understanding on what might actually be contained within the 
habitus’ unconscious24 is necessary if we are to understand how the habitus 
operates and that preconscious may be a more useful term to describe this 
aspect of the habitus. 
Akram (2014: 385) continues by saying that the preconscious refers to “that 
arena of influences that affects agency below the level of conscious action”. 
These preconscious motivations and habits contained within the habitus 
inform agency, contra to those accounts which “conceptualise agency largely 
in terms of reflexivity, decision making and actors who are unaffected by 
habit or anything below consciousness” although she maintains that 
reflexivity and intentionality are of course a part of agency too (Akram 2014: 
386). What is important here is that she insists on the significance Bourdieu 
attributed to the presence of one’s personal history in their everyday 
practice. 
Quoting Bourdieu (1977 cited in Akram, 2014: 387) she states that the 
preconscious has a critical role in agency and biography because “in each of 
us, in varying proportions, there is a part of yesterday’s man... Yet we do not 
sense this man of the past, because he is inveterate in us, he makes up the 
unconscious part of ourselves”. The interaction between our past and present 
and the various forms of structural influence will “be the site of much 
overlap, reinforcement and even contradiction” so that the habitus, replete 
with experiences of class, gender, disability, ethnicity and sexuality as well 
as a commitment to roles and institutions provides the “fertile  motivations” 
for our practice. This is significant when thinking about affect, specifically 
when we contend with the supposed emancipatory potential that some 
scholars attribute to affect. In such cases, some affect theorists emphasise 
that the biology which is observed in affective experience is essentially a 
“creative space” or an “inherent dynamism” which, owed to its 
                                         
24 For many readers, the unconscious will evoke Freudian notions of the id, ego and superego, 
a kind of structural model of the psyche which is counter-intuitive to the dialectical nature 
of the habitus (Akram, 2014). 
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unpredictability enables experimentation through resisting embodied habits 
(Papoulias and Callard, 2010: 35). However, whilst affect and biology may 
certainly have a disruptive or unpredictable nature, this does not necessarily 
guarantee resistance, reflexivity or transformation. Moreover, the optimism 
attached to an alleged biological productivity ignores the power of embodied 
dispositions. It ignores the power that the “accumulation of bodily affect 
[has] to shape practice” and create dispositional tendencies (Watkins, 2012: 
7). This kind of thinking grants legitimacy to the idea of “social 
weightlessness”, a term used by Bourdieu (2000: 13-14) to describe an 
abstract way of thinking about the world which fails to contend with the 
deeply embedded and embodied realities of everyday practice, power and 
unequal relations (McNay, 2014). 
We might therefore describe the influences that shape and characterise our 
practice that we aren’t consciously aware of, such as the accumulative 
experiences of class, gender, disability and so on, as preconscious. This does 
not preclude that these aspects of our embodied orientation may become 
more or less saliently felt and consciously experienced and instead only 
highlights that this embodied orientation enables us to go about our day to 
day lives in fairly unreflective ways. 
This chapter will now proceed using the term ‘preconscious’ to describe 
those influences that exist before-below our radar. Therefore, whilst much of 
the brain activity involved in social action may be preconscious, so that, for 
example, we do not have to modify our accent or comportment around 
friends, there is always the potential to pay more attention and for these 
ordinarily preconscious practices to become more consciously considered, as 
in the experience of a job interview, where we might painstakingly 
concentrate on our bodily presentation, accent, manners and so on. During 
these more attentive moments this focus “strongly amplifies the patterns of 
activation, and is correlated with the experience of consciousness” 
(Wetherell, 2012), demonstrating how our feeling of ease and unease and the 
sense of place this instils facilitates reflections on the self normally taken for 
granted. That which remains at a preconscious level is normally the 
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mundane, habitual and non-significant details of social action (Wetherell, 
2012).  Within the previous chapter, I supported a more flexible 
understanding of doxa, suggesting that as we occupy various social positions, 
our embodied understanding of and relationship to doxa is more 
differentiated. This may create more gaps or mismatches between the 
habitus and social space which prompts us to negotiate with diverse practices 
and meanings which I will return to in Chapter Five. As Sweetman (2003: 537) 
has suggested, the habitus may be considered more flexible or reflexive as a 
result of “economic, social and cultural shifts, not least shifting patterns of 
work and employment, changing forms of community and relationship, and 
the impact of consumer culture, which encourages us all to constantly 
monitor and ‘improve’ ourselves”. That is to say that as a result of increased 
changes across fields, disruption between the habitus and field becomes the 
norm and encourages an increasingly flexible habitus (Sweetman, 2003). 
Whilst acknowledging the problem in thinking about affect as beyond 
consciousness and pre-social, Shouse’s (2005) thinking on the experience of 
affect remains helpful in theorising the capacities of the habitus. Shouse 
(2005) elaborates that the experience of affect is “the body’s way of 
preparing itself for action in a given circumstance by adding a quantitative 
dimension of intensity to the quality of an experience” (Shouse, 2005, 
emphasis added). These quantitative measures of intensity include the 
autonomic workings of our body, the responses of our muscles and organs, 
the changes in our blood flow and breathing and so on. He notes that at any 
given moment there are hundreds if not thousands of stimuli which act upon 
the body and that the body responds by simultaneously “infolding” them and 
registering them as an intensity. He states, “Affect is this intensity...it is 
pure potential (a measure of the body’s readiness to act in a given 
circumstance”. This leads Shouse (2005) to argue that the experience of 
affect within infants is innate, and it is only with age, experience and 
practice that we come to regulate and control these responses. This seems to 
echo Bourdieu’s (1990: 57) thinking on the capacities of the habitus for 
incorporation “which exploits the body’s readiness”. What is more, the way 
in which Shouse (2005) has described affect as a readying and preparatory 
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force resonates with Bourdieu’s (1990: 66) habitus as an anticipatory device 
which endows agents with “practical sense as a proleptic adjustment to the 
demands of the field”. Therefore, although Bourdieu is certainly guilty of 
under-theorising the corporeal and affective basis of the habitus, we might 
identify that affect is actually what animates the habitus and primes us for 
practice. Moreover, it is these affects which makes our “feelings feel” in that 
they determine the intensity of our feelings as well as the peripheral 
intensities of daily life “the half-sensed, ongoing hum of quantity/quality 
that we experience when we are not really attuned to any experience at all” 
(Shouse, 2005). 
This preconscious mode becomes particularly relevant if we return to doxa 
and doxic practice and think about the mundane and habitual social practices 
which constitute our daily lives. This is to say that the ‘microstructures’ of 
the habitus have biological and neuro-cognitive foundations which are open 
to transformative processes of enculturation which come to produce different 
patterns of neuro-cognitive thoughts, feelings and dispositions. Doxa, as part 
of our internalised and embodied understanding of the world becomes laid 
down in neural circuits. Franks and Turner (2013) show how social values, 
emotions and meaning (or what Bourdieu would call the schema of the 
habitus) are mapped onto the neural circuitry through the interconnection of 
associative circuitry and body circuitry and thus produces meaningful 
embodied experiences. This embodied doxic knowledge endows us with the 
feeling of proprioception and a “sense of limits”, which, for the most part, 
enables us to experience the world as self-evident and undisrupted. It 
disposes us with knowledge that allows us to anticipate the everydayness we 
encounter in a fairly straightforward way and grants us the feeling of ease 
which Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) described as being a fish in 
water.  However, when doxic practice is disturbed, or when the ontological 
complicity between the habitus and field is disrupted, there is an experience 
of disjuncture. This disjuncture may unsettle the patterns of neural 
activation in a way that prompts more consciously considered action, a 
reflection which Bourdieu (2000: 162) says “remains turned towards practice 
and not towards the agent who performs it”.  As Imrie (2001) has shown, 
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escalators within public buildings can prove to be problematic for the visually 
impaired and elderly or frail who may find it more difficult to judge speed 
and distance. In these instances, the individual might be expected to pay far 
more attention to stepping onto the escalator, holding on to the side, 
preparing themselves to disembark and so on. However, as these disjunctions 
between the body and field become the norm, they are assimilated into our 
practice and we are granted the feeling of doxic ease. In this example, we 
can see how Bourdieu (2000) might have maintained that practical reflection 
“has nothing in common with the scholastic thinker” and is distinct to 
reflexivity. However, this assimilation of disjuncture may not be so 
straightforward for those with fluctuating impairments or episodic disability 
(such as epilepsy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, Crohn’s, etc). Adaptations may 
be less routine or reliable, leaving practice feeling precarious and disrupted 
and therefore may require more conscious deliberations. This raises 
interesting considerations regarding the extra work that disabled bodies must 
take on in order to achieve habitual practice in a world organized around the 
non-disabled body. This is to say that in order for some practices to become 
habitual, the simple repetition of a behaviour is not sufficient and may 
require modifications to the environment to accommodate for doxically 
designed space. Disabled people who employ personal assistants (PA) to help 
with feeding, bathing, dressing, getting in or out of bed and going to the 
bathroom and so on, require the conscious effort of both individuals to 
achieve practice (Engman and Cranford, 2016). Although familiarity, ease and 
intuitiveness often develops from having the same PA for a long period of 
time, individuals are still said to engage in conscious mediation of limiting 
environments and emotional labour with the PA (Engman and Cranford, 
2016). 
To consider the role of affect in these situations, we might go on to think 
about how the visually impaired or frail person might feel self-conscious or 
fearful about falling over, or embarrassed if they were to fall or knock into 
someone.  Someone with epilepsy might fear the responses of others if they 
were to have a seizure, highlighting the affective element involved in 
practice. A disabled person may feel annoyed and frustrated with the 
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inaccessible space, and that this frustration might build upon previous 
vexation committed to the preconscious of the habitus. These are not just 
emotional experiences in that we do not just feel shame or anger in these 
situations, but are characterised by cognition as well as affective flows so 
that we might indentify how these disjunctures (caused by the environment 
organised to suit non-disabled others doxic practice) disturb our practical 
relation to the world and may lead us to question its organisation. In this 
respect, the microstructures of our habitus might be said to have shifted 
from a preconscious state to an actively conscious state, which, building upon 
our internalised history produces feelings and dispositions within the 
emergent context. Through acknowledging that affect and feelings of various 
intensities characterise our practice and build on/add to previous 
experiences we can see how psychosocially developing Bourdieu’s habitus 
accounts for practice which is far less mechanistic or disinterested. 
Affect in this sense seems so vital to our sense of limits and of place. It is 
affect which allows us to experience the ease of doxic practice or the unease 
of disjuncture and could be said to register our feelings of being out of place. 
Farrugia (2010: 75) has suggested that it is the sensuous embodied feelings 
which, being the result of various power relations, constitutes our 
subjectivity, that is to say “affect is the process by which symbolic capital 
comes to constitute embodied subjectivity and create feelings related to the 
dispositions of the habitus”. 
Importantly, whilst Shouse’ (2005) work provides an interesting way of 
viewing the intensities we sometimes experience, his conceptualisation of 
affect seems to assume a linear order which in relation to the habitus, would 
appear to dissipate. Within Shouse’ account there is no strategy for 
understanding how affect is part of social practice and as such, an ongoing 
process in which the habitus is constantly fed back into and subsequently 
adapted. We might think about how a disabled person who has experienced 
hate crime may be subject to feelings of unease, timidity or fear, especially 
when revisiting the area in which the crime took place and this may 
discourage them from frequenting such places or to only go at certain times 
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of the day or when accompanied. In this respect we can see how the break in 
flow of practice disrupts the relationship between habitus and space and 
prompts strategic calculation for future practice. However, the risk is that 
these experiences may have an even more detrimental impact through 
intense avoidant responses as with agoraphobia. 
Unlike Shouse, Wetherell (2012) demonstrates how affect, emotion and 
feelings are a more recursive and integrated process. Indeed, affect is too 
ephemeral to be understood in isolation and Wetherell (2012: 13) notes that 
in affective action: 
 “bits of the body (e.g. facial muscles, thalamic-amygdala pathways in 
the brain, heart rate, regions in the prefrontal cortex, sweat glands, 
etc.) get patterned together with feelings and thoughts, interaction 
patterns and relationships, narratives and interpretive repertoires, 
social relations, personal histories and ways of life”. 
This focus, Wetherell (2012) argues, inevitably leads us to embodiment as 
“coming to terms with affect [which] implies coming to terms with the 
body”. In her bid to develop an interdisciplinary way of thinking through the 
interconnectedness of psychobiology and social analysis, Wetherell (2012) 
suggests that the concept of affective practice may provide the most 
promising and encompassing way of integrating “somatic, discursive, 
situated, historical, social, psychological and cultural bases of affective 
activity”. Through observing affective practice, Wetherell (2012) aims to 
focus “on the emotional as it appears in social life” so that affect might be 
taken to mean “embodied meaning-making” which may be more or less 
recognised as human emotion. 
These affects, cognitions and judgements can accumulate and create lasting 
dispositions, emotional traits and characteristics. By focussing on affective 
practice we can begin to contemplate how habitus is customised through the 
recurrent interactions of relational histories, narratives, emotional 
expressions, habitual routines of the body and ways of meaning making 
(Wetherell, 2012). Importantly, various situations will be characterised by 
more or less intense feelings of affect and these embodied experiences will 
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be accompanied by a “qualia of subjective feelings, along with other 
cognitions, evaluations, images, memories and appraisals of the situation” 
(Wetherell, 2012). Therefore while experience is undoubtedly mediated by 
our feelings and bodily dynamics, emotions and affect are not the sole or 
primary processes taking place, and can assume a relatively subtle role. 
Although the experience and pressure of having too much to do might cause 
us to feel stressed, the primary feeling may be one of focus and 
concentration, our past experiences encourage us that we know we can 
achieve the task or that we can ask a colleague for help. Even when stress 
feels like the primary and overwhelming response, our affectivity can be 
tempered by other thoughts. To reiterate Bourdieu’s thinking, embodied 
experiences are reflective of our habitus as it emerges and interacts with 
social context and our social position. 
We might also expect situations which register more intense affective 
feelings to have “reinforcing, inhibiting [and] orchestrating [effects on] 
neurobiological flows” (Wetherell, 2012). Here we can conceive of the 
complex affective and cognitive microstructures that underlie the habitus 
and work to reinforce or discourage certain practices and which creates the 
sense of ease or unease that a person feels within a given field. As we have 
seen, Bourdieu’s work has stressed the issue of fit and misfit and the 
embodied sense of limits and of place. In theorising the psychic operations 
involved in these processes, we can see how affect vitalises the habitus. 
Wetherell (2012) therefore argues that social value and differentiation is 
“turned into flesh”. Observing the affective and neuro-cognitive components 
of the habitus allows us to see the individual as a “physical, embodied actor, 
subject to development, cognitive and emotive constraints and affected by 
the very real physical and institutional configurations of the field” (Lizardo, 
2007: 5). At this individual level, we begin to see the habitus as a cognitive-
practical generative matrix (Lizardo, 2007) which becomes affectively 
personalised (Wetherell, 2012). 
In this respect, we might think of the body as constantly monitoring, 
maintaining and responding and so it can be useful to think of “the body in 
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social practice [as] a flow immersed in other flows” (Wetherell, 2012).  
Acknowledging how these states of body are in constant flux thereby rejects 
basic emotions hypotheses which tend to portray the experience of emotion 
as triggered and instinctual and which may portray practice as a kind of 
procedural recall rather than as the result of complex negotiated and 
emergent processes (Wetherell, 2012).  Instead of seeing emotions as neatly-
bundled universal experiences in response to corresponding stimuli, we might 
conceptualise how the body/brain “acquires routines that form distinctive 
dispositional body/brain shapes” and that through exposure to cultural and 
developmental processes acquires unique neural circuitries of emotion 
(Wetherell, 2012). To quote Bourdieu (2000: 165), the habitus makes us 
sensitive: 
“through a whole series of imperceptible transactions, half-conscious 
compromises and psychological operations (projection, identification, 
transference, sublimation, etc.), socially encouraged, supported, 
channelled and even organised, [so] that these dispositions are little by 
little transformed into specific dispositions”. 
Significantly, Wetherell (2013: 234) notes that Bourdieu’s handling of affect 
was typical of the “bio-cultural orthodoxies of the day” in that he seemed to 
conceive of affect in terms of the basic emotions and therefore as 
unreflective and universal responses. With this in mind, Bourdieu was 
evidently more interested in how this aspect of corporeality, what he appears 
to have termed libido, reinforced and reproduced certain unreflective 
practices rather than the inner workings of affect and the nuances of 
affective practice. In this regard, it is easy to see how Bourdieu may have 
conceived of intense emotions such as disgust and shame as encouraging 
“familiar routines, discouraging transgressions and reinforcing established 
patterns and inequities” (Wetherell, 2012). However, with the new 
psychobiological models of affect that are emerging, we can take accounts of 
social practice forward through an incorporation of affective plasticity which 
provides new ways of understanding embodied action (Wetherell, 2012). 
In a similar vein, there are those who have suggested that although 
Bourdieu’s work neglects the moral capacities of agents, his 
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conceptualisation of the habitus is amenable to their incorporation (Lamont, 
1992; Sayer, 2005; 2010; Ignatow, 2007; 2009).  Sayer (2010) suggests that we 
learn good or ill natured dispositions, virtues or vices, through the repeated 
encouraging or discouraging practices and relations that we encounter in 
everyday life. These moral dispositions, much like and in cooperation with 
our emotional responses, are sometimes quite deliberate and at other times 
semi-conscious. Emotions such as shame, embarrassment and guilt may 
combine with more cognitive evaluations of what behaviour is appropriate to 
produce morally acceptable practice whereas feelings of contempt, anger 
and disgust may distinguish moral violations (Ignatow, 2009).  We are, at 
times, barely aware that we have enacted a moral disposition, showing just 
how inert our behaviours can become although the strength of this response 
may be dependent upon the frequency with which it is evoked and our 
reflexive self-observation (Sayer, 2010). Therefore, while moral dispositions 
may reside in the preconsciousness of the habitus there is the opportunity for 
moral judgements and decisions to be more critically evaluated. These moral 
beliefs can, of course, be exploited and used to ratify social inequalities but 
they can also contain “notions of fairness and conceptions of the good which 
can prompt resistance to domination” (Sayer, 2005). The habitus is a 
therefore a “complex matrix of cognised emotions and embodied cognitions 
that is a foundation for moral judgement of the self and others” (Ignatow, 
2009: 108).  In order to think through complex psychosocial experiences 
which are constantly re-forming, we should see subjectivity as an “affective 
intersectional” experience (Wetherell, 2012) 
We might ask does this give emotion too much credit? If sociology has 
criticised the Kantian position which overvalues the role of reason and the 
rational actor, (Leys, 2011) can we also suggest that too much focus is now 
being given to the role of emotions? Leys (2011: 436) shows that in response 
to the Kantian disembodied account, affect theorists have claimed that to 
understand beliefs we must acknowledge the “subliminal affective intensities 
and resonances that so decisively influence or condition [us]”. I am by no 
means suggesting that emotion is the primary force or factor behind practice 
or that affect and emotion have “epistemological privilege” (McNay, 2008: 
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14) and only mean to highlight that affect as an embodied aspect of the 
habitus has consequences for practice which Bourdieu left previously under-
developed. Affect is but one feature of the habitus as it emerges in different 
social settings and spaces so that the habitus remains socio-centric (McNay, 
2008). Importantly however, affect and emotions significantly characterise 
our experiences and the visceral feelings we experience are embodied 
expressions of our relation to power. 
Thus far the chapter has explored how the psychological underpinnings of the 
habitus may serve to enhance our understanding of embodied social practice. 
Through highlighting the affective flows and neuro-cognitive processes 
involved in practice, we have identified how dispositions may be formed, 
enhanced and encouraged so that an understanding of the experience of fit 
or misfit may be discerned. We have also looked at how doxic thought may 
come to be laid down in neural pathways and the potentiality for our doxic 
practice to be disrupted so that more deliberate and conscious thought is 
necessitated. The chapter will now turn to look at the role of affect in 
shaping dispositions in relation to experiences of inequality and social 
suffering and the lasting effects this may have on the habitus. 
4.4 Affect, Dispositions and the Habitus 
As we have seen, for Bourdieu (1984, 1990, 2000) the habitus is 
fundamentally about fit, or lack thereof (Reay, 2015). As we saw in the 
previous chapter, it is when Bourdieu begins to write about the lack of fit 
that we start to see the power of affect and emotions and the feelings of 
conflict that can arise (Reay, 2015). As Bourdieu (2000: 163) shows: 
“The degree to which one can abandon oneself to the automatisms of 
practical sense obviously varies with the situation and the area of 
activity, but also with the position occupied in social space: it is likely 
that those who are ‘in their right place’ in the social world can abandon 
or entrust themselves more, and more completely, to their dispositions 
(this is the ‘ease’ of the well-born) than those who occupy awkward 
positions…the latter are more likely to bring to consciousness that 
which, for others, is taken for granted, because they are forced to keep 
watch on themselves and consciously correct the ‘first movements’ of a 
habitus that generates inappropriate and misplaced behaviours”. 
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Here we are seeing Bourdieu’s incorporation of affect and emotion into the 
habitus and its role in shaping dispositions and practice. In these instances of 
mismatch, we see how practice shifts from the habitual preconscious to more 
actively considered thought.  It is in these awkward moments of embodied 
disjuncture that we see the conscious work of habitus guided by affect. Reay 
(2015: 12) notes that a salient example of the psychosocial workings of the 
habitus is evidenced in Bourdieu’s account of the development of 
dispositions: 
“We are disposed because we are exposed. It is because the body is (to 
unequal degrees) exposed and endangered in the world, faced with the 
risk of emotion, lesion, suffering, sometimes death, and therefore 
obliged to take the world seriously (and nothing is more serious than 
emotion, which touches the depth of our organic being) that it is able to 
acquire dispositions that are themselves an openness to the world, that 
is, to the very structures of the world of which they are the 
incorporated form”. (Bourdieu, 2000, pp. 140–141) 
Once again we are seeing Bourdieu’s acknowledgement of the vulnerability of 
our being. Reay (2015) elaborates that she does not attribute certain 
emotions or affective processes to a specific kind of habitus, as we have seen 
emotional capital differentially attributed within her previous work (Reay 
2004; 2005). Instead Reay (2015: 12) suggests that the impacts of these 
affective transactions can become more or less entrenched within certain 
habitus so that, for example, “the learning that comes through inhabiting 
pathologised spaces within the field often results in a predilection for shame, 
fear, anxiety or even righteous indignation”. As we saw in Chapter Three, 
many of these doxic spaces serve to pathologise impaired bodies and can 
have significant impact on well-being, demonstrating how symbolic power 
works through “emotional pathways” (Reeve, 2006: 96). Conversely, Reay 
(2015: 12) posits that the internalisation of social inequality from the 
standpoint of the privileged can create “dispositions of superiority, 
entitlement, disdain but also a predilection for guilt, ambivalence and 
discomfort”. Similarly, Lende (2012) has noted the poverty poisons the brain 
model within neuroscience which identifies local mediators relevant to 
socioeconomic status as altering the development of the internal mechanisms 
of affective and cognitive systems within the neurobiological system. This 
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model relies on understandings of human development which show how early 
life experiences become embedded, the impact of accumulative risk as well 
as the impact of environment on development, leading Lende (2012: 188) to 
state that “inequality can get under the skin through the experience of social 
status”. 
These are significant considerations when thinking about disability because 
experiences of oppression, exclusion and discrimination can have powerful 
psychological implications for marginalised groups of people. This is to say 
that social suffering is expressive of our relation to power and our experience 
of inequalities; it is therefore associated with certain groups of people 
(McNay, 2014). The psychological aspect of disability has been largely 
overlooked by the Disabled People’s Movement and as a result, has neglected 
the experiences of internalized oppression (Reeve, 2012). Understanding the 
psychic aspects of being disabled is essential if we are to build upon the 
structural analysis of disability and fully grasp the ramifications of prejudice, 
exclusion and discrimination (Reeve, 2002). 
Reeve (2006) identifies that whilst disabling attitudes have been widely 
written about, a psychology of disability remains largely untouched. She adds 
that this is crucial to our account because “dealing with anger, self-loathing, 
and daily experiences of rejection and humiliation are among the hardest 
aspects of being a disabled person” (Shakespeare, 1996: 42-43, cited in 
Reeve, 2002: 493). Moreover, the disparaging, patronising and shaming 
actions of strangers in response to disability may be preventing disabled 
people from participating in society as much as structural barriers (Reeves, 
2006) demonstrating that the perpetuation of negative symbolic capital may 
transform the habitus of disabled agents in detrimental and limiting ways. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, disabled people are devalued through the 
quotidian power of doxa, the “most mundane everyday words or deeds that 
exclude or invalidate” (Hughes, 2007: 682). This invalidation can take place 
through the stares of strangers, through jokes about your impairment and 
through the thoughtless remarks from others (Reeve, 2012). Adding to this, 
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Reeve (2012: 80) talks of the experience of exclusion resulting from people’s 
avoidance of disabled people as though “disability is catching”. Reeve (2012: 
80) illustrates that disabled people are often ontologically invalidated as 
having a worthless existential status, describing how one of her research 
participants, Laura, overheard someone say (of her wheelchair) “I’d rather be 
dead than be in one of those”. This undermines psycho-emotional wellbeing 
through “the hugely negative value accorded to her life as a wheelchair user” 
(Reeve, 2012: 80). Here, the impact of negative symbolic capital attributed 
to Laura on the basis of her impairment has harmful consequences which 
extend beyond this interaction as they become internalized within the 
habitus. These experiences of direct psycho-emotional disablism can have 
lasting effects upon a person’s wellbeing through creating an existential 
insecurity “associated with the uncertainty of not knowing how the next 
stranger will react” (Reeve, 2012: 80). Here we can observe how negative 
field relations may produce anxious and unconfident dispositions which can 
inhibit future practices and shows how the embodied experience of negative 
symbolic capital as a positioning sense relation has significant psychosocial 
consequences. 
As welfare retrenchment continues to deepen inequalities, symbolically 
deprive and materially impoverish disabled people, pushing individuals into 
further isolation and dependency, there may be real and lasting 
consequences for the habitus. Crucially, the prolonged experience of 
inequalities have potentially depoliticising and disempowering effects in that 
they are often internalised in the habitus in a way that hinders and distorts 
our capacities to enact change or resistance and can produce feelings of 
despair and resignation and may even make suffering seem inevitable and 
unavoidable (McNay, 2014). This long term exposure to chronic deprivation 
and internalisation of inequalities can also naturalise our experiences so that 
we do not even identify our problems or dominated relation as political in 
nature (McNay, 2014). In this respect, Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992: 201) argues that inequality inhabits and haunts us as an internalised 
domination, a “presence of otherness at the very heart of subjectivity”. 
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Given the extensive moralisation of benefits, feelings of shame and other 
high emotional costs involved in accessing support as well as the precarious 
and ambiguous status as a disabled welfare claimant, it is no wonder that 
disabled people forego benefits they are eligible for and even question their 
deservingness of support (Reeve, 2002; Garthwaite, 2013; Grover and Piggott, 
2010). The neo-liberal doxa of legitimate citizen as individualised worker has 
destroyed our concepts of collective responsibility and facilitated an 
approach in which the individual is blamed and shamed for their poor 
position, negatively positioning the disabled claimant as morally 
reprehensible. As we saw in Chapter One, those on benefits have been 
inculpated as a wilfully unemployed “emerging underclass” who must be 
recuperated through the “recognition that the nature of the life you lead and 
the choices you make have a significant bearing on whether you live in 
poverty” (Iain Duncan Smith, 2009: 4). Experiences of shame are powerful 
and, Sayer (2005) argues, a necessary experience of symbolic domination. 
Significantly though, shame is accompanied by a spectrum of accompanying 
feelings so that Sayer (2005: 454) describes shame as “to feel inadequate, 
lacking in worth, and perhaps lacking in dignity and integrity” demonstrating 
the complex mixture of affect, evaluative judgements and cognition involved 
in these experiences. The negative symbolic capital attached to disability 
welfare claimants is viscerally felt and serves to inhibit or dissuade disabled 
people from pursuing economic capital through state support which, in turn, 
contributes to the cyclical nature of poverty and disability and barriers to 
work (Roulstone, 2015). I would also argue that this may be compounded by 
the affective experience of negative symbolic capital associated with 
disability in other social spaces, deepening negative patterns of thought and 
dispositions. For Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992), this is the 
experience of symbolic violence enacted through the logic of power and 
embodiment. Although we can “rationally” know or explain away the 
discrimination or negative attitudes we experience as the result of prejudice 
and ignorance, the experience of negative symbolic capital as a positional 
sense relation can be deeply affective and difficult to ignore. Moreover, if we 
think about disability hate crime, there is always the chance that these 
negative attitudes or comments may become more than hurtful words. 
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At this point I would like to return to something discussed earlier in the 
thesis. Within the second chapter, I argued that Bourdieu’s conceptualisation 
of the submissive attitude characterised as amor fati was too fatalistic and 
treated individuals as dupes who collude in their own domination and which 
neglected psychosocial issues of affect. Having developed an idea of how 
affect characterises the habitus and its role in the creation of dispositions 
and practices, we can now begin to understand how experiences of 
domination and suffering do have significant consequences for the psyche of 
some marginalised groups and why resistance can be so difficult. This does 
not reduce individuals to passive victims with no agency, but instead acts as a 
barrier to what McNay (2014: 16) calls “second-order agency”, that is, the 
ability to “autonomously shape one’s conditions of existence”. This 
psychological erosion of our capacity for second-order agency can push 
individuals into deeper isolation and can stop us from engaging in practices 
that we know to be beneficial or which could improve our circumstances 
(McNay, 2014). Although this seems to speak to the charges of fatalism I 
criticised Bourdieu for in the second chapter, I would like to emphasise that 
psychological suffering and disempowerment are not inevitable and some 
disabled people may be in a position to resist or challenge oppressive 
practices, however, it remains a serious consideration for more marginalised 
individuals. For Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:81) then, the logic 
of our adjustment to social position show us how the dominated are more at 
risk of becoming submissive, however he adds that “there is no denying that 
there exist dispositions to resist; one of the tasks of sociology is precisely to 
examine under what conditions these dispositions are socially constituted, 
effectively triggered, and rendered politically efficient”. Importantly 
Bourdieu’s framework identifies this symbolic violence and social suffering as 
the result of inequalities and oppressive relations of power. As we saw in the 
third chapter, doxa and negative symbolic capital function as mechanisms of 
domination and inequality and demonstrates the negative psychological 
experiences which come to shape the habitus through the internalisation of 
oppressive structures.  McNay (2014: 53) argues that this dismantles the 
defeatist psychological inevitability of “suffer-mongering” which “victimises 
the victim” and defends against criticisms which tend to argue that accounts 
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of social suffering over-exaggerate the powerlessness and distress of agents 
(McNay, 2014). 
Understanding the affective dimension of the habitus is also important when 
we return to thinking about the negative symbolic capital attached to welfare 
claimants as well as the feelings of ressentiment described in Chapter One 
(Hoggett et al, 2013). As we saw earlier, the boundaries between deserving 
and undeserving disabled have been symbolically shifted, redrawn and 
obscured and disabled people are at risk of being identified as abusers of the 
welfare system imbued with negative agency (Hoggett et al, 2013). This has 
coincided with a discourse on fairness, (Hoggett, 2013) which we saw 
positioned disabled people as dishonest and burdensome to moral, tax-paying 
and legitimate citizens. The state therefore has a decisive role in attaching 
negative symbolic capital to disabled welfare claimants through 
implementing cuts and sanctions and through disseminating and reinforcing 
neo-liberal doxa which values and consecrates the individualist tax-paying 
worker as a legitimate citizen. As we saw in Chapter One, Iain Duncan Smith 
has alluded to the social decay of disability claimants who have been 
“allowed to fester” on benefits so that cuts to welfare should be understood 
as corrective: “These reforms are about changing those lives, to give them a 
chance that through work, through employment, through positive action, 
they can change their lives” (Smith, 2012). He therefore envisages that the 
‘Fit for Work service’ implemented through Universal Credit will act “as the 
first line of defence when someone falls sick” (Smith, 2015) highlighting the 
unacceptable social cost of ill-health and those who use disability benefits 
(Garthwaite, 2011) as something that must be withstood and opposed. The 
feelings of resentment which are produced have been shown to be 
experienced quite intensely by people in low status groups so that it would 
seem that the anti-welfare rhetoric is turning the poor on the poor, the 
disabled against the disabled, demonstrating the divisive and affective nature 
of neo-liberal ideals of individualism and competition (Hoggett et al, 2013). I 
would suggest that for the most part, people think of themselves as 
sympathetic to disabled people and bear an understanding that the welfare 
state should provide for them even though this may reflect a paternalistic 
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disposition “that something must be done for the ‘wounded’...They cannot 
be left to die” (Hughes, 2009a: 401). Garthwaite’s (2013) research into the 
feelings associated with accessing sickness benefits showed that her 
participants understood the genuine need for the welfare state and that 
there are those who could not get by without it. However, she noted that the 
interviews were dotted with anecdotes about perceived fraudulent Others 
which created a distinct us against them divide. Kemp (2000) and Piggott and 
Grover (2009) have shown that the retrenchment of disability benefits has 
been especially difficult because the public have had substantial sympathy 
for the sick and disabled and as Garthwaite et al (2013) argued, the disability 
category has, until recently, been thought of as an unquestionably deserving 
category. 
Now however, political rhetoric and media representation are symbolically 
manipulating categories of perception, producing ideas about disabled people 
as scroungers and “false mendicants” (Hughes, 2015: 992). The anti-welfare 
sentiment that has developed out of these insidious and slanderous practices 
becomes deeply internalised and affectively registered. Hoggett et al (2013) 
have similarly identified the distinction between traditionally conceptualised 
emotion and affect, allocating ressentiment to the realm of affect due to its 
unformed and fluid character and its capacity to come in varying waves, 
intensities and flows. For Hoggett et al (2013: 11), ressentiment is not a 
neatly boxed emotion directed at an object, but a “complex configuration of 
feelings, beliefs and subject positions”. This “symbolic drip-feed” of 
disability claimant as burden (Bourdieu, 1998: 30) slowly embeds and 
reinforces through affective appeals to fairness, producing enduring feelings 
of ressentiment in the habitus which Hoggett (2009: 16) describes as an 
“abiding affect [of] social suffering”. For Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992: 212), ressentiment is especially associated with deprivation: 
“Ressentiment is for me the form par excellence of human misery; it is 
the worst thing that the dominant imposes on the dominated (perhaps 
the major privilege of the dominant, in any social universe, is to be 
structurally freed from ressentiment)”. 
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This is an important observation which shows that although ‘the poor’ might 
be said to be turning on one another and exerting a domination against the 
disabled through these feelings of ressentiment and suspicion, this is itself 
expressive of a dominated relation. Welfare sentiments such as resentment, 
contempt, anger, and disgust are “not just forms of ‘affect’ but are 
evaluative judgements of how people are being treated as regards what they 
value” (Sayer, 2005: 948) and are expressive of the inequalities they face. 
These feelings are forms of emotional reason which although often 
differentially distributed can be “partly indifferent to social divisions, for 
they are responsive to – and discriminate among – standards, situations and 
behaviours, which vary partly independently of class and other divisions” 
(Sayer, 2005: 948). In this instance, we can identify the affective and moral 
workings of the habitus which extends beyond locating influence in 
traditional class divisions and which allows for a broader understanding of 
dispositions and (dis)tastes than originally considered by Bourdieu.  Therefore 
whilst these emotions are clearly deeply embodied, they should not be 
reduced to mere affect which is heuristically counter-posed to reason and 
instead form part of the cognitive and evaluative dimension of our 
intelligence (Sayer, 2010). Moreover, our affective dispositions are powerfully 
related to our “nature as dependent and vulnerable beings” (Sayer, 2010a: 
114). As we have seen in the first section of this chapter, affect is not 
distinct from cognition, rather a part of complex system of neural activity. 
According to Sayer (2005: 950) “We derive our concerns from culture but in 
relation to our capacity as needy beings for being enculturated”. We have 
concerns for our welfare, and these concerns derive from our capacity to feel 
or believe that actions have consequences for our well-being. Sayer (2005: 
950) therefore posits that “For this to be possible we must be the kind of 
beings which are capable of flourishing or suffering and of registering (albeit 
fallibly) how we are faring”. He elaborates that we are therefore not only 
economically and physically dependent upon each other, but psychologically 
as well, arguing that we have a psychological need to be recognised.25 
                                         
25 However, in agreement with McNay (2008), the idea that the social suffering associated 
with misrecognition or non-recognition can be ameliorated through recognition of difference 
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Skeggs (2005) suggests that we should think of values as “sedimented 
valuations” which have become embodied in our attitudes and dispositions. 
These valuations combine with emotional dispositions and shape our 
conceptual and affective apparatus and thus informs our evaluations of 
things. The presence of our concerns communicates something about our 
well-being and the values we possess as well as the motivation that drives our 
practice (Sayer, 2010). What is more, Sayer (2010) argues that the shaping, 
reproducing and transforming of habitus is mediated by our emotional 
responses, evidenced in the shame we might feel if we are despised and 
devalued. Perhaps more saliently, he identifies how deeply embodied 
depression can become so that even a fortunate change of circumstance does 
not register with us immediately and can entail a slow process of 
readjustment and reduction of anxiety (Sayer, 2010). Our emotional 
responses to situations are therefore dependent upon the circumstances and 
the deeply embodied dispositions, whether they be optimistic or pessimistic, 
nervous or confident and so on (Sayer, 2010). In this respect we can observe 
how it is possible for us to strive to change the dispositions of habitus through 
deliberate and repeated practice but that this may require significant 
counter-training to achieve durable transformation of the habitus (Bourdieu, 
2000; Sayer, 2010). 
So far we have seen how affect is incorporated into the habitus and how 
values, beliefs and practices become sedimented in the microstructures of 
the habitus in a deeply embodied way. Having focussed on how other scholars 
have endeavoured to develop the affective and psychosocial underpinnings 
within their own work, this chapter will now turn to look at the affective 
experience of disgust. As we have seen from the second chapter, disgust 
(although more frequently referred to as distaste) has been an important tool 
within Bourdieu’s social theory to explain the social distance between people 
of different classes. More recently however, scholars have noted how disgust 
is mobilised to govern (Leahy, 2009) and has recently been popularly 
conceptualised through abjectification as a means of producing marginality 
                                                                                                                      
neglects that some such differences are the product of unequal relations and therefore 
obscures these inequalities as alternative subjectivities and discourses. 
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and exclusion (Tyler, 2013). Significantly disgust is noted as the prime 
emotion in maintaining the exclusionary binary between the disabled and 
non-disabled (Hughes, 2012b). As Reeve (2014) argues “Disgust can be 
revealed when a stranger avoids interacting with a disabled person on the 
street, within newspaper reports of disabled people as workshy benefit 
scroungers, and as part of disablist hate crime”. 
4.5 Disgust and Aversions 
This section of the chapter will now consider the way in which the specific 
emotion of disgust has been used to understand inequalities and tensions as 
well as how disgust has been employed as a means of neoliberal governance 
(Tyler, 2013). I will go on to suggest that this use of disgust is identified as 
limited when it comes to describing the aversive feelings often experienced 
in response to “abnormal” and disabled bodies. Instead, this chapter will 
consider how it is more useful to think of these responses as embodied 
disjunctures. In acknowledging that the responses towards disabled bodies 
can be a complex nexus of emotions, concerns and curiosity it seems more 
fruitful to discuss how they are experienced as instances of affective 
disjuncture. 
Disgust, just like all emotions, is more than just a feeling (Miller, 1997). As 
we have seen from the first section of this chapter, emotions are intricately 
patterned and interwoven, combining the visceral, social and cultural with 
cognitive and practical behaviours. There are some who point to the 
universality of the experience of disgust but as we saw earlier, it is more 
common to talk of emotions as affective capacities subject to social and 
cultural transformation and remodelling.  Miller (1997: 17) notes that even if 
“there are broad convergences in the content of the disgusting, that doesn’t 
mean there aren’t also important variations” leading him to argue that 
disgust is intimately related to the production of culture. Even when we 
experience self-disgust, our interpretations are deeply implanted in social 
and cultural systems of meaning (Miller, 1997). He expands that disgust is not 
a raw disconnected feeling but a feeling about and in response to something. 
Although disgust might be commonsensically perceived as instinctual or 
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reflexive due to its sometimes visceral qualities, an important part of disgust 
is the consciousness associated with being disgusted, that through its 
intrusive and disruptive nature we cannot help but be aware of its presence. 
Miller (1997) demonstrates that disgust is necessarily accompanied by the 
notion of danger entailed in pollution, contamination and defilement and is 
therefore predictably and politically associated with certain social and 
cultural situations. In such instances, disgust is often politically paired with 
contempt in a way that works to hierarchize social order.  In some settings 
this affective coupling is said to work to maintain hierarchies, and sometimes 
to construct claims to superiority and then in other settings it is seen as 
indicative of “one’s proper placement in the social order” (Miller, 1997: 9). 
Disgust is a negatively evaluative affect and as Bourdieu would suggest, 
maintains social distance: 
“As social position embodied in bodily dispositions, habitus contributes 
to determining whether biological bodies come together or stay apart by 
inscribing between two bodies the attractions and repulsions that 
correspond to the relationship between the positions of which they are 
the embodiment” (1996: 182-3). 
Drawing upon Bourdieu in her work on class disgust, Lawler (2005) has 
considered what expressions of disgust against the working classes tells us 
about middle-class identities. Importantly, Lawler (2005) highlights the 
slippage between underclass and working class so that the idea of a 
respectable working class is eroded and that the ensuant disgust against this 
group is culturally permissible and so ubiquitous that it forms part of our 
doxic understanding. She goes on to note that whilst cultural representations 
are open to contestation these representations rely upon a set of shared 
meanings and that although classes are not homogenous, there is enough of a 
shared understanding among the public bourgeoisie, “comprising academics, 
broadsheet journalists, social commentators and the like”, that to speak of 
the working-class is to speak to their doxic constitutions (Lawler, 2005: 231). 
She elaborates that the working classes are often held to be disgusting in 
appearance (through the wearing of shell suits, piercings and tattoos, large 
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gold earrings) but that this appearance signifies their pathological inner being 
characterised by lack and deficit. The disgust which is expressed against the 
working classes is said to consolidate middle classes lifestyles as normative 
and normalised, demonstrating the power of disgust in the drawing of 
distinctions, distinctions which are laden with negative affect (Lawler, 2005). 
In this respect, the experience of disgust demonstrates that we are deeply 
invested in a norm which when violated produces a deeply embodied and 
visceral response (Lawler, 2005). Whilst this experience feels viscerally 
intimate it nevertheless appeals to our collective sentiments in that it relies 
upon knowing that we are not alone in this experience of the disgusting 
object (Lawler, 2005). Lawler (2005) writes specifically on class disgust which 
she goes on to elaborate draws some of its affective power from its 
association with that which is threatening because they represent a teeming 
mass. Whilst this work on disgust demonstrates its power in drawing and 
maintaining distinctions, it is not the same kind of disgust which is held for 
those with “abnormal” disabled bodies. As Miller (1997: 130) argues “We 
recognise a difference between the ‘social deformities’ of low-class taste and 
vulgarity and the bodily ugliness that bears no special connection with class 
once we discount for the effects of class on physical health”. 
While there is relatively little written on disgust in relation to disability 
(Reeve, 2014) Hughes (2009; 2012a; 2012b) has written on aversive responses 
to disability and specifically of disgust as the prime mediating emotion 
between disabled and non-disabled people. He notes that emotions are a kind 
of pre-reflective evaluation which attach value or disvalue to objects and 
that the basic aversive emotions (fear, hatred, pity and disgust) 
unambiguously attach negative value to disabled bodies (Hughes, 2012a). 
These aversive emotions are said to “populate the non-disabled imaginary” 
and invalidate disabled people because negative affective value is said to be 
the emotional basis for discrimination and exclusion (Hughes, 2012a: 67-68). 
For Hughes (2012a: 68), the three main emotions which are the “building 
blocks of the emotional infrastructure of ableism” and contribute to social 
distance between disabled and non-disabled people are fear, pity and 
disgust. 
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Noting that the “emotional infrastructure of ableism” (2012a: 68) is a product 
of the civilising process, Hughes (2012b: 22-27) states that a cultural 
citizenship has been created premised on the idea of a body which is stable, 
hygienic and an instrument of will and which thereby denounces the 
impaired body through its pathology and “aesthetic unruliness” which comes 
to exemplify “what not to be”. The increasing restrictions imposed through 
the process of bodily refinement is said to create a “binary of bodies and 
minds” and a “tyranny of normalcy” through which thresholds of disgust and 
intolerance for difference are produced and intensified (Hughes, 2012b: 19). 
Hughes (2012b: 19) elaborates that the increased control and rigorous 
expectations of bodies and their comportment has narrowed the “social 
distance between classes but creates an underclass of outsiders” which 
condemns those with impairment for their “‘animalic’ element of humanity”. 
Similarly, Soldatic (2007) argues that the emotion of disgust is a normative 
evaluative judgement which makes the exclusion of some bodies acceptable. 
She notes that there are a number of emotions that function within the 
public realm when it comes to dealing with disability, namely pity, shame, 
compassion, but that it is disgust which stands out “due to its clear 
association with the body and bodily processes”. Soldatic (2007: 3) elaborates 
that disgust and its derivatives have a biological, a psychosocial, a moral and 
a philosophical structure and that “the complexity of these structures is 
intimately related to our notions of bodily integrity, to be free from 
contagion, not to risk contamination” and a human concern to be seen as 
separate to animals. As Shakespeare (1994: 295) argues “Disabled people are 
seen to be ambiguous because they hover between humanity and animality, 
life and death, subjectivity and objectivity”. 
Hughes (2012b) notes that this ableist disgust suggests an aversion to the 
Other but is in fact more accurately conceived of as self-aversion or the 
means by which we deny the corporeal basis of our own humanity and our 
subjection to fate. He elaborates that the non-disabled body and self has no 
empirical basis and is instead rooted in the myth of invulnerability and 
wholeness, it is a normative construct to which all aspire but none can 
achieve (Hughes, 2012b). The impaired body as Other therefore reminds us of 
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our own bodily constraints and mortality so that “People project their fear of 
death, their unease at their physicality and mortality, onto disabled people, 
who represent all these difficult aspects of human existence” (Shakespeare, 
1994: 298). Disgust then, as a hierarchizing emotion, juxtaposes disabled 
bodies against a mythic body beautiful and acts as a “mechanism of 
disengagement” through which we can distance ourselves from feelings of 
ontological insecurity (Hughes, 2012b: 66). 
As Soldatic (2007) goes on to note the one distinguishing feature that 
becomes apparent in multi-disciplinary work on disgust is that disgust and its 
derivatives are used to police the boundary between human and natural. 
Noting the clear association between disgust and disease, Soldatic (2007: 4) 
states that notions of bodily decay clearly convey messages about our human 
frailty and ultimately our mortality which we emotionally conceal through 
disgust which allows us to “actively exclude those bodies that represent our 
insecurity”. Disgust is therefore used to establish boundaries between that 
which is safe and human and that which is closer to nature with those who 
transgress this boundary being subject to moral debasement (Soldatic, 2007). 
This would seem to demonstrate the importance of disgust in structuring our 
world and the kind of social order it helps maintain (Miller, 1997). Moreover, 
it appears to show how disgust constellates our everyday moral discourse but 
also how “disgust ranges more widely than we may wish, for it judges ugliness 
and deformity to be moral offenses. It knows no distinction between the 
moral and the aesthetic, collapsing failures in both into an undifferentiated 
revulsion” (Miller, 1997: 21). 
Within the non-disabled imaginary then, disability represents a “collapse in 
one’s human currency, the destruction of one’s social, emotional and cultural 
capital” (Hughes, 2012a: 72). The “discriminatory distinction” between a 
normative ableist body and its inferior other is secured and reproduced 
through aversive emotional dispositions which are “enfleshed”, experienced 
as a corporeal knowledge which at the same time transcends the individual in 
as much as they are felt across communities (Hughes, 2012a: 67-72). This 
echoes what Bourdieu (1990; 2000) has argued, that principles of vision and 
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division are inculcated as dispositions at a common transcendental level 
through uniformly imposing corporeal and mental disciplines upon all agents. 
It might then be suggested that disgust and other aversive emotions plays a 
role in reinforcing doxic knowledge as we saw in the previous chapter. 
Within her book Revolting Subjects, Tyler (2013) has written that the disgust 
directed towards disability benefit recipients demonstrates that their 
“pejorative visibility has created a consensus within the British public” that 
most people receiving disability benefits are fraudulently claiming. Tyler 
(2013) uses abjection as a social process and a theory of power through which 
certain subjects are produced as the “object of the other’s violent 
objectifying disgust” (Tyler, 2013; 4). Through examining what it is to be 
made abject within specific social and political climates, Tyler (2013) 
demonstrates both the exclusionary and inclusionary power that the state 
yields in creating abject subjects. Whilst her work on social abjectification is 
not on disability specifically she does imply that disabled people are also 
made into objects of disgust and stigma or national abjects.  However, it 
might be argued that Tyler’s account of social abjection becomes 
problematic when the complexities within this process, specifically regarding 
liminal identities and boundary making are explored further. 
According to Burghardt (2013) disabled people represent a threat to social, 
economic and corporeal stability in that they depart from the expectations of 
the legitimate citizen, however, are conferred a status of vulnerability as a 
means of psychically ameliorating this threat. They therefore occupy a 
liminal space within society as a result of the complex entwinement between 
threat and vulnerability. The interplay of cognitive, social, affective and 
categorical understandings of both threat and vulnerability thus render 
disability as a figure of protection and of administrative control, as needy but 
also a social risk (Burghardt, 2013). I would suggest that this ambiguity and 
perceived vulnerability might mediate disgust responses towards disability 
claimants. 
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While disgust illustrates the power of affect in shaping our opinions, beliefs, 
relations and responses I cannot help but feel that we risk attributing too 
much to disgust alone. Disgust is a strong, violent, visceral response and if we 
attribute behaviour and practices to disgust alone, we may sideline the 
nuances of affective practice and experience. We saw within the first section 
of this chapter that emotions cannot be neatly boxed off and that they are 
immersed within cognitive and affective flows as well as moral evaluations. 
Our affective responses are mediated by context so that what registers as 
disgusting in one space does not necessarily do so in others, demonstrating 
the cognitive negotiations which take place in the presence of “disgusting 
objects”.  Moreover, those with extremely high thresholds for disgust or who 
appear to be insensitive to disgusting things are often perceived as not quite 
human, “proto-human like children, subhuman like the mad, or suprahuman 
like saints” (Miller, 1997: 11). Acknowledging the versatile responses to what 
might ordinarily elicit disgust responses shows the complex negotiations of 
different habitus within different fields. Affective behaviour requires an 
understanding of the social space in which the practice arises, it is not 
sufficient to just look at the practice in isolation. 
To this I would add that the relationship between disabled and non-disabled 
people is not necessarily mediated by the prime emotion of disgust, but 
feelings of unease. These feelings of unease I suggest, stem from the doxic 
exclusion of disabled people from both space and thought which reproduces 
poor understandings and unfamiliarity. This highlights that the doxic absence 
of disabled people feeds into psychic mechanisms which reproduce their 
exclusion through avoidance. Scope (2014) conducted research into non-
disabled perceptions of disabled people and found that 67% of people feel 
uncomfortable talking to disabled people, often due to worry of saying or 
doing the wrong thing, and that almost half of those asked (43%) did not 
personally know a disabled person. Kirton and Greene (2015) report that non-
disabled people tend to have very little personal contact with disabled 
people, serving to reinforce ignorant beliefs and perpetuate stereotypes 
about disability. As well as this, 66% of people said they would worry about 
talking about disability in front of a disabled person. One fifth of 18-34 year 
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olds have actually avoided a disabled person because they did not know how 
to interact with them and it is this age group which is most likely to have 
negative attitudes towards disabled people. This has been the basis for 
Scope’s (2014) End the Awkward campaign which seeks to light-heartedly 
address these awkward moments through ‘What Not To Do’ videos. The 
campaign draws attention to the many uneasy, awkward and cringe-worthy 
encounters between non-disabled and disabled people to raise awareness and 
provides suggestions on how to tackle these awkward situations. This is not to 
say that disability does not elicit disgust or that disgust does not play a role 
in disabled peoples’ exclusion but that we must be careful when thinking 
about the psychosocial mechanisms which exclude disabled people. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Within this chapter I have demonstrated the importance of incorporating 
affect into a psychosocial conceptualisation of the habitus.  Although 
Bourdieu (2000) often alluded to the importance of affect in the habitus it 
was left relatively unexplored within his work. Through showing how our 
dispositions, beliefs and practices are formed, enhanced and encouraged 
through affective, evaluative and cognitive processes I have also 
demonstrated that we can go beyond talking about the emotional or 
psychological capitals of habitus and instead discuss the habitus as a 
psychologised capacity. We also covered Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of 
consciousness which polarised practice as either practical or reflective. 
Suggesting that his way of thinking was perhaps reflective of the 
psychological orthodoxies of the day it may now be more appropriate to think 
of the unconscious aspect of habitus as the preconscious. As such, I argued 
that what is ordinarily conceived of as beyond conscious thought may be 
brought into focus and may be especially associated the affective experience 
of disrupted doxic practice. 
The chapter also looked at how experiences of inequality and social suffering 
may shape the habitus in psychologically harmful ways. Here I spoke of how 
negative symbolic capital may undermine a disabled person’s psychological 
wellbeing as well as reinforce limiting and unconfident, anxious dispositions, 
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demonstrating that the oppressive and exclusionary practices that disabled 
people face may have depoliticising and disempowering effects. I also 
suggested that affect has played a significant role in shaping peoples’ feelings 
about welfare, illustrating the embodied logic of symbolic power, but that 
these evaluations cannot be reduced to affect alone and instead demonstrate 
forms of cognitive, moral and emotional reason. 
The chapter then moved onto a discussion of the how disgust has been used 
to understand inequalities and specifically how disgust has been theorised as 
the prime emotion in maintaining unequal relations between disabled and 
non-disabled people. Here I suggested that we should be careful not to 
attribute too much to the emotion of disgust alone and that this risks 
sidelining other affective, cognitive and moral evaluative processes.  As such, 
I suggested that we might also focus on the unease produced by doxic 
exclusionary structures and attitudes. This focus on unease will be further 
unpacked within the next chapter on Bourdieu’s concept of hysteresis. 
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Chapter 5 
Hysteresis: Theorising Breaks and Mismatches 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has discussed the psychosocial microstructures of the 
habitus in order to more fully understand how affect characterises social 
practice. The chapter highlighted that Bourdieu’s account of social practice is 
largely inattentive to issues of feeling even though much of his work points to 
the emotional turmoil of social struggle. As such, it was suggested that by 
understanding how the habitus is affectively constituted and experienced, we 
are better equipped to understand how our practice, dispositions and beliefs 
are affectively characterised. The chapter also suggested how doxa might 
become affectively and cognitively embedded and also met with the 
inevitable disturbance of doxic practice. It is with this in mind that this 
chapter now seeks to interrogate these instances of disjuncture and 
mismatches through an analysis of Bourdieu’s little used concept hysteresis. 
Bourdieu utilised the concept of hysteresis to describe moments of ill-fit 
between the habitus and field and noted its potential to disrupt our feelings 
of ease within social space. Having suggested that the fit between doxa and 
habitus is less stable than originally envisioned by Bourdieu, it is important to 
theorise these breaks, especially given that they may also provide space for 
individuals to reflexively engage with these breaks. In addition to this, I 
highlighted that many people report feeling uncomfortable and awkward 
around disabled people, with some people reporting that they actually avoid 
disabled people for lack of knowing how to interact with them, it is pertinent 
that we understand how ease and unease (as expressions of fit) in social 
relations might be produced in different habitus. As I have already suggested 
in the previous chapter, these encounters should be understood as a complex 
mesh of affects, cognitive evaluations, moral dispositions and beliefs. 
Bourdieu’s most notable and oft cited concepts might be grouped as habitus, 
field, capital and doxa and are all well-known and regularly used, however, 
hysteresis is used less. Bourdieu continues to attract criticism for his 
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reproductionist and determinist thinking so it makes sense to elaborate his 
thinking on mismatches and breaks in practice if we want to argue that his 
work is still useful. The chapter will begin by highlighting Bourdieu’s use of 
hysteresis before proceeding to an account of how hysteresis might be used 
to understand the embodied interactions when the fit between habitus and 
space is broken to theorise how (un)ease around disability may develop in 
different habitus’. The chapter will then examine how the hysteresis may be 
routinely felt in disabled bodies who regularly ‘come up against’ doxa, 
suggesting that this friction may push individuals to critically reflect upon 
their own and others’ practices. However, whilst this may afford individuals 
greater opportunities to be reflexive and question the status quo, there may 
also be a psychic cost to reconciling these tensions. 
The chapter will finally look at the concept of hysteresis with reference to 
the cuts to disability welfare discussed in Chapter One. Here I will suggest 
that the drastic cuts being made to disability benefits and the redefinition of 
the disability category leaves many disabled individuals out-of-step within the 
newly configured welfare system and the neo-liberal expectations of citizens 
and poses significant psychosocial risk. 
5.2 Hysteresis – Lags, Mismatches, Disjunctures and Breaks 
We have seen within the previous chapters that Bourdieu is often criticised 
for the reproductive character attributed to the habitus and practice which is 
seen to be a self-reinforcing feedback loop and which downplays the capacity 
for agents to engage in reflexivity (Jenkins, 1992; Archer, 2010). As a result 
of this cyclical fit between habitus and social space, Bourdieu argues that 
people are granted a doxic experience of practice as self-evident and 
natural, allowing them to go about their lives in a taken-for-granted way. As 
a result of the ease of this doxic practice, agents are not considered to 
engage in “everyday reflexivity” (Sayer, 2010b: 108; Archer, 2010). In this 
respect, Bourdieu has been seen to have polarised the awareness of practice 
as either doxic practical sense or reflexive logic (Myles, 2004). However, as 
we saw in the previous chapter, this may be due to Bourdieu’s now dated way 
of conceptualising consciousness which limited his thinking about the 
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opportunities for more reflexive considerations. This conceptualisation of 
practice as mainly motivated by practical sense relied upon placing our 
dispositions, beliefs and practices within unconscious, embodied/affective 
thought as though they were somewhere beyond our conscious consideration. 
Having shown that practice is characterised by conscious as well as 
preconscious thought and involves a myriad of embodied and neural processes 
such as affect and cognition, we can argue that there are more opportunities 
for agents to reflect on their beliefs and practices than Bourdieu 
acknowledged. A more psychosocially developed conceptualisation of the 
habitus has shown us that practice is immersed in flows of consciousness, 
cognition and affectivity which may become more or less accentuated in 
different contexts. As such, I would like to suggest that experiences of 
hysteresis as those which disrupt the ease of practice can prompt more 
consciously deliberated thinking and can provide opportunities for individuals 
to engage in critical and reflexive thought. 
Bourdieu (2000) was at pains to make clear that the fit between the habitus 
and field, which tends to ensure its own preservation through reproduction, 
should not be treated as a universal rule or an infallible instinct. He noted 
that the appropriate adjustment of the habitus to objective conditions of the 
field is the result of frequent and familiar encounters and is but one form of 
relationship between the habitus and space, a “particular case of the 
possible” (Bourdieu, 1990: 63). In this respect he argues that the “near-
circular relationship of near-perfect reproduction” only takes place when 
habitus and field are homothetic (Bourdieu, 1990: 63). However, although the 
tacit fit between dispositions and positions is largely conceived of as stable 
and “quasi-miraculous”, Bourdieu (2000: 157) acknowledged that there are, 
at times, instances of disjuncture in which some agents are left “‘out on a 
limb’, displaced, out-of-place and ill at ease”.  Indeed, Bourdieu (2000) 
recounts that the concept of the habitus forced itself upon him as the only 
way to understand the mismatches he was observing in Algeria in the 1960s in 
which the pre-capitalist dispositions of agents were misaligned to the 
imposing and imported demands of the market. In this instance, agents were 
negatively described as lacking rationality and as resistant to modernity 
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which was often attributed to their religion, Islam. This led Bourdieu (2000) 
to question the universality of rational economic attitudes and the cultural 
and economic conditions of access to these dispositions. In short, Bourdieu 
(2000) argued that although habitus’ are constantly adapting in response to 
new situations, the habitus’ of these agents were out of synch and 
misadjusted as a result of the sudden and drastic change in the field, leaving 
them with outdated and dysfunctional dispositions. This is what he called the 
hysteresis effect. 
As a result of the mismatch between habitus and field characterised in the 
hysteresis effect, Bourdieu (1977: 78, my emphasis) stated that an 
individual’s “practices are always liable to incur negative sanctions when the 
environment with which they are actually confronted is too distant from that 
to which they are objectively fitted”. Bourdieu elaborated that during times 
of major change, the rules and regularities of the field are profoundly altered 
and leave “dispositions which are out of line with the field and with the 
‘collective expectations’ which are constitutive of its normality” which he 
termed the Don Quixote effect (Bourdieu, 2000: 160). This is why conflicts 
between different habitus’ are said to occur, that is, the imposition of 
“different definitions of the impossible, the possible, and the probable, cause 
one group to experience as natural or reasonable practices or aspirations 
which another group finds unthinkable or scandalous, and vice versa” 
(Bourdieu, 1977: 78). 
The mismatch between the habitus and the field is said to be most clearly 
identifiable “in the case of positions situated in zones of uncertainty in social 
space, such as still ill-defined occupations” (Bourdieu, 2000: 157). Bourdieu 
(2000: 160) goes on to state that the agreement accorded to the fit between 
the habitus and field should therefore not be taken as a universal rule and 
concedes that the habitus has “degrees of integration”. What is more, he 
argues that for those who occupy contradictory positions “which tend to 
exert structural ‘double binds’ on their occupants, there often correspond 
destabilised habitus, torn by contradiction and internal division” (Bourdieu, 
2000: 160). Most significantly, Bourdieu (2000: 157) states that the mismatch 
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between habitus and social space “may be the source of a disposition towards 
lucidity and critique which leads them to refuse to accept [the] self-
evident”. This is to say that during these instances of mismatch there may be 
the opportunity for agents to see through (Hey, 2006) the doxa and 
emphasises the reflexive potential of the habitus. 
Developing upon these instances of disjuncture or mismatch, Bourdieu (2000: 
162) stated that “In a more general way, habitus has its ‘blips’, critical 
moments when it misfires or is out of phase: the relationship of immediate 
adaptation is suspended”. During these blips, Bourdieu (2000: 162) suggests 
that we are granted a practical reflection in which we “evaluate instantly 
the action or posture just produced and to correct a wrong position of the 
body, to recover an imperfect movement”. As we have previously noted in 
Chapter Four, Bourdieu (2000: 163) acknowledges the consciousness involved 
for those who occupy awkward positions in the field and whose habitus 
“generates inappropriate or misplaced behaviours” but does not equate it to 
reflexive or critical thought but instead a practical reflection. He submits 
that even though dispositions may fade away or soften through lack of use or 
even as a result of heightened consciousness, there remains the hysteresis of 
habitus described as an inertia which tends to perpetuate dispositions which 
relate to their original conditions of production (Bourdieu, 2000: 160). 
However, as we will go on to see, the “conciliation of contraries”, or what 
might be described as the reconciling of dual experiences and meanings 
within social space, may allow us to conceive of how these inappropriate and 
misplaced practices can in fact generate critical and reflexive thought 
(Bourdieu, 2007: 100). 
Importantly, Bourdieu attributed the disjuncture in hysteresis to the 
temporal lag between change in the field and the adaptation of dispositions 
to meet the new demands of the field, so that hysteresis is necessarily a 
temporally constituted phenomenon. However, other social theorists such as 
Brubaker (1985: 760) have focussed less on the temporality of this mismatch, 
instead describing these experiences of being “out of phase” as “dispositional 
lag” and the “structural mismatch” between expectations and opportunities. 
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As well as this, we have seen that Bourdieu describes the hysteresis of 
habitus as an inertia, that is, a tendency to stay the same (Bourdieu, 2000: 
160). Elsewhere Bourdieu (1977: 83; 1990: 59) describes the hysteresis as the 
“structural lag between opportunities and the dispositions to grasp them”. 
Moreover, one of Bourdieu’s favoured metaphors for describing the fit 
between habitus and field was like a fish in water: “it does not feel the 
weight of the water, and it takes the world about itself for granted” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 127). To extend this then, we might describe 
the hysteresis as a “fish out of water” experience. Wacquant (2016) therefore 
says that although conceived as lag, the hysteresis might also be conceived of 
as a hiatus. 
So far we have seen that Bourdieu has variously referred to instances of 
mismatch between the habitus and field as the hysteresis effect, the Don 
Quixote effect, being out of sync, out-of-place, out on a limb, displaced, ill 
at ease and so on. As a result, it is hard to discern, for him, where exactly 
the hysteresis effect should be applied and what it is that they actually 
describe. The hysteresis effect sometimes appears to refer to the lag, but 
then it is also used to describe the status of the habitus itself as one of 
inertness. Within Bourdieu’s (2000) account of hysteresis, instances of 
disjuncture appear to arise when there is change to the rules, regularities 
and structures in the field with which agents’ habitus cannot keep up. The 
mismatch might also be the result of a major upheaval as in a change of 
position (2000: 150), but then Bourdieu has also referred to the poor fit of 
the habitus which straddles contradictory positions. It might even be 
suggested that the hysteresis effect occurs when an agent enters a new and 
unfamiliar field and has yet to develop the appropriate dispositions, practice 
and capitals. Failure to adapt to these new demands through the inertia of 
the habitus may be met with negative sanctions. 
Whilst I acknowledge the temporality of practice which is inherent within 
these mismatches, I would suggest that in practice, these experiences of 
mismatch are rarely understood to be the outcomes of temporally constituted 
and misaligned dispositions but rather as embodied feelings about our sense 
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of place and how we fit into social space. Moreover, while dispositions may 
appear quixotic due to the temporal lag of the habitus, the social order of 
fields is often already organised around a “dominant definition of practice” 
(Bourdieu, 2001: 62) which has the potential to exclude those who fall 
outside of these parameters as is often the case with disabled people through 
social and environmental barriers (inaccessible transport, public buildings, 
working environments, disabling attitudes). As Ryan’s (2005) work has shown, 
learning disabled children may often act in ways which do not conform to 
doxic conventions of public space and can be met with negative responses 
such as disdainful comments and looks, staring and tutting. In this respect, 
the misalignment between the habitus and field is less about temporality and 
more to do with the habitus which does not fit the organisation of social 
space. As well as this, I would argue that framing hysteresis as temporal lag 
inherently places the onus of adaptation on the agent and presumes that 
agents will choose to, be able to or even want to adapt. Hysteresis is perhaps 
not a sufficient metaphor to describe the mismatch between the habitus and 
field due to its temporal connotations but it is the most apparent concept to 
which Bourdieu refers when addressing mismatches, gaps and ill-fit. Hardy 
(2008) has suggested that Bourdieu elected to use the term hysteresis 
because of its scientific origins in order to suspend the moralistic judgements 
which were associated with similar concepts like alienation and anomie 
although as I will go on to show, I am unconvinced by this suggestion. 
Although the ill-fitting habitus can exert a force in the field, “inasmuch as 
belonging to a field means by definition that one is capable of producing 
effects in it (if only to elicit reactions of exclusion on the part of those who 
occupy its dominant positions)”, (Bourdieu 1992: 80) I am mostly interested 
in the impact of this mismatch on the habitus. Therefore although I recognise 
that hysteresis is a relational concept that emerges in the misaligned 
relationship between the habitus and the field, I will use hysteresis to focus 
on the embodied experience of disrupted practice as it is felt in the habitus 
during these moments of misfit. This is not to locate the source of ill-fit as 
within the habitus but to focus on how mismatches between field and habitus 
are felt. As well as this, I consider that these experiences of mismatch are 
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more common than Bourdieu theorised and are not limited to periods of crisis 
but can occur when the habitus is experienced as misaligned and out-of-
place. Although these embodied disjunctures may be disruptive or fraught 
with negative feelings, I would argue that they provide a space in which 
agents can achieve greater reflexivity although this is not to dismiss the 
negative impact that reflexive self-knowledge can have or suggest that 
mismatches guarantee reflexivity let alone transformative practice. 
At this stage it is perhaps useful to elaborate what we mean when we talk 
about reflexive thought26. For Bourdieu (2000), the habitus was an important 
way of preventing scholars from attributing their own distant rational and 
contemplative attitudes to the practices of most peoples’ everyday lives 
(Sayer, 2010). In contrast to this many scholars have argued that our lives are 
increasingly reflexive as society becomes more morphogenetic so that agents 
have “no choice but to choose” and to actively fashion their self-identity 
(Giddens 1991: 81 cited Sweetman, 2003; Archer, 2010). According to Archer 
(2007), the concept of reflexivity has historically been conceptualised in 
vague terms, often subsumed under consciousness or subjectivity or layman’s 
contemplation so that the process of reflexivity is often under-theorised.  
Archer (2010: 2, original italics) notes that “Human reflection is the action of 
a subject towards an object” in which we have the capacity to consider what 
constitutes appropriate responses and action towards the object, a response 
which we have seen the habitus obviously caters to through practical 
reflections. Reflexivity on the other hand is distinguished from reflection 
because of its self-referential quality, a mental “bending-back” upon the self 
so that thought takes the form of subject-object-subject (Archer, 2010: 2). At 
the most basic level, Archer (2007: 2) states that reflexivity “rests on the 
fact that all normal people talk to themselves within their own heads” so 
that they are engaged in what she calls “internal conversation”. Not all 
internal conversation is reflexive and reflexive thought tends to be 
characterised by questions to do with self-concern and social-engagement 
such as ‘what will others think of me?’ and ‘is this the best way to help 
                                         
26 I will be using Archer’s (2007; 2010) work on reflexivity because of her focus on individual 
reflexivity rather than the more temporally and socially situated conceptualisations of 
reflexivity associated with Beck. 
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myself?’ and ‘does this really matter to me enough?’ (Archer, 2010). 
Reflection and reflexivity often have “fuzzy borders” so that a reflection on 
what to do next in a situation (weak reflexivity) can often flow into more 
self-referential questions (strong reflexivity) of how able we feel to deal with 
it or our commitment to it at all (Archer, 2007; 2010). Weak reflexive 
thinking might therefore be said to be characterised by shallow 
contemplations of a situation whilst strong reflexive processes involve a 
conscious deliberation and thrashing out of thinking within the internal 
dialogue (Archer, 2007). These reflexive processes might be what we consider 
everyday reflexivity and are naturally quite different from the critical 
reflexivity that Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) tasked the 
sociologist with. 
5.3 (Un)Ease and Disability 
In order to talk fully about the experience of hysteresis as it might be applied 
to disability, a closer look at practice within the field is required. This is to 
acknowledge that Bourdieu insisted on understanding the social space in 
which social phenomena occurred so that the object of investigation, in this 
case hysteresis of habitus, could be located within a specific historical, 
positional and relational context (Bourdieu, 1990, 2000). As we have seen 
within the previous chapters, Bourdieu (1984, 1990, 1998) theorised that 
each field or social space has its own logic (customs, regularities, norms, 
beliefs) which is experienced as the natural and largely unquestioned social 
order of things, i.e. doxa. As has already been elaborated within earlier 
chapters, the agents within these fields understand this logic in an implicit, 
embodied and practical way, in “the forms of mental dispositions” and in the 
ways “of standing, speaking, walking, and thereby of feeling and thinking”, 
which equips them with a feel for the game (Bourdieu, 1977: 15, 1990: 69-
70). This is to say that so long as we are submerged in our harmonious doxic 
relation to the world we experience the “privilege of those who move in their 
field of activity like fish in water” (Bourdieu 1986: 257). It is this embodied 
aptitude which enables an agent to differentiate and classify the ongoing 
practices within a field, but it is also the signifier of their own classifiable 
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practices so that the (dis)advantage of each agent is determined by the stock 
of capitals and capacities they bring to the field. As Bourdieu (1998: 6) 
noted, the “idea of difference, or a gap, is at the basis of the very notion of 
space”. Bourdieu (1986) argued that in order for these capitals and capacities 
to be recognised as legitimate (and function as symbolic capital), they must 
be perceived to be embodied, as an integral part of the person, as their 
habitus. 
Social fields are imbued with hierarchical logics which tend to have a 
positioning effect upon the agents within them so that each individual 
understands the practical logic of their status and therefore the appropriate 
behaviours and practices expected of this position. In this sense, we can see 
how the interaction of the habitus, capitals and field produces a “practical 
relation to the future, which governs his present practice” and is defined 
between the relationship of the individuals habitus and their particular 
universe of probabilities (Bourdieu, 1990: 64). Through repeated exposure to 
the regularities of certain fields, agents become instilled with approximately 
aligned cognitive structures of appreciation and perception (Bourdieu, 1990, 
1998). 
Bourdieu (1998) has shown that the learning of dispositions and perceptions 
which take place within the field are primarily learned through the body. 
Therefore, our basic embodied knowledge originates within the familial field 
so that our practical learning will reflect the values, norms, postures, 
gestures, gait, meaning and speech attached to parental (and sibling) bodies. 
As Skeggs (2004) has noted, Bourdieu’s work on social space has helped 
feminist theory explain the reproduction of sexual division of labour within 
the familial field, illuminating how the functioning of the normative family 
has secured the normalisation and naturalisation of gendered behaviour. For 
Bourdieu (1998), the family paradigm therefore represents a privilege which 
is “instituted as a universal norm” and affords those that satisfy its conditions 
the “symbolic profit of normality” (Bourdieu, 1998b: 69). Therefore, those 
who are perceived as possessing high volumes of legitimate capital tend to 
have the symbolic power to define what constitutes legitimate capital 
Chapter 5 Page 199 
Hysteresis: Theorising Breaks and Mismatches 
throughout the rest of the field or as Bourdieu (1998b: 102) has stated, 
“produces...a capital of recognition which permits him to exert symbolic 
effects”.  As we saw in Chapter Three, implicit within most fields is an idea 
about the body as non-disabled. Symbolic capital is attached to able-
bodiedness and is instituted as a societal norm which grants those who more 
or less align to this ideal the symbolic profit or ease of normality. For those 
of us who do not match this expectation, our presence may disrupt the taken 
for granted conventions of social space, demonstrating how hysteresis 
emerges between habitus within the field but also how this disruption to 
practice might be differently felt across various habitus. 
Having previously highlighted that as many as 43% of people do not know a 
disabled person, that 67% of people feel uncomfortable talking to a disabled 
person, and one fifth of 18-34 year old have avoided a disabled person 
because they did not know how to interact with them (Scope, 2014), it is 
pertinent to further explore how these kinds of unease (and ease) might 
develop within different habitus. I would begin by suggesting that an 
individual who is born into a family where impairment figures quite saliently 
(in either a parent or sibling27) is more likely than those with no firsthand 
experience to pragmatically understand the everydayness of impaired 
practice so that it constitutes an embodied knowledge. You know what that 
person can and cannot do, you know the aspects of the house that are a 
nuisance and you know how they move within it or where they might choose 
to spend their time, all their foibles, how they sit, how they rest, how they 
eat, you know where things (aids, medicine) live and you know if the person 
has a routine, but most importantly you do not even have to think about 
knowing these things. 
The everyday living with a person with an impairment at a young age, when 
the family is your primary source of socialisation, creates an ease which is 
not experienced by those unacquainted with impaired bodies. Those without 
this experience of impaired embodiment, or indeed mental health issues or 
learning disabilities, will not have gained the practical knowledge of these 
                                         
27 As well as in other close family members or close friends 
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bodies and their accompanying routines, behaviours, gait, speech and so on. 
For these individuals, these types of bodies will be experienced as the 
unfamiliar and even the uncanny because they will not form part of their 
embodied knowledge or expectations. This is not to suggest that children or 
siblings of a disabled family member do not perceive the wider doxic 
interpretation of impairment as difference, or indeed, negative difference. 
As Stalker and Connors (2004) demonstrated within their research into 
children’s perceptions of their sibling’s disability, many were aware of the 
negative responses to disability within the general public. However, Stalker 
and Connors (2004: 220) have shown that “siblings are well placed to mediate 
difference, as they move between the outside world with its dominant views 
of normalcy and difference, and the family, which includes their disabled 
brother or sister”. Through their interviews, Stalker and Connors (2004: 225) 
demonstrated the ordinariness of having a disabled sibling, noting the 
response of one participant, “She’s different, but it’s normal for us”. In such 
cases, it might be suggested that their habitus’ straddle dual, even 
contradictory, positions of meaning and that the disparity between the 
primary socialisation of the habitus and wider doxic messages produces weak 
reflexive thinking in that disability as difference within wider social space is 
known and acknowledged in a conscious way but not deliberately critiqued or 
contemplated. This is similarly supported by Burke (2010: 1682) who states 
that disability becomes part of the family’s normality and that growing up 
with disability “instils an understanding of disability as an everyday 
experience”. Similarly, I would suggest that those who work closely with 
disabled people, for example in caring or medical roles, are likely to gain this 
same sense of ease through familiarity. In such instances, understandings of 
disability are mediated by the setting so that impairment and illness are to 
be expected within these social fields and as such, less likely to be met with 
negative sanctions or attributed negative symbolic capitals associated with 
poor doxic understandings. 
We saw in Chapter Three that doxa at the collective social level sustains and 
consolidates the non-disabled body and reproduces poor understandings and  
negative meaning about disability but that there are varying degrees to which 
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individual habitus’ and their schema correspond directly to this doxic 
knowledge. I also showed that what is understood as negative in one social 
space is not necessarily the case across all fields. This demonstrates that for 
some people (those with experience of disability), there is a gap or mismatch 
between the knowledge contained within the habitus and the doxa of 
different social spaces. It could be argued that early interaction or the 
familiarity gained through regular contact with disability expands the habitus 
into anticipating practice which is not transmitted or reflected in doxa and is 
a space in which disability is not negatively understood. To use Bourdieusian 
terms, the strength of the orthodox message contained within doxa is resisted 
through the heterodoxy of the familial space and practice.  In this respect, 
being at home with disability and impairment provides a space in which 
disability is negotiated and reconciled with the mainstream doxic knowledge 
and may take on different meaning to that which is sustained by doxa. In this 
case, Bourdieu (2000) would suggest that because socialisation of an 
individual’s primary habitus is not radically different to the logic of broader 
social space, these agents tend to reconcile difference in an unproblematic 
way. I would suggest then that our relation to doxa and the extent to which 
we misalign with the expectations of doxa may prompt weak reflexive 
thinking (‘yeah, she’s different, but so what?’). 
However, when this misalignment to doxa becomes the basis of exclusions or 
negative sanctions, this weak reflexive thinking is likely to become more 
actively contemplated and the situation reflexively critiqued. In this respect, 
we might think about how parents of a disabled child experience hysteresis. 
As we saw within Chapter Three, having a child who does not conform to 
doxic conventions of public space creates a feeling of being out of place and 
devalues disabled bodies within these spaces (Ryan, 2008). For many parents 
of disabled children, the negative attitudes of others are the biggest barrier 
to inclusion; “just ‘crossing the threshold’ into a new play setting can be a 
very uncomfortable and worrying experience” (Sense, 2016: 18). One parent 
told the Sense report (2016: 20) that: 
“There needs to be more mixing of disabled and non-disabled children 
but this is difficult as if parents don’t feel welcome when they first 
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access a setting, they are unlikely to go back to that setting again. 
When you have a disabled child it is much easier to mix with other 
families with disabled children who will understand the issues you are 
facing” 
For parents, the perceived misfit of their child and their subsequent 
exclusion disrupts the flow of their everyday practice, demonstrating how 
hysteresis is not necessarily located in the habitus of the ‘ill-fitting’ person 
and highlights the relational character of hysteresis.  Most importantly it 
highlights how this mismatch between doxa/doxic space and their child is 
experienced as a concern for the child’s inclusion and well-being. This may 
prompt critical questioning from the parents (‘she’s different, but why should 
that mean that she can’t take part?’ Or ‘why should she have to go to a 
different nursery/school/play area?’). In this respect, the questions become 
more saliently felt as a concern about the social engagement of someone we 
care about, demonstrating the affective nature of these disruptions to 
practice. These mismatches are disruptive because they trouble and unsettle 
the dispositions and attachments of our habitus, they are disruptive because 
they impact upon people who matter to us and we are invested in this 
practice. We might feel angry, frustrated, annoyed or incredulous at the way 
doxa (in attitudes, organisation, structures) excludes this person and this 
pushes us to question the status quo. For some parents, these negative 
sanctions have pushed them to develop a “thick skin” and to explain away 
discriminatory practice as the result of ignorance and insensitivity so as to 
feel able to carry on attending exclusionary play spaces (Sense, 2016: 20). 
However, these feelings of unease may just as easily discourage the family 
from returning to certain areas, feeding back into the cyclical nature of doxic 
exclusion. 
So far we have seen that familiarity with disability may produce an ease 
around disabled bodies that those with little to no experience of disability 
have not gained, demonstrating how disabled bodies may come to be 
experienced as disruptive to differently socialised habitus’. To elaborate, as 
we have already seen the idea of difference is at the very foundation of 
social space. The habitus is primed to anticipate these differences through 
the various interactions and experiences it encounters within diverse social 
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settings. This does not equate to the habitus experiencing hysteresis every 
time it encounters a practice or person who is differently socialised as these 
differences still fall within the realm of doxic thought. However, when this 
difference is not accounted for within doxa or when this difference is 
negative, an individual may feel this as a disjuncture to practice and it may 
produce a sense of unease. Therefore the disabled body which is imbued with 
negative symbolic capital and which comes up against the doxa can produce 
the hysteresis response in able-bodied individuals.  In this respect, negative 
symbolic capital exerts a disruptive force within the field which may be felt 
in both the habitus of the perceiver and also the perceived. 
This is significant when we see how these dispositions constitute and 
reinforce doxa in structure and in habitus. We have previously seen that the 
non-disabled ideal which underlies our doxic thinking consolidates other 
bodies, such as raced or impaired bodies, as having negative symbolic capital 
and this often excludes them from the doxic entitlement and ease of access 
to public social space. This exclusion consolidates itself within doxic thinking 
even further because when these bodies are systematically excluded from 
space, they become the unfamiliar and therefore are excluded from doxic 
thought about this space. As a result, the unease that people feel around 
disabled bodies is likely to deepen and as we have seen, can produce 
avoidant behaviour which only serves to further intensify awkward feelings 
and uneasy interactions. This demonstrates that non-disabled people may 
feel the natural flow of their practice to be disrupted in encounters with 
disabled people through not knowing how to act, so that their habitus may 
feel out-of-step or in hysteresis. However, the non-disabled individual whose 
habitus has internalised doxa (which reaffirms their own bodily legitimacy 
and provides them with the embodied aptitude to classify the bodies and 
practices of others on the basis of this doxic knowledge) recognises the 
disabled body as being out-of-place. The unease felt in this encounter may 
push individuals towards practice (avoidance, exclusion, discrimination, 
condescension) which removes or dismisses the source of hysteresis from 
consideration and reinforces the original feelings of unease and the disabled 
person’s ill-fit. As Bourdieu (1996) noted, the experience of hysteresis can 
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produce confusion and disorientation within the habitus but that many agents 
dismiss rather than engage with this disruption to meaning. Feeling 
embarrassed, uneasy or awkward around a person does not incline you to 
engage with them and is far more likely to prompt you to avoid them.  This 
demonstrates the cyclical strength of doxic knowledge as it is contained 
within the affective dispositions of the habitus and that although the 
hysteresis may provide a “critical window” (Akram and Hogan, 2015: 1) for 
reflexivity and the possibility to respond differently and therefore initiate 
change, the dispositional tugs of the habitus can reign us back in, making 
social change much harder to achieve. 
Whilst both non-disabled and disabled people might experience the hysteresis 
through misaligned habitus’ and interruptions to practice, the disabled 
person is the one considered, after the Don Quixote effect, quixotic and as 
the one who does not fit.   As such, although disabled bodies may disrupt or 
suspend the embodied practical logic in their non-disabled counterparts, the 
symbolic power of doxa is weighted in favour of non-disabled actors and 
therefore allows disability to be excised from doxa on the basis of negative 
value, demonstrating the asymmetry of power in this interaction. This is not 
to deny that other affective feelings (such as disgust, pity, fear, contempt, 
etc) and negative values may be attributed to disabled bodies within these 
interactions, indeed, aversive feelings and negative values may serve to 
reinforce these relations. Instead I wish to show the strength of embodied 
dispositions as they are reinforced by the symbolic system of doxa and 
negative symbolic capital and the asymmetry of power in these relations. In 
this respect, we can see how being perceived as embodying negative symbolic 
capital has both a distancing and reproductive effect whereby having a body 
that departs from the non-disabled expectation entails exclusion from space 
which has the secondary effect of exclusion from doxic thought which goes on 
to reproduce exclusionary attitudes, spaces and so on. 
Whilst we have so far looked at the unease or ease that may be felt by non-
disabled individuals, it is important to consider how being a body that does 
not fit doxa can have significant psycho-emotional effects on the habitus. 
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This is to say that the diffuse symbolic capital attached to non-disablement 
contained within doxa serves to structure fields and the practices of agents 
within these fields and therefore, the experience of disjuncture or ill-fit may 
be more routinely felt by disabled people whose bodies and practices do not 
align with the collective expectations of the field. 
5.4 Routinely Felt Hysteresis and Reflexivity 
Although Bourdieu seemed to portray the hysteresis effect as one which 
ultimately displaced and removed out of sync agents from social space, he 
also acknowledged that it could provide forms of resistance; “The tendency 
of groups to persist in their ways...can be the source of misadaptation as well 
as adaptation, revolt as well as resignation” (Bourdieu, 1990: 62). Similarly 
he implied that the hysteresis of habitus can push people to resist owed to 
their “past loyalties exerting hysteresis effects” (Bourdieu, 1985: 739). 
Therefore while the hysteresis of the habitus often produced “utter 
confusion” and disorientation which frequently leads the most marginalised 
to “simply give up” (Bourdieu, 1996: 219), the hysteresis also enables us to 
question the self-evidence of doxa. In addition, while Bourdieu mostly talked 
of hysteresis is terms of large scale crises and drastic change to fields, 
Friedman (2015) has noted that he also began to examine how the hysteresis 
might be experienced at an individual level especially among the socially 
mobile working classes. As Hardy (2008: 134) observes, Bourdieu’s (1999) The 
Weight of the World is a “series of heart-rending examples of individuals’ 
struggles with the hysteresis effect”. 
Being disabled in a society which is doxically organised around the non-
disabled body can often produce moments of disjuncture in which the 
disabled person and their practice is confronted with their perceived ill-fit in 
social space. While I acknowledge that in many of these instances we simply 
react, adapt and adjust to these mismatches in fairly unreflective and 
uncalculated ways so that we are granted what Bourdieu (2000: 162) called a 
practical reflection which “remains turned towards practice and not towards 
the agent who performs it”, there are occasions in which this hysteresis is not 
so easily absorbed or diffused (Karsenti, 2012). 
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As I suggested within Chapter Three, understanding that your own experience 
diverges from the doxic expectation highlights that there is a gap or 
mismatch between your own knowledge and the knowledge that others have 
of you. As such, a disabled person may often have to reconcile this gap 
through critically engaging with doxic belief so as to dismantle the tensions it 
can produce. In situations such as these, a disabled person might choose to 
use humour to ‘break the ice’ or reassure non-disabled people and to 
encourage a sense of ease in interactions. Alternatively they might choose to 
deflect attention from their disability through accentuating other aspects of 
the self or reassure the non-disabled person of their ability through 
normalisation (Goffman, 1963). Therefore whilst a disabled person’s 
difference or ill-fit might be reified through the inaccessibility of the physical 
environment, their out-of-placeness may be more saliently felt and 
reinforced through the reactions and interactions of non-disabled others and 
the emotional labour that is involved in ameliorating sticky situations (Scully, 
2008). 
As Bauman (2006: 13) states: 
“To be wholly or in part “out of place” everywhere, not to be 
completely anywhere (that is without qualifications and caveats, 
without some aspects of oneself “sticking out” and seen by others as 
looking odd) may be an upsetting, sometimes annoying experience. 
There is always something to explain, to apologise for, to hide or on the 
contrary to broadly display, to negotiate, to bid for and to bargain for; 
there are differences to be smoothed or glossed over, or to be on the 
contrary made more salient and legible”. 
Within Chapter Three and Four I demonstrated the power of doxa in 
attributing negative symbolic capital to disabled bodies and that this negative 
value could have profound effects on the psycho-emotional well-being of 
individuals. Disabled people are patronised, avoided, abused, disrespected 
and undermined in myriad of ways, devalued as parents, workers and lovers, 
excluded from education and leisure, gawped at in the street and invalidated 
through jokes and careless remarks (Hughes, 2012a, Reeve, 2012). As we saw 
in Chapter One, disabled people become negatively positioned through the 
doxic conceptualisation of the legitimate citizen and the naturalised idea 
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that disabled people are unproductive and unable and therefore not able to 
meet these individualistic expectations. Although disablism can be explicit 
and outright, as with hate crime, much of disability discrimination takes 
place at the unquestioned level of doxa meaning that discriminatory attitudes 
and practices are naturalised to the point that they are not even recognised 
as such (Scully, 2010). The negative symbolic capital attached to disability 
creates such low expectations of disabled people that we uncritically elevate 
them as objects of inspiration and bravery for simply having achieved 
ordinary practices and that their completion of the most mundane of 
activities is regarded as exceptional (Silva and Howe, 2012; Young, 2012). 
These poor understandings of disability contained within doxa mean that 
disabled people are faced with negative, stereotyped and demeaning 
responses and expectations, more so than their non-disabled peers, and this 
can result in sticky interactions between the two (Scully, 2010). The full 
acceptance of disabled people in social interactions unmarked “by any 
unusual degree of awkwardness, embarrassment or hostility” is still 
uncommon and is often limited to small and local networks between people 
who are familiar to one another (Scully, 2010). This often means that 
disabled people are seen to be out-of-place and have to work harder to 
manage interactions with non-disabled people (Reeve, 2006; Scully, 2010). 
With this in mind it can be argued that being disabled means that you are 
regularly ‘up against’ the doxa and denied the ease and sense of fit that 
comes with meeting the corporeal expectations of doxa, you are denied the 
“symbolic profit of normality” (Bourdieu, 1998b: 69). The disabled person’s 
body within social space organised around non-disabled bodies disrupts what 
is taken-for-granted in the minds of non-disabled people but this also entails 
that the disabled person has to negotiate and reconcile with these 
interruptions to practice and gaps in meaning as well as exclusionary space 
and organisation, once again demonstrating the asymmetry of power within 
this relation. 
These instances of being out-of-place may push disabled people to consider 
the situation from the perspective of non-disabled counterparts so as to 
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manage the awkwardness, misapprehensions or tensions which can arise in 
such situations.  Disabled people therefore conciliate the contraries 
(Bourdieu, 2004) between their experience of disability as part of their 
habitus and which constitutes their everyday, taken-for-granted embodied 
knowledge with the meanings produced by doxa in which inaccessible 
environments and social organisation reproduce disability as out-of-place and 
ill-fitting. Here I would argue that the experience of hysteresis, while 
envisaged by Hardy (2008) to distance itself from the moral judgements 
associated with alienation and anomie, is actually an expression of symbolic 
power. This places the onus on the individual to adapt and manage the 
disjuncture because their exclusion is naturalised as the result of the disabled 
body/practice which does not fit, rather than the result of disabling 
organisation/structures and serves to reinforce the negative symbolic capital 
associated with disability. This straddling of the dual meanings of disability 
might be said to produce a “double consciousness” (Bourdieu, 1998b: 113) 
which questions the self-evidence and taken-for-granted nature of doxa. As 
Bourdieu (1998b: 113) contends, negotiating these multiple meanings  is “at 
the basis of a very great (partial) lucidity which is manifested above all in 
situations of crisis and among people in a precarious position, and thus out of 
sync with the most obvious and basic facts of doxa”. As such, we might be 
able to identify how this gap between a disabled individual’s habitus and 
space pushes agents to critically engage with the others’ perceptions of 
disability, it “brings the undiscussed into discussion, the unformulated into 
formulation” (Bourdieu, 1977: 168). This is to say that “breaking the 
immediate fit between the subjective structures and the objective 
structures, destroys self-evidence practically” (Bourdieu, 1977: 168-169). 
Importantly, although Bourdieu (1977) envisaged this break as necessary for 
critical thought he did not see it as enough on its own to guarantee 
reflexivity. As such, it could be equally argued that many disabled people 
absorb this mismatch, adapting and adjusting, covering and passing 
(Goffman, 1963) or dismissing so as to move past this disjuncture. 
Although this conceptualisation of the hysteresis as one which is routinely 
experienced demonstrates how reflexive thought may be prompted in ill-
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fitting habitus’, this constant mediation between meaning in fields can also 
produce a  “habitus divided against itself, in constant negotiation with itself 
and its ambivalence, and therefore doomed to a kind of duplication, to a 
double perception of self, to successive allegiances and multiple identities” 
(Bourdieu, 1999: 511) which we have previously seen him describe as the 
destabilised habitus. Elsewhere Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; 
2004) has described himself as possessing a cleft habitus as a result of having 
to reconcile the dual experiences of coming from low social origins and going 
on to achieve high academic success, although he notes that this class 
defection can more often than not produce a great deal of unhappiness and 
feelings of shame. As Morrin (2015: 132-133) notes, disjunctures between 
habitus and field may produce unsettled feelings which can linger on in the 
habitus leaving individuals with further feelings of unresolvedness. As we saw 
in the previous chapter, these disjunctures may produce and consolidate 
affective responses and unsettle our practice, shifting from a preconscious 
state to an actively conscious state, registering our feelings of being out-of-
place. But these are not just emotional experiences and are characterised by 
cognitive evaluations. In this respect, these disjunctures (caused by the 
environment organised to suit non-disabled others doxic practice) disturb our 
practical relation to the world and may lead us to question its organisation. 
Moreover, these gaps may push the person to consciously deliberate with 
others’ perceptions of them, which although may provide them with the 
ability to manage misunderstandings and uneasy interactions, also means that 
they are required to internalise these negative expectations, demonstrating 
how the experience of hysteresis and reflexivity may have psychic costs. As 
such, we can see why the added emotional labour entailed in reflexivity 
might prompt some individuals to choose to conceal disability through 
techniques such as passing (Goffman, 1963). 
The hysteresis can produce significant embodied and psychosocial 
consequences, sometimes producing what Ingram (2011: 290) has described 
as the habitus tug in which “conflicting dispositions struggle for supremacy 
and the individual can at times feel pulled in different directions”. She 
elaborates that this can produce the destabilised habitus so that an agent no 
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longer has the fit of Bourdieu’s analogical fish in water which in turn can 
create division, “leaving an individual to feel alienated from the practices 
within a field” (Ingram, 2011: 290). Whilst the experience of hysteresis might 
open up spaces in which individuals can critically and reflexively engage, it 
must be remembered that the unequal relations of power which precede and 
often characterise these disjunctures may produce negative psychosocial 
responses within the habitus. As we saw earlier, Bourdieu (1977) envisaged 
that these mismatches often entailed negative sanctions so that the 
experience of hysteresis may be psychically harmful. So far we have seen how 
the hysteresis might emerge in a more everyday sort of context through the 
gaps and mismatches between the habitus and doxa. However, it is also 
important to consider the experience of hysteresis within periods of 
significant social change. The chapter will now turn to look at how within the 
current context of welfare cuts and the expectation of disabled people to 
move into employment, disabled people may face multiple instances of ill-fit 
and the psychosocial harm this may cause. 
5.5 A Fish out of Water? 
As we saw in Chapter One, while paid employment has been seen as the 
hegemonic expectation of ‘legitimate citizens’, disabled people have been 
historically excluded from participating in the labour market as a result of 
being perceived as unproductive and unable. That is to say that disabled 
bodies have been excluded from the field of work on the basis of their 
perceived negative symbolic capitals which make them incompatible and ill-
fitting to the doxic demands of the labour market and doxic expectations of 
the citizen worker. To use Bourdieu’s (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) 
favoured metaphor, they have historically been seen within this field as a 
‘fish out of water’, demonstrating how doxa and negative symbolic capital 
collude to socially enforce and naturalise the misfit and out-of-placeness of 
the disabled person within mainstream employment. 
However, now that the disability category has been significantly redefined, 
the rules and regularities of welfare entitlement have been profoundly 
altered and the expectations of disabled claimants significantly changed. The 
Chapter 5 Page 211 
Hysteresis: Theorising Breaks and Mismatches 
ongoing reforms to welfare represent a period of major change and have 
been hailed by David Cameron as the “biggest welfare revolution in over 60 
years” (Randall, 2012).  We might identify that during this period of welfare 
reform and austerity, the state has ‘moved the goal posts’ through redefining 
the symbolic capital attached to disability welfare claimant and drastically 
changing the rules of the game for disabled people. Where some disabled 
people once qualified for state support under the consecrated and legitimate 
disability category, a category which was synonymous to unemployability 
(Warren, 2005), they are now quite arbitrarily recast as illegitimate (Stone, 
1984; Roulstone, 2015). As we saw in Chapter Three, this has been 
accompanied by a specific kind of misrecognition known as allodoxia. Here I 
suggested that the symbolic manipulation of the disability category enacted 
by the State represented a significant yet uncertain redefinition of disability, 
leading to a mismatch between doxic perceptions of disability and the reality 
of those living with impairment. The narrowing of the disability category that 
has taken place through the attribution of additional and diametrically 
positioning negative symbolic capital (as either truly vulnerable or as 
fraudulent scrounger) may therefore produce negative sanctions for 
individuals whose identities are displaced and mistakenly perceived. 
Despite their long-term exclusion from the labour market and their perceived 
unproductivity, this group are now expected to find work in a competitive 
market which is doxically organised to exclude and invalidate them. This is to 
reiterate that despite the fact that disabled people have been persistently 
perceived as at odds with the “dominant definition of practice” as a result of 
the negative symbolic capitals that they are seen to embody, they must now 
move into mainstream employment (Bourdieu, 2000: 62). 
These changes to welfare will therefore leave many disabled people out-of-
step with the new rules and expectations of the field. They are once again a 
“fish out of water”. Many disabled people will face not only adapting to the 
impending material change in terms of losing their entitlements to social 
support, but also be expected to come to terms with the redefinition of their 
impairment as not significant enough and therefore as illegitimate. As I 
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showed earlier, Bourdieu (2000) theorised that the experience of hysteresis 
was commonplace during periods of uncertainty and when new but ill-defined 
identities were emerging. For those waiting to find out whether or not they 
still qualify for support under the new rules, this hysteresis may provoke 
worry, stress and anxiety. Knowing that nothing about your impairment has 
fundamentally changed but confronted with the message that you are no 
longer deserving of support forces disabled people to straddle and negotiate 
contradictory positions, meanings and expectations which may produce a 
destabilised habitus. 
Just as Bourdieu conceived of the hysteresis effect in terms of the 
misalignment between Algerian peasants and new capitalist demands of the 
field and which negatively positioned them as irrational and resistant to 
modernity, disabled individuals are now misaligned with the neo-liberal 
demands of the labour market and duties of legitimate citizenship which has 
negatively positioned them through their apparent pathologised personhood. 
What the hysteresis illuminates in this situation is that the displacement of 
disabled individuals as a result of drastic welfare retrenchment is an 
expression of symbolic power. The onus has been placed on the individual to 
adapt, neglecting that the position of disabled people is the result of 
particular historical exclusionary conditions, embedded within doxa, and in so 
doing morally condemns “those who have already been condemned in reality 
to the fate of economic ‘misfits’” (Bourdieu, 2000a: 28). Rather than 
focussing on the multiple disabling barriers in structures, organisation and 
attitudes, or the lack of suitable jobs, or the very real limitations associated 
with having a long-term impairment or health condition, the victim is blamed 
for their poor position. In depicting welfare claimants as choosing to lead a 
fraudulent lifestyle, political rhetoric has positioned disabled people as 
wilfully unemployed. The rhetorical solution to this is to force them to 
choose the legitimate citizen lifestyle and penalise those who don’t. The 
practical solution is rather more complicated. 
Identifying the experience of hysteresis in disability welfare claimants may 
therefore open up a discussion on the conditions of access to legitimate 
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citizenship and the obstacles faced in their anticipated move into the labour 
market. Many disability welfare claimants live in areas with the poorest job 
opportunities, meaning that unless strong employment opportunities are 
created, processes of activation are relatively ineffective in getting people 
who are workless because of poor health into work (Barnes and Sissons, 
2013). Although social model thinking may have been co-opted within social 
policy and government thinking, it remains external to the collective 
sentiments of doxa. As we saw in Chapter One and Three, disabled peoples’ 
exclusion and negative positioning is historically and pervasively sedimented 
in institutions, organisation, environment and collective dispositions, it is 
situated deep within doxa and the structures it creates. In the eyes of 
potential employers, disabled people face being seen as unproductive, costly 
and risky (Bell and Heitmüller, 2005). Weak market conditions and increased 
competition for scarce jobs alongside the extra barriers that disabled people 
face means that many disabled welfare users are pushed to the “back of the 
jobs queue” (Barnes and Sissons, 2013). 
Other barriers to work include an individual’s skills and qualifications, their 
employment history, caring responsibilities, household situation and income, 
transport options as well as health barriers (Barnes and Sissons, 2013). Health 
barriers remain a highly significant factor so that “recovery or improvement 
of a condition appears the best predictor of moving into work” (Barnes and 
Sissons, 2013: 91). Many of those who have already been found fit for work 
and moved onto Jobseeker’s Allowance are ill-suited to these requirements 
due to the ongoing management of a health condition. Whilst these health 
barriers alone do not necessarily preclude a person from work they often 
combine with other problems and produces multiple disadvantages so that 
interaction between various compounding factors must be recognised (Barnes 
and Sissons, 2013). This is not to mention the kinds of disillusioned and 
despondent dispositions that long-term unemployment and long-term ill 
health may produce. As we saw in Chapter Four, symbolic power works 
through emotional pathways (Reeve, 2006). The perpetuation of negative 
symbolic capitals associated with disability and with welfare fraud may 
transform the habitus of disabled agents in detrimental and limiting ways, 
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producing feelings of shame, embarrassment, anxiety or fear. As Barnes and 
Sissons (2013) report, some disability welfare claimants who had been judged 
fit for work felt powerless to appeal, once again demonstrating the emotional 
costs associated with accessing benefits and the psychosocial ramifications of 
hysteresis as disorientating, disempowering and depoliticising (McNay, 2014). 
Those that are reclassified as fit for work will have to work against the 
asymmetry of status produced by the negative value and deficit thinking 
attached to disability as well as the negative symbolic capital attached to 
illegitimate welfare user. Although there will be those who can critically 
assess this situation for what it is, (disability activists, Disabled People 
Against Cuts, etc), it demonstrates the potential for the experience of 
hysteresis during periods of drastic change to produce feelings of 
disempowerment through the destabilised habitus and may be quite profound 
for more marginalised disabled individuals. 
Importantly, Bourdieu (1990) argued that an individual’s capacity to resist 
and reflexively consider their position was reflective of their relation to 
power.  In this respect, during times of crisis in which the fit between habitus 
and field becomes disrupted, Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) 
conceded that rational choice may take place among individuals who are in a 
position to be rational, i.e. not limited or pressured by financial constraints, 
not faced with the threat of losing benefits or being evicted or relying on 
food banks. However, if we take into consideration the negative positioning 
of disabled people through symbolic power, we soon begin to see that the 
combination of both negative symbolic capitals and hysteresis can make 
resistance inconceivably problematic. As the welfare cuts continue to 
intensify inequalities, symbolically deprive and materially impoverish 
disabled people, suffering may seem inevitable and unavoidable (McNay, 
2014). 
5.6 Conclusion 
Through developing upon Bourdieu’s concept of the hysteresis effect, I have 
demonstrated a way of theorising the mismatches between the habitus and 
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field and their potential to produce more critical and reflexive thinking. 
Contrary to what critics suggest, Bourdieu’s theoretical framework can be 
developed beyond his emphasis on reproduction and can provide a more 
flexible way of theorising the habitus and practice. Building upon the 
affective nature of practice and the experience of disjuncture, I have 
demonstrated how the hysteresis effect may produce feelings of unease 
around disability as a result of the negative symbolic capital attributed to 
disabled bodies and how this tends to reproduce through the symbolic system 
of doxa. As such, experiences of mismatch do not guarantee critical thought 
and may serve to reinforce doxic dispositions. I also showed how ease 
develops through familiarity with disability and how being at home with 
impairment socialises habitus’ to anticipate practice not accounted for within 
doxa. 
The chapter then moved onto discuss how being disabled can often mean that 
you ‘come up against’ doxic space and thought. As such, disabled people may 
be more able to critically question the status quo of doxa as a result of 
reconciling the gap between their own experiences and an understanding of 
the doxic perceptions of disability. This demonstrates that being disabled 
may entail a conciliation of contraries and produce a ‘double consciousness’, 
granting individuals greater reflexivity. However, this increased reflexivity 
may come at a cost through the extra emotional labour that disabled people 
often engage in to manage interactions with non-disabled peers. The 
internalisation of negative meanings associated with disability may produce 
psychosocial harm in the destabilised habitus. 
The chapter concluded with a look at how the current cuts to welfare may 
produce the experience of hysteresis for disability benefit claimants. Here I 
showed that disabled people have historically been perceived as ‘fish out of 
water’ within the labour market and this exclusion has been naturalised 
through the negative symbolic capital attached to disability. However, the 
state has now redefined the disability category and attributed additional 
negative symbolic capital to disabled benefit claimants through the rhetoric 
of fraud and accompanying cuts to welfare. Once again a ‘fish out of water’, 
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the hysteresis in these situations signals the individual experience of the 
asymmetry of symbolic power and raises questions of access to legitimate 
citizenship. Resistance may prove more problematic for disabled people in 
this situation as a result of multiple disadvantages faced, indicating that 
hysteresis can provide a focus on an individual’s displacement of social 
position.
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Conclusion 
This thesis has explored how Bourdieu’s social theory can provide a dynamic 
and complex approach to understanding disability and disability inequality 
with a focus on the precarious positioning of disabled people within the 
context of neo-liberalism. At a time when attitudes towards disability are 
deteriorating, hate crime increasing, and disabled people are being devalued 
through increasingly hostile and acrimonious terms (Scope, 2011; Hughes, 
2015), understanding the perceptions and positioning of disability and the 
power of disabling practices is critical. The composite nature of disability and 
multiple forms of exclusion and inequality associated with it benefits from a 
multipronged approach which acknowledges personal, embodied and 
psychological aspects of disability alongside socio-political and cultural 
conceptualisations. This is by no means complete, however, Bourdieu’s 
approach is one in which the micro and macro aspects of social life are 
brought together through their meso interplay and provides a thorough 
analysis of many aspects of disability. At the same time, I have sought to 
develop some of Bourdieu’s conceptual thinking through incorporating 
considerations from a disability perspective. This is an important contribution 
because there remains a tendency for Bourdieu to be read as overly 
reproductionist and determinist and therefore limited when it comes to 
questions of reflexivity. 
In chapter one, I considered what it means to be disabled within 
contemporary neo-liberalism  highlighting how the political rhetoric behind 
welfare reform has reclassified the disabled benefit claimant as potential 
fraud and called into question their entitlement to citizen status. Historically 
tracing the liberal belief in the individual and the competitive free-market, 
we observed how the liberal doctrine of possessive individualism has 
promoted an idea of the legitimate citizen as homo economicus who requires 
minimal assistance from the state. Those that failed to meet these criterion 
were dismissed as pathologically idle, moral failures and justified a survival 
of the fittest attitude which abandoned the poor and disabled to workhouses 
and ‘less eligibility’ Poor Laws. The advent of the welfare state was premised 
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as demonstrating a change in attitude towards poverty and was optimistically 
considered a means of ending social exclusion through the rights of social 
citizenship (Morris, 1994). However, the reality was quite different for 
disabled people. 
Access to these rights were designed around the white able-bodied male and 
much of the benefits depended upon a previous earning capacity, relegating 
the non-productive disabled as second class citizens with meagre 
entitlements, often housed in institutions. Those with congenital disability, 
learning disablement and mental health issues were consigned to the group of 
Other disabled and classified as unproductive non-workers for whom the 
social rights and opportunities of citizenship were decidedly less apparent. 
Disabled individuals classified as such were often forced to take low-skilled, 
low-paid work with little consideration given to what might constitute a 
meaningful career for them and consequently, reproduced ideas about the 
poor fit of disabled people within the workforce. 
Viewing the security provided by the welfare state as fostering dependency 
and as a hindrance to the competitive, entrepreneurial practices needed of 
citizens, neo-liberal governance has steadily reconfigured the legitimate 
citizen as the responsible and dutiful, free possessive individual who is self-
regulating and unremittingly responsive to the demands of the market (Hall, 
2011, Olssen, 1996). The social contract between disabled people and the 
state is increasingly precarious and uneasy. The implementation of various 
welfare-to-work and workfare strategies alongside social model politics, 
increasing disability rights and anti-discrimination legislation perpetuates the 
idea that employment exists for all those who seek it. 
The incremental changes that have been made to the welfare state over the 
years have functioned as a “symbolic drip-feed” (Bourdieu, 1998: 30), 
distilling a message about the illegitimate citizens that depend on welfare as 
degenerate and pathologised whilst contrasted against the symbolically 
consecrated image of the legitimate worker citizen. The disabled figure 
therefore continues to be dys-entwined in the social contract between citizen 
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and state and has long occupied a position of deficit value, existing as an 
awkward afterthought to mainstream non-disabled conceptualisations of 
citizen practices. 
The second chapter then was largely concerned with articulating some of the 
perceived gaps in both disability studies and Bourdieu’s social theory and 
what they might offer each other.  Although the social model has afforded a 
great deal of political purchase for disabled people through illuminating the 
social barriers to inclusion and has been deeply influential in changing the 
way disability is viewed, it lacks an embodied perspective. I also considered 
some of the arguments from Critical Disability Studies (CDS). Here I 
contended that the CDS endorsement of performative politics to challenge 
ideological constructions and unsettle normative thinking about bodies 
neglected questions of access to this political agency whilst at the same time 
seemed to consider the disruption of discourse as producing the meaningful 
transformation of subjectivities, practices and structures. 
This chapter also dealt with Bourdieu’s concepts of the habitus and the 
centrality of bodies to his social theory, demonstrating how the habitus may 
be used to tell us about the embodied orientations and values attached to 
different social positions. I also highlighted some of Bourdieu’s criticisms as 
overly deterministic and reproductionist, as well as some of his tenuous 
biological analogies and neglect of affect. However, I suggested that these 
may be unduly narrow interpretations of his work and that with a more 
flexible interpretation and application of these concepts, Bourdieu can 
provide composite understandings of disability through the perspective, 
practice and experience of agents as they are socio-politically and historically 
located. Used within disability studies, the habitus  allows us to see how 
material and structural factors come to characterise the social position and 
dispositions of disabled people as well a consideration of the perspective of 
the agent which is deeply embodied and therefore inclusive of the experience 
of impairment. 
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Within Chapter Three I demonstrated that although Bourdieu focussed heavily 
on the social inequality of class, his work on the exclusionary power of 
symbolic distinctions could be extended to include the differentiation and 
evaluation of disabled bodies within wider corporeal ideologies and the doxic 
knowledge against which they are measured. Here I showed how doxic 
knowledge creates, sustains and consecrates the non-disabled body within 
space, organisation, practice and attitudes in taken-for-granted ways, 
demonstrating how disablism is consolidated at structural and individual 
levels. Through showing how the non-disabled body functions as a diffuse 
form of symbolic capital, I also developed Bourdieu’s lesser used conceptual 
adjunct negative symbolic capital to describe how disabled bodies are 
imbued with negative value, the exclusionary nature of this kind of capital 
and how this is felt as a positional sense relation through our embodied 
feeling of fit. 
Although there were normative reasons to reject impairment, irreducible to 
social conditioning, I suggested that it is when these deeply embodied beliefs 
gain commonsensical self-evidence that they may naturalise harmful 
approaches to non-normative bodies. The naturalisation of negative value 
associated with disability therefore serves to further naturalise oppressive 
and unequal relations and obscures the harmful practices done to disabled 
people. While some disabled individuals may feel able to resist the negative 
symbolic capital of disability, I also showed that the power of the symbolic 
system is stacked against individual acts of resistance and that the repeated 
devaluation and invalidation which takes place through doxa act as forms of 
psycho-emotional disablism. Psycho-emotional disablism may therefore be 
thought of as the embodiment of symbolic power, the transfiguration of 
negative symbolic capital into a positional sense relation, showing how doxa 
functions as a psychic mechanism of domination. The chapter also discussed 
how the current welfare rhetoric has manipulated the symbolic categories of 
perception, producing a misrecognition more accurately described as 
allodoxia, or the mistaking of identities as a result of the ambiguity of 
categories. Here I argued that the state has wielded significant symbolic 
power through raising and reproducing poor understandings and ideas about 
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disability alongside the figure of fraud, obscuring the reality of living with 
disability and positioning disabled people as symbolic burden. 
Building upon the psychic experiences of negative symbolic capital, Chapter 
Four developed how we might incorporate affect into theorisations of the 
habitus to produce a more psychosocial (and therefore less mechanistic) 
understanding of dispositions, practice and attitudes. I showed that Bourdieu 
had polarised doxic practice as unconscious and affective/embodied against 
reflexive practice which was conscious, rational and critical. Noting that 
these were reflective of past psychological orthodoxies, the renewed 
theorisation of the habitus as comprised of a preconscious was suggested in 
order to account for how our practice may shift from being unthinking and 
unreflective to more consciously considered. The chapter also showed how 
affect is not opposed to reason and instead forms part of a complex and 
recursive patterning of evaluative cognition which shape our dispositions, 
practices and judgements. 
Developing upon doxa, I discussed how affect characterises our sense of fit 
within social space and how social position, inequality and the exclusionary 
nature of doxic spaces may produce detrimental dispositions within disabled 
peoples’ habitus’, highlighting how the accumulative internalisation of 
oppression may produce disempowered subjectivities, especially in 
marginalised groups of disabled people. I also looked at the role of affect in 
producing anti-welfare sentiment, arguing that the feelings of ressentiment 
that people express are reflective of embodied relations of symbolic power. 
Finally, I considered the role of disgust in producing unequal relations 
between disabled and non-disabled people, suggesting that whilst disgust 
plays an important role in maintaining social distance, we risk overlooking a 
deluge of other embodied dispositions and cognitive evaluations which 
mediate exclusion, specifically,  feelings of unease and awkwardness. 
Chapter Five developed upon this theme of unease through a discussion of 
Bourdieu’s concept of the hysteresis effect. Here I argued that although 
Bourdieu envisaged the hysteresis to relate to the mismatch between the 
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habitus and field in times of crisis, these mismatches may occur far more 
frequently and provide a space in which the status quo may be questioned 
and critically reflected upon. As such, although Bourdieu has previously been 
criticised with having a limited view of the possibilities of reflexive thought, 
these gaps may push us to negotiate, reconcile and conciliate the differences 
in meaning which occur through our varied relations to doxa.  In this chapter I 
showed how people may develop different feelings of ease and unease around 
disabled bodies as well as how being a disabled person who regularly ‘comes 
up against’ the doxa may be able to question its self-evidence but how this 
may also produce a destabilised habitus through the internalisation of 
negative value attributed to them. The chapter concluded with looking at 
how the hysteresis effect might be employed to understand the displaced 
position and ‘fish out of water’ experience of disabled people as a result of 
current cuts to welfare. Although the hysteresis might open up spaces in 
which individuals can critically and reflexively engage, it must be 
remembered that the unequal relations of power which precede and often 
characterise these disjunctures may produce negative psychosocial responses 
within the habitus and make resistance that much harder. 
Contributions to Disability Studies 
I suggest that Bourdieu’s account can contribute to Disability Studies by 
providing a compromise between the materialist and social constructionist 
approaches through an analysis which is simultaneously concerned with 
structure, discourse and embodied lived experiences. Through the habitus, 
Bourdieu enables us to identify the material conditions associated with the 
social position of disabled agents and the impact that this has on their lives 
allowing us to identify the structural inequalities as well as a consideration of 
the perspective of the agent which is deeply embodied and therefore 
inclusive of the experience of impairment. The corporeal nature of the 
habitus demonstrates that the body has significant consequences in every 
aspect of life so that bodies, and impairment, would never be understood as 
separate to practice. 
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This thesis has also contributed to understanding the exclusion of disabled 
people through applying  Bourdieu’s concepts of doxa and negative symbolic 
capital which explain how disablism and negative value are insidiously 
reproduced in structure, organisation, practice and beliefs, demonstrating 
how this mechanism of domination functions at the macro, meso and micro 
levels of society. Through showing how symbolic power works through bodies, 
I have demonstrated that psycho-emotional disablism may be thought of as 
the transfiguration of negative symbolic capital into a positional sense 
relation, showing how doxa functions as a psychic mechanism of domination.  
This framework acknowledges that although responses to and feelings about 
disability may be diverse, Bourdieu’s social theory provides a valuable way of 
understanding how multiple exclusionary social structures shape the lives of 
disabled people. This does not dismiss the heterogeneous experience of 
individuals but locates them within a wider framework of symbolic power. 
Therefore, although not everyone will perceive disability in terms of negative 
symbolic capital, we live in a society which is overwhelmingly organized to 
disadvantage and devalue disabled bodies and practice. In this respect, it 
emphasises the symbolic power of structure and doxic organisation which 
characterizes individual lives rather than the individuals who comprise the 
structure. 
Through my discussion of how disablism is insidiously produced through doxa 
and how normative thought forms part of this doxic knowledge, I have also 
shown that normative thought is not in and of itself harmful or oppressive to 
disabled people, rather, it is when it accumulates with other (negative) doxic 
thought and becomes deeply embodied as self-evident and unreflected upon 
that it may produce harmful responses to disability. In this sense, I have 
shown that it is the mechanism of doxa which facilitates oppressive beliefs, 
rather than normative thinking. 
Contributions to Bourdieu 
Through showing that Bourdieu’s theory works upon a mythic non-impaired 
body, I have highlighted how a consideration of the impaired body in practice 
necessitates a more flexible understanding of the fit between habitus and 
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social space. Additionally, although much of his work alluded to the working 
of affect within the habitus it was something he left undeveloped. As such, I 
have also elaborated upon a psychosocial reworking of the habitus to show 
how practice is affectively characterised and may become understood as less 
mechanistic as well demonstrating that there are more appropriate ways to 
discuss the consciousness associated with habitus and practice. In this 
respect, I have shown how there may be something in between doxic practice 
and reflexive practice. 
I have also developed his concept of negative symbolic capital. While 
Bourdieu discussed the various benefits associated with possessing symbolic 
capital, he spent considerably less time discussing the attribution and 
consequences of negative symbolic capital. This concept might be extended 
to further areas of study (for example with reference to raced, ageing or fat 
bodies). I have also elaborated upon Bourdieu’s concept of the hysteresis 
effect to show the experience of misfit and how the disjunctures between 
habitus and social space may provide the opportunity for us to question the 
status quo and that these are affectively characterised experiences which 
may build upon earlier unsettled feelings. Importantly, I have developed 
these concepts of negative symbolic capital and hysteresis as they relate to 
each other through the system of symbolic power, yielding an approach which 
provides a complex understanding of the position of disability as an 
entwinement of both material and symbolic relations. 
Future Research 
This thesis has been primarily concerned with the perceptions and positioning 
of disability, however, future research in this area should consider how 
disability intersects with other important aspects of our embodiment such as 
race, sexuality and gender and how these may mediate the perceptions, 
positioning and experiences of disability. In this respect, it is important to 
note the symbolic capitals which may negate or compound the negative 
symbolic capitals associated with disability. 
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Future research into the exclusion of disabled people might benefit from an 
approach which considers the combined effects of negative symbolic capitals 
associated with disability and the experience of hysteresis and how they are 
naturalised through the system of symbolic power. Using Bourdieu in the neo-
liberal context allows us to denaturalise and assess the ubiquity of neo-
liberal doxa which favours certain lifestyles, subjectivities and practices and 
produces systems of classification and structures which negatively position 
disability. This is to say that Bourdieu’s approach allows us to question and 
expose the presuppositions of value (the naturalisation of legitimate 
citizenship and practices which reduce life to a set of market values and 
economic relationships) which leads to the multifaceted exclusion of disabled 
people.
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